

JPRS-UPA-90-016
28 MARCH 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

19980123 155

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-016

CONTENTS

28 March 1990

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Baltic Parliamentary Group Objects to Constitutional Oversight [NOORTE HAAL, 23 Dec 89]	1
Estonia's Toome Sees Manipulation on Constitutional Oversight Issue [I. Toome; NOORTE HAAL, 23 Dec 89]	1

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Conference Views Party's Relation to Informal Organizations	3
'Informals' Defined [A. Gorenkov; PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN No 2, Jan 90]	3
Status of European USSR Informal Groups [A. Gorenkov; PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN No 3, Feb 90] ..	7
Correspondents Discuss Republic Elections [SOYUZ No 9, 26 Feb-4 Mar 90]	11
Moscow March of Democratic Forces Recalled [S. Kredov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 6 Feb 90]	14
Leningrad Political, Economic Woes Noted [V.G. Ivanov; LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 Jan 90] ..	15
Armenian Gosplan Chairman on Republic's Draft Economic Independence Plan [M. Mkrtchyan; KOMMUNIST, 2 Feb 90]	18
Armenian Government Details Economic Aspects of Refugee Resettlement [KOMMUNIST, 7 Feb 90]	19
Estonian Democratic Party Goals Described [O. Gogin; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 6 Feb 90]	21
Estonian Draft Law on Political Parties [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 31 Jan 90]	22
Estonian Union of Labor Collectives Election Platform [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 1 Feb 90]	24
Estonian United Council of Labor Collectives Election Platform [SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 1 Feb 90]	25
Rival Estonian Labor Groups On Independence Declaration [V. Ivanov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 4 Feb 90]	28
Georgian Election Boycott Plans Criticized [D. Usupashvili; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 25 Jan 90]	30
Georgia's Development of Black Sea Area to Aid Economic Independence [B.D. Gulua; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 17 Feb 90]	32
Speeches as January Georgian Central Committee Plenum [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 13 Feb 90]	34
Georgian Komsomol to Debate Future Status [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 11 Feb 90]	42
Masaliyev Delivers Kirghiz Buro Report on Nationalities Policy [SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 14 Jan 90]	43
Latvian Local Election Preliminary Statistics [A. Sheynin; SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 10 Feb 90]	53
Uzbek Election Commission Finds Campaign Flaws [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 13 Jan 90]	54
Uzbek Supreme Soviet Views Election Campaign Faults, Crime Rate Growth [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 24 Jan 90]	55
Draft Charter of Uzbek Youth Organizations Committee [KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 31 Jan 90]	55

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Military Academy Teacher Sees Positive Role for Informal Groups [S.N. Yushenkov; SOYUZ No 7, 12-18 Feb 90]	59
Armenian Officials Blast TASS, Central TV Statements on Caucasus Crisis	62
TASS Statements Scored [KOMMUNIST, 24 Jan 90]	62
Appeal to USSR Procurator [KOMMUNIST, 24 Jan 90]	63
Armenian-Kurdish Tension Allegations Refuted [T. Afo; KOMMUNIST, 24 Jan 90]	64
Supreme Soviet Deputy Witnessed Baku Events, Evaluates Role of Army [O. Suleymenov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 24 Feb 90]	66
On Relations Between Baku Residents, Soldiers [S. Turchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Feb 90]	69
Problems Encountered by Troops in Baku [A. Krayniy; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 7 Feb 90]	71
New Estonian SSR Minister To Coordinate Non-Estonian Affairs [E. Cherevashko; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 26 Jan 90]	74

Gumbaridze Meets People's Front, Media [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 13 Jan 90]	75
Moldavian Peasant Union Formed [SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 23 Jan 90]	76
Ukrainian CP Secretary Comments on Chernigov Incident [L.M. Kravchuk; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 12 Jan 90]	77
Ukrainian Official Discusses Nationalities Commission [Yu. Yelchenko; SOYUZ No 5, 29 Jan-4 Feb 90]	80
Statistics for Recent Fergana Oblast Migration Trends	83

LAW AND ORDER

Public Prosecutor Holds Collegium Session on Gdlyan Affair [S. Kosterin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 10 Feb 90]	84
Alleged Abuses by Gdlyan Investigators Reported [V.A. Yarin; IZVESTIYA, 9 Feb 90]	86
Juridical Specialist on Crime, Co-op Activity [G.F. Khokhryakov; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 Feb 90]	93
Georgian MVD Evaluates 1989 Performance [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 15 Feb 90]	95
Latvian MVD Official on Foreign Travel, Emigration Regulations [A. Baltatsis; SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 15 Feb 90]	96
Kharkov Corruption Investigation Described [A. Kleva; IZVESTIYA, 3 Feb 90]	98

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Armenian Newspaper Scores TASS Reportage of 28 Jan Yerevan Events [KOMMUNIST, 6 Feb 90]	100
Armenian Writer Condemns Central Press Coverage of Caucasus Crisis [Z. Balayan; KOMMUNIST, 7 Feb 90]	101
Latvian CP Plans Changes in Structure, Output of Official Publications [SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 5 Jan 90]	102
Supreme Soviet Member Lunev Comments on Draft Press Law [V.A. Lunev; MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 Jan 90]	103

Baltic Parliamentary Group Objects to Constitutional Oversight

18150129A Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian
23 Dec 89 p 1

["Statement of the Baltic Parliamentary Group"]

[Text] We, the USSR people's deputies of the Baltic Parliamentary Group, deem it our duty to once more express our attitude toward the formation of a USSR constitutional oversight committee, and hence also toward the USSR constitutional oversight law.

Both the law and the committee would curb the essential sovereign rights of the republics, and give institutions outside of the republic the right to annul their laws, including any provisions that are part of the constitution of the republic.

We are not authorized to relinquish this kind of state independence of the republics, and neither are the deputies from other republics authorized to take it away from us. We are convinced that passing resolutions about the law and the committee is possible only by following the principle of consensus, but a mechanism for discussing such issues and passing such resolutions has not been worked out yet. The draft for the constitutional oversight law has not even been presented, neither has it been discussed in the chambers of the Supreme Soviet, which indicates that there is a deliberate attempt to push it through fast.

In the present situation, where all-Union legislation is undergoing radical reform, and where all-Union constitutional reforms are lagging behind constitutional reforms in the republics, constitutional oversight measures would serve a reactionary purpose against reform. As long as we do not have a fully developed USSR constitution of the reform era, this could be applied against any economic measure or resolution already passed in any of the republics.

We want to call the attention of the congress to the fact that incorporation of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs into the Soviet Union has not been sanctioned by international law, putting constitutional oversight and the supremacy requirement of Soviet law in conflict with the principle of self-determination of these nations.

For reasons stated above, we propose to the congress that discussion of the proposed legislation be terminated, and elections for the committee be postponed until such time when all constitutional and legal prerequisites are met. For the time being, since these prerequisites have not been met, we will not participate in the discussion or voting on these issues; consequently we will also deny the legality of any resolution regarding the law or the committee that may be passed by the congress without a due consensus.

Estonia's Toome Sees Manipulation on Constitutional Oversight Issue

18150128A Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian
23 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by Toomas Sildam "Tough Days for Baltic Deputies in Moscow" (Part 3: Interview with Indrek Toome)]

[Text] Between the sessions of the congress, Estonian prime minister **INDREK TOOME** gave an interview to NH:

"I don't understand why these documents will have to be approved in such a hurry. Or, rather, I do understand—this is necessary for the vast majority of Union deputies in the auditorium, and possibly also for some people outside the auditorium. There is an attempt to prove that we have decided to hold on to the federation, at any price. But the COC [Constitutional Oversight Committee] and the COL [Constitutional Oversight Law] can hardly be expected to accomplish this any more effectively than the present structures and efforts of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, which have drawn attention to, and made attempts to amend our legislation. This is a serious case of self-deception."

Indrek Toome said that everything concerning the federation will have to be approved with a maximum degree of consensus. Right now, however, there is a situation in the Kremlin where every fifth republic has announced its opposition. In Toome's opinion the presidium of the congress is assigning the order of speakers deliberately, something that is tantamount to manipulating the congress. Several Estonian deputies have requested their turn to speak, but only Yarovoy and Kogan were called on.

"Their presentations contained much that couldn't be called anything but libel. All of this contributes to mounting tensions between the republic and the Center."

Speaking of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, Mr Toome thought that the mood there is swinging clearly right of the center again, since there is no reason to think that any change would have occurred over the past day or two. Undoubtedly, things could get particularly complicated for Lithuanians, in fact, for all of those representing the democratic cause.

Indrek Toome cannot speculate why Gorbachev has veered so much to the right of the center. For purposes of big politics, he should be presenting himself as being a lot more dialectical: there are reasons why he should support efforts that may seem conservative to us, and there are also reasons why he should support the democratic efforts of the other side.

"The latter, however, is not in evidence. And that is sad. It is also hard to tell whether this stems from a certain confusion, or from the difficult situation that we find ourselves in?" Indrek Toome recalled the recent summit

meeting on Malta and the current U.S. military action in Panama. Obviously, the question could be asked, and rightly so, if all of this had been agreed to beforehand. Or Romania, about which nothing was said by the Soviet leadership for several days. Plus all that's happening in Lithuania.

In Indrek Toome's estimation, the warning published in PRAVDA regarding the Lithuanian Communist Party showed a certain nervousness on the part of the first man of the state.

It was also seen when that same first man Mikhail Gorbachev made a concession to the Baltic deputies yesterday afternoon, when he announced that the Constitutional Oversight Law bill is going back to the commission for revisions (for the second time!). The resolution about establishing supervision over the constitutions and laws of individual republics has been rescinded. And even though words of high hope were heard from the podium about support from all quarters for this compromise, a number of Baltic deputies had left their chairs in protest.

Conference Views Party's Relation to Informal Organizations

'Informals' Defined

90UN1035A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 9 Jan 90)
pp 31-36

[Article by A. Gorenkov, Novosibirsk: "Communists and Spontaneous Movements"]

[Text] On 3-4 December 1989, on the basis of a CPSU Central Committee decision, a zonal seminar-conference was held in Novosibirsk. The seminar-conference for workers at republic Communist Party central committees, and party kraykoms, obkoms, and okruzhkoms dealt with problems of the interrelationships between the party committees and spontaneous public organizations. Approximately 100 ideological workers from party organizations in the Urals, Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia took part in it.

Reports were given by V. Mukha, first secretary of the CPSU Novosibirsk Obkom; and A. Zhuchkov, secretary for ideology. The participants shared their experience in working with the "informals." They also took part in the work of the city discussion club and visited the Sovetskiy Raykom in Novosibirsk, where they exchanged opinions with secretaries of party organizations at the scientific center of the Siberian Branch of USSR Academy of Sciences with regard to the problems of their interaction with spontaneous formations. Those questions were broadly discussed at a roundtable discussion at the party's Novosibirsk Obkom that was conducted by V. Yegorov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's Ideological Department.

Exactly Who Are 'Informals'?

That question and the attempts to provide these organizations with definitions on the basis of an analysis of the sociopolitical events in their region were heard from the seminar rostrum in practically every statement made by the participants. The conclusion that can be considered unambiguous is: public spontaneous associations, or "informals," as they have been christened by the mass media, are the product of the democratization of Soviet society. The process of their appearance and their actions themselves were considered in the course of the discussion as one of the methods that sprang up "from below" to allow Soviet citizens—Communists and non-party members—to overcome their alienation from real political activity and the depersonalization and limitation of the existing official structures in the spiritual, socioeconomic, and political life of society.

It was emphasized that the ideological and social palette of the informal associations is becoming increasingly complicated and that such organizations already represent a real social force and their influence upon people's frame of mind is growing. For example, Sverdlovsk Oblast currently has more than 3000 spontaneous public

associations and clubs, with more than 120,000 persons taking part in their work. There are approximately 250 of such associations in Maritime Kray. In Chelyabinsk Oblast there are 30 politicalized organizations with 1000 activists. In Novosibirsk there are more than 100, of which approximately 20 have a clearly expressed politicalized nature.

The seminar participants noted that the organizations that should and can become the integrating force that unites and consolidates everything constructive that exists in the movements of informal organizations, the force that channels the common efforts to the single goal—the renewal of society on the base of socialist values—and also rebuffs various destructive elements are the party organizations of the labor collectives, krays, and oblasts in the region. Political work here must be conducted in the most concrete manner possible, with a consideration of the peculiarities of each public movement or organization. In this regard the conference participants placed a rather large amount of importance on their classification.

The participants divided the entire spectrum of spontaneous associations into basically three groups: behavioral (for example, rockers); cultural-recreational; and sociopolitical, or philosophical. It was the last-mentioned group to which, with complete justification, the chief attention was paid during the discussion of the problem.

When they were being described by V. Berezovskiy, associate of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of USSR History, the speaker presented two models that were recognized by most of those present in the auditorium. According to method of organization: people's fronts and democratic movements, united fronts of workers striving to seize the system of state and political power; "parties" that have not yet been legally recognized, but which actually are already functioning in many regions of the country; clubs (for example, voter clubs), seminars, and groups—the classic form of informal movements; territorial committees of social self-government and the structure of *samizdat*—the "independent" press, and information bulletins, on the basis of which independent organizations also form.

According to their trends, the speaker subdivided the spontaneous movements into: patriotic, perestroika-support, ecological, student, Communist-reformer, workers' or independent trade-union, and religious-political.

In the region, as most of the seminar participants emphasized, there has been an active politicalization of the informal associations, among which there have appeared in the past year or two, especially since the spring of 1989, the time of the election of USSR people's deputies, organizations that are attempting to develop their own sociopolitical platforms for perestroika and their own concepts of the renewal of socialism, which organizations publish their own printed publications and typed

or other periodicals. Certain formations have become increasingly frank in preaching nationalistic views and separatist ideas, have been aligning themselves with reactionary circles in the religious environment, speaking out in favor of a nonsocialist path in the development of our society, and demonstrating under the slogans of eliminating the CPSU from political leadership.

Representatives of the party organizations of RSFSR oblasts and krays pointed to the direct influence exerted upon most of the informal politicalized associations by the interregional group of USSR people's deputies. Its ideas and concepts are used as the basis for forming the "informals'" slogans, appeals, and demands, which frequently are of a destructive, or even frankly separatist, nature. For example, a document with the title "Decree on Power," that was prepared by that group, was used to prepare the constitution of the so-called Far Eastern Republic, with the presentation of demands for the creation of the independent Urals and Siberian oblasts. The appeals to have the Soviet Armed Forces withdrawn from the Far East are based on the same slogans. One has observed an intensified search for channels of reciprocal support with various groups both for the purpose of guaranteeing the increase in the influence in the country as a whole, and in the period preceding an election campaign. Many members of the interregional group have established contact with politicalized spontaneous movements, rendering support to them in agitation and propaganda work and "test-driving" their ideas through them.

On the whole the tie between the "center" and the "outlying areas" in the activity of the spontaneous associations and in their management can be discerned with increasing clarity. One can observe the introduction of order into their structures and the creation of local departments and branches of nationwide or regional associations. A telling fact in this regard was the creation, at a meeting in Chelyabinsk, of the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations (MADO), the program documents of which were also developed by representatives of the interregional group of deputies. From Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltic republics the "informals" in the Asian part of the country are promptly supplied with *samizdat* printed works, including tendentious political reports. Periodically the region is visited by emissaries from various fronts, the "Democratic Union," the "Democratic Movement," "Pamyat," and other of the most politicalized organizations that are gravitating toward political structures or already creating them.

The seminar participants threw light on instances of the destructive influence exerted by the nationalistic elements on the work of the "informals." In particular, Sh. Bikkulov, deputy chief of the Ideological Department of CPSU Bashkir Obkom, discussed the activities of the Tatar Public Center (TOTs) and its negative role among the informal organizations in the region along the Volga, and hindrances in the establishment of their constructive

interaction with party and soviet agencies. In a republic where more than 70 nationalities are represented, 3000 organizations mostly national-cultural ones—are functioning, with the participation of approximately 120,000 citizens; this position taken by TOTs is objectively causing tension.

A. Kuchkarov, director of the Interrepublic Branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, AON [Academy of Social Sciences], under CPSU Central Committee, in Tashkent, mentioned the influence that the Islamic fundamentalists exerted on the events in Fergana Valley in the summer of 1989. He expressed his conviction that they interacted with individual informal organizations and wheeler-dealers in the illicit economy of Uzbekistan and of Central Asia in general. Fertile soil for the activities of the Islamic fundamentalists is created by the very serious socioeconomic living conditions for the region's population, the speaker emphasized. It was precisely those conditions that led to the appearance of many informal movements, the leadership of which is actually carried out by religious figures.

At the same time, numerous examples were also given of the construction work performed by individual—basically ecological and national-patriotic—groups and clubs to improve the situation in the oblasts and krays. For example, with the participation of the Rodina [Motherland] patriotic organization the Arkaim archeological monument in the south of Chelyabinsk Oblast, a monument of world importance, was saved from inundation. A positive result was produced by the work performed jointly with the spontaneous organizations of Novosibirsk in working out the problems of constructing the Katunskaya GES [hydroelectric power plant].

The opinion of the discussion participants was summarized in that, although in the eastern regions of the country the political nature of the spontaneous movements and organizations is not expressed on such a broad scale as, for example, in Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic republics, or in the European part of the country in general, those movements and organizations, using for propaganda purposes the socioeconomic difficulties of the transitional period, have been intensifying with every passing day their political influence upon the development of events in the region, which events have a tendency toward a more powerful kind of countereffect to everything happening in the center.

Criteria for Dialogue and Interaction

An analysis of the practice of the interrelationships that the party organizations and their agencies have had with the spontaneous associations during recent years, which analysis was presented in the course of the seminar, demonstrated the broad range of their contacts. As many speakers emphasized, these interrelationships have gone through a number of stages: from the complete nonacceptance of the "informals" (when the participants in those movements—Communists—were subjected to direct organizational pressure on the part of the party

agencies and some of them were even expelled from the party) to a serious analysis of their actions and to constructive cooperation within the confines of dialogue and discussions.

The shortage of experience in the political analysis of the situation, and of knowledge of the laws of social life, as well as the adherence to old work methods based on administrative fiat, sometimes led to the underestimating of the importance or prospects of the spontaneous movement, and to the opposing of it by means of bans, demands to the center that it "restore order," etc. On the other hand, it led to a condescending attitude, to the poorly thought-out playing up to, but actually playing into the hands of, the quasi-radical statements of individual leaders of the "informals." These approaches limited the opportunities for expanding the social base of perestroika, contradicted the Leninist understanding of the living creativity of the masses as the basic factor in creating a new society, and, at the same time, disarmed and disoriented the Communists in those situations when it was necessary to repel those who were actually ideological opponents.

In this regard those who spoke cited a large number of examples of the complicated, at times painful, but extremely necessary reconsideration of the approach to the informal associations. In the Kuzbass, for example, as L. Plotnikova reported, the deputy head of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Kemerovo Obkom at first, guided by the decree issued by the bureau of the party's obkom, ignored the strikers, and even began applying sanctions against the Communists who were participating in the strikes, but, after analyzing the situation, they began to work with the strike committees to prepare a list of miners' demands, and currently are interacting with their successors—workers' committees—having created joint groups for monitoring the implementation of Decree No. 608 of USSR Council of Ministers in eleven coal-mining cities and settlements. The plenum of the party's oblast committee supported the Workers' Union that had been created in November 1989, as a spontaneous organization attempting, jointly with the party, to achieve the complete power of the people and to guarantee workers' rights and the principles of social justice.

In practically all oblast centers and major industrial centers in the eastern part of the country, public discussion clubs have begun operating on the base of political enlightenment houses. Such a club also exists in Novosibirsk. It operates under the patronage of the party's gorkom, and its Council includes activists from many of the city's spontaneous organizations. Here, in the presence of the seminar participants, the Communists and the "informals" heatedly discussed the topic "CPSU and Modern Society," and questions pertaining to the interaction between the party and the state, the multiparty system, and the place and role of the party apparatus in the political processes.

In many oblast committees, and also in certain party gorkoms and raykoms, special problem-oriented groups and sectors have been created. The members of these groups and sectors include associates of various departments of party committees who engage in the analysis of the spontaneous associations, their platforms, their political slogans, and their practical actions. M. Makhshulov, leader of lecturers at the Tajik CP Central Committee, shared the work experience of a group under the revealing name Kontakt [Contact], which includes all the members and candidate members of the Central Committee bureau. The basis of its work is the conducting of monthly meetings with the "informals" and the public of the city of Dushanbe, and discussions concerning questions that have come to a head, the materials concerning which are then broadcast over television and published in the press.

The seminar participants emphasized that, in addition to public discussions at rallies, at roundtables, in voter clubs, etc., an extremely effective measure is the establishment of personal contacts between the party workers and the leaders of the "informals," the involvement of them in the practical resolution of the vitally important problems in the city and region, in the process of which one can discern the constructive or destructive essence of each movement and can establish effective contacts among all the sides having a self-interest in renewing our socialist society. Such meetings, for example, were held recently with practically all the "informal" leaders in the city at the CPSU Novosibirsk Obkom. Similar experience exists at the Kazakhstan CP Tselinograd Obkom, according to V. Menyayev, a consultant in its Ideological Department and a participant of two spontaneous movements. He expressed the idea of the effectiveness of involving in the political struggle against the extremists in certain spontaneous movements the "informals" themselves, but those that stand on a platform of perestroika and on socialist positions.

In addition, special importance at the seminar was attached to the forms and methods of individual work with the participants of the informal organizations and of having the labor collectives exert an influence on them.

A report that aroused the self-interestedness of the audience was the report given by A. Shopina, deputy chief of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Khabarovsk Kraykom, concerning cooperation with the representatives of spontaneous politicalized organizations in preparing the platform for the kray's party organization that it will take to the election to the local soviets. In development of this cooperation, a joint public council to prepare for the election has been created and is functioning, and joint statements over the radio and television by party workers and "informals" are becoming traditional. This is the way, for example, that the live Puls [Pulse] permanent television program operates. The interest in this experience gained by the people of Maritime Kray on the part of the seminar participants was determined first of all by the fact that the question of

preparing for the election had objectively taken the center of the discussion of the ways to interact with the spontaneous organizations.

Election: Diversity of Platforms or Confrontation?

Unfortunately, the previously given example of fruitful cooperation is one of only a few with regard to the preparation of the election of party organizations in a vast region of the country. Most of the informal associations and groups in its administrative centers, as was stated at the seminar, do not conceal their intentions to take an active and antiparty part in the campaign to elect people to the republic-level and local agencies of power. Many of the spontaneous organizations, in the course of the election of USSR people's deputies, obtained definite political experience and tested their forms and methods of agitation-and-propaganda work. An analysis of the programs, platforms, and statements made by leaders of the politicalized organizations enabled the conference to make definite conclusions both concerning their goals, and the tactical methods to be used in the forthcoming struggle.

For example, in the speech made by V. Shevtsov, instructor at the Ideological Department of the CPSU Omsk Obkom, the speaker gave a detailed analysis of the election platform of the oblast's leading politicalized organization—the United People's Front (ONF), which platform is represented in a number of the front's resolutions, including a resolution presenting the platform for the election, a resolution concerning the attitude toward the CPSU, a resolution on work in the countryside ("Wake up, countryside!"), and others.

The purpose of the election campaign of this organization, as well as many others that the speakers mentioned, is to make deputies to agencies of authority at various levels their own candidates with the purpose of forming in the republic-level and local soviets deputy factions that are independent from the party and that have an oppositional attitude toward it. At such time the persons who are nominated as candidates will be not only members of informal organizations, but also those potential deputies, even CPSU members, who are close in their views and convictions to the "informals." Their nomination is planned after the registration at the election commissions of other candidates, for example, from the party or another "official" organization, as an alternate. At such time both the ONF and the other informal groups, by currently working intensively to gather all kinds of "negative information" on their potential opponents, will make their emphasis on confrontation, or, rather, on discrediting their competitors in the eyes of the voters.

They plan to carry out the key agitational measures in the labor collectives and at people's place of residence: over the telephone, by means of small-sized agitation groups with megaphones in the streets, by the timely dissemination of leaflets, and also by supporting one another (after registration) in the mass media, having

achieved the right granted to each candidate to have a definite amount of time on the air and to make statements in the press. In Omsk the ONF has taken on as objectives of agitation military units, hospitals, and senior-citizen homes. The basic slogans under which it is planned to have the front and most of the informal politicalized organizations carry out their demonstrations are aimed at crowding out of the soviets the representatives of the party agencies. At such time the leaders, for tactical reasons, speak out in favor of combining the jobs of party committee first secretaries and representatives of the appropriate soviets, hoping to use the wave of the population's dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation to knock down the candidacies of the party managers.

Many leaders of the "informals" link the reinforcement of their positions in the election campaign with the creation of so-called public control of the elections and of the work performed by the election commissions, which, naturally, will enable them to exert definite pressure on them.

The representatives of the region's party committees also noted the reinforcement of the ties that the spontaneous associations have with cooperatives, wheeler-dealers in the illicit economy, and foreign sovietological centers, radio stations, and publishing houses, especially in the matter of financing the production of printed works and disseminating them. On the other hand, the members of cooperatives take advantage of the complete support provided by the informal organizations in conflicts with agencies of the Soviet authority, when defending their own financial interests.

Act Aggressively, Do Not Lag Behind Events

Speaking at the seminar, G. Trandin, instructor at the CPSU Yakutsk Obkom, expressed what was probably the opinion of most of its participants when he said that the party committees, and the party as a whole, having begun the democratization process and have emphasized the importance of the spontaneous public organizations in perestroika, were not read for that sharp politicalization of the masses that was noted on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and in the course of the election of the USSR people's deputies. Making conclusions from this unpleasant, but, unfortunately, unambiguous fact, many of the region's ideological workers made a number of recommendations to reinforce the party influence on the spontaneous movements.

The chief recommendations include the putting of all the appropriate work by the party organizations on a solid scientific basis. It is necessary to involve in the objective and thorough study of the programs and platforms of various informal associations specialists in the social sciences: historians, political scientists, philosophers, economists, ecologists. Both in the center and in the outlying areas, in the opinion of the seminar participants, it is necessary to create as rapidly as possible the appropriate data banks containing the largest possible

number of documents issued by the spontaneous organizations—programs, appeals, and leaflets—with their scientific analysis and the practical recommendations of the specialists in political science.

It is necessary to establish efficient exchange of information among the regions, and especially with the center, where the administrative agencies and publishing bases of the spontaneous associations are concentrated and their constant analysis is carried out. The recommendation was made to publish a special informational bulletin with the programs of all the politicalized structures of the public movements and their analysis.

In addition to the justifiably critical comments with regard to the "sluggishness" with which the central party agencies provide information to the outlying areas, the seminar participants also expressed the naive hope that there might be some kind of general-purpose methodological elaborations and instructions "for working with the informals." Appeals to "provide concrete written recommendations," "to develop rigid criteria," "to say who is who among them, and who a person will be in a year or two," etc., attest both to the existence of a "dependent's mentality" in the outlying areas, and to a definite amount of confusion among the cadres.

But on the whole an efficient, constructive approach to resolving the problems of cooperating with the informal associations was demonstrated. Organizationally it was recommended, for example, to reorganize the work of the political enlightenment houses and the Marxism-Leninism universities, to allow the "informals" to go there, and then to wage polemics with them there. It would be desirable to promote the creation of various clubs, to organize their activities on the basis of cost accountability, and to involve the "informals" in specific work in the region—work to protect the ecology, restoration work, etc. In the area of political ideology, it is planned to intensify the influence exerted on them by way of the public organizations, labor collectives, soviet agencies, and the Communists participating in the spontaneous movements, but with the definite proviso that thorough retraining be provided for the party and Komsomol cadres to enable them to work professionally and knowledgeably in nonstandard situations.

An opinion that was heard as a constant refrain was the opinion concerning the need for the outstripping action of the party agencies—the need for them not to lag behind the events, but to anticipate their development, by proceeding from a scientific analysis of the social processes. S. Trofimov, lecturer at the CPSU Buryat Obkom, expressed the idea that the logic of the political development of our society quite possibly will lead in the foreseeable future to the rebirth of the spontaneous politicalized movements and associations into political parties, a process that is already being observed in a number of regions throughout the country. And our work, the position taken by all Communists, will determine what those parties will become—ally parties or opposition parties. That realistic approach found the

general support of the participants of the seminar-conference that was organized for the first time to deal with such a timely political problem.

The discussion of the ways in which the party organizations can interact with the spontaneous public movements was not limited to the meeting in Novosibirsk. It was later continued at a seminar-conference of the ideological workers of republic-level and oblast party agencies in the European part of the country, which was held on 17-19 December in Vitebsk. In a future issue of this magazine our correspondent will give complete details about that discussion.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Partiynaya zhizn", 1990.

Status of European USSR Informal Groups

90UN1035B Moscow PARTIYANAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 3, Feb 90 (signed to press 23 Jan 90)
pp 29-33

[Article by A. Gorenkov, Vitebsk: "Party Organizations and Spontaneous Movements"]

[Text] As we already reported (see No 2, 1990), in December 1989 Vitebsk was the scene of the second (the first having been in Novosibirsk) zonal conference-seminar of ideological workers of oblast and republic-level party organizations in the European part of USSR and the trans-Caucasus to deal with questions of working with spontaneous public organizations.

Judged according to the fever pitch and the real results, the sociopolitical life of the European part of USSR has noticeably outstripped Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia. The mass nature of the spontaneous movements, their clearly expressed political—and, for many of them, also nationalistic—coloration, the existence of nationwide centers in Moscow and Leningrad, the real situation of multiple parties and "dual power" in the Baltic republics and the trans-Caucasus, as well as the armed conflicts that are still occurring there—all this found its reflection in the nature of the discussion, in which more than 200 party workers took part.

I. Naumchik, secretary of the Belorussian CP Vitebsk Obkom, who gave the basic report, commented on the socioeconomic reasons for the present-day political situation. He emphasized that that situation has an obvious tendency toward aggravation even in such an apparently economically favorable oblast as Vitebsk Oblast. The planned assignments in industry are constantly overfulfilled there, new management methods are being successfully introduced, and the programs for the additional production of consumer goods, housing construction, the development of public health, etc. are being implemented. The agroindustrial complex, for example, produces 124 kilograms of meat and 840 kilograms of dairy products per oblast resident.

However, the economic reform is still being carried out slowly. There has been a worsening of the disproportions

in providing production with raw materials, and between the increase in wages and labor productivity. There has been no cardinal improvement in the quality of output, and the situation in monetary circulation has become more complicated. All this has had a detrimental effect upon people's moods. There has been an increase in people's critical attitude toward the course of perestroika and toward the work style of the party, soviet, and public organizations.

The announced goals and tasks of perestroika engendered in the population large hopes of a change for the better, which hopes have not yet been justified, since there have been no positive shifts, whereas negative changes have become for many people an everyday reality, giving rise in a considerable segment of the population to disappointment and dissatisfaction, irritation, and sometimes also to protest. And, as a result, as compared with the data provided by sociological surveys conducted in Vitebsk Oblast two years ago, the feelings of hope and the expectation of favorable changes which were widespread at that time have substantially diminished during the time that has passed—by one-half to three-fifths. Unease and disappointment have increased in the same proportion—by a factor of 2 to 2.5.

Such moods (which are incomparably more noticeable in other regions of the country) could not fail to have an effect, on the one hand, on the decrease in the authority of the "official" agencies, primarily the party and soviet agencies, and, on the other hand, on the increase in the influence exerted by the informal organizations and the reinforcing of their social base. For example, in Moscow alone there are hundreds of groups and organizations of "informals," nine-tenths of which have republic or nationwide status. The Ukraine has approximately 10,000 spontaneous organizations. In the Baltic republics, where from 10 to 15 organizations that have declared themselves to be republic parties are already functioning, practically the entire adult population has joined public spontaneous movements. In Latvia, for example, 2400 persons out of each 10,000 are participating actively in the politicalized organizations alone.

The opposition of many politicalized public movements to the CPSU, which was mentioned with alarm two months ago by the participants of the conference in Novosibirsk, has intensified. In the trans-Caucasus, the Azerbaijan People's Front (NFA) and the Armenian Nationwide Movement (AOD) are actually carrying out duties of authority on the entire territory of the republics. According to V. Solodov, sector chief in the Ideological Department of the Latvian CP Central Committee, the People's Front bloc possesses decisive influence not only in the republic, but also upon its party organization. In his words, after the convincing victory that the Latvian People's Front had at the election to the local agencies of power, the republic's party organization has been conducting a discussion to prepare for work under conditions of political opposition. According to a report given by R. Tomla, associate at Tartu University,

the Estonian People's Front, in a bloc with the "Green" party, has also received the majority in the local agencies of power.

What, then, are the basic reasons that the speakers gave for the defeat suffered by representatives of the Communist Party at the elections in Latvia and Estonia?

In addition to the worsening of the situation in the consumer market, the dissatisfaction felt by the population as a result of the slow rates of democratization of sociopolitical life and economic reform, and the assertion of the republics' sovereignty, those reasons include, primarily, the total antiparty propaganda waged by the mass media, both the "independent" ones and certain state ones.

In this regard, complaints were leveled against the center, in particular, for having insufficiently provided the Latvian CP Central Committee with paper, document-duplicating equipment, etc. At the same time it was admitted that the well-known party-opposition newspaper ATMODA used to be type-set at the publishing house of the Latvian CP Central Committee. The reason that each of the 30 associates at the publishing house who work to produce that newspaper used to receive from it every month 400 rubles in addition to their salary. It is also well known that, since a journalist at ATMODA was paid 270 rubles, and a journalist at the organ of the party's Central Committee was paid 180 rubles, the "best" cadres proved to be located where the pay was better.

In general the material aspect of the preparation for the election of forces oppositional to the party—and most of the national politicalized organizations in the republics unambiguously occupied those positions, after discarding phrases about the supporting of perestroika—was viewed rather carefully at the conference. For example, Ye. Andryushchenko, CPSU Central Committee lecturer, cited an example of a pre-election four-day seminar for candidate deputies from opposition parties and organizations in Tartu, where they heard statements made by seven political consultants from the U.S. Research Foundation, who were paid in hard currency. A similar seminar was held with the support of representatives of the interregional group of USSR deputies, with the inviting of foreign political specialists, in Kaunas.

Having permanent currency proceeds from abroad—and certain organizations in the Baltic republics that have declared themselves to be parties (for example, the Estonian Christian-Democratic Union [KhDS], which is a member of the KhDS International) have indeed established solid ties with the appropriate foreign centers—they have at their disposal the most advanced computerized document-copying and printing base.

The speakers also spoke bitterly about the tactical miscalculations made by the party agencies a year or two ago. Carrying out the instructions of the party leadership in the republics, they did everything to support the newly

created spontaneous movements, practically all the fronts, and especially the people's fronts, without attaching the proper importance to those negative tendencies to which their leaders were already gravitating at that time. And now they have taken frankly antiparty, if not antisocialist, positions. The euphoria of pluralism has deprived many Communists of their sociopolitical orientation, ideological firmness, and conviction.

Self-critically evaluating the errors of the republic party organizations in the Baltic republic in the pre-election struggle, the speakers preserved a realistic picture of the placement of the political forces in Latvia and Estonia: the party is losing political power, the formation of new agencies of power is in progress, but the forces heading that process are the "informal" people's front in a bloc with the other political forces. Nevertheless, despite all the realism of this analysis, evaluations which, in our view, have proven to be cast overboard are the evaluations of the nationalistic, separatist nature of the sociopolitical processes in the region. It would seem that this is what prompted the basic conclusion in V. Solodov's statement—if we had had in Latvia the status of an independent Communist Party, all the questions would have been resolved. The majority did not agree with that conclusion.

It should be noted that the somewhat defeatist moods of the representatives of the Baltic republics did not determine the atmosphere or nature of the seminar-conference as a whole. Yes, many of those who spoke there said, it is necessary to take into consideration the experience of our Baltic comrades, to proceed from the real aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in many regions of the European part of the country and the trans-Caucasus, and to see the negative manifestations on nationalistic grounds.

For example, I. Zaretskiy, consultant at the Department of State Law, Moldavian CP Central Committee, remarked that the Moldavian People's Front (NFM) in its documents replaces the idea of the republic's sovereignty by the sovereign rights of the Moldavian nation; reduces the questions of federation to the problem of confederation; and makes territorial claims on the Ukraine. The NFM is approaching the election under the slogan of transferring precisely to it—and to no one else—the entirety of power. The republic's party organization under these conditions is preparing for a political power struggle.

A complicated situation is developing in the western rayons of the Ukraine, especially in Lvov, where, as reported by A. Peskorskiy, obkom sector chief, approximately 90 politicalized informal organizations are functioning. They include such organizations as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UKhS), which stands on obviously anti-Soviet positions and which speaks out in favor of "the *samostiynnyy* [Ukraine nationalist] Ukraine," in favor of the elimination of the CPSU, and the confirmation of private property. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union created the Union of Independent Ukrainian

Youth (SNUM) in the likeness of the West Ukrainian nationalistic youth formations in the 1930's and 1940's. There has also been a sharp aggravation of the religious problems in the region as a result of the increased participation of the Ukrainian Catholic, or so-called Uniate, church.

Participants at the seminar frequently expressed their profound concern about the destructive actions being taken by the spontaneous public movements in the trans-Caucasus and about the confusion displayed by the local party organizations. It is telling that the representatives of the latter did not take part in the discussions.

Nevertheless the recommendations that formed the basis of the discussion were the constructive ones dealing with the participation of the region's party organizations and their agencies in the forthcoming election to the local soviets under conditions of the noticeable aggravation of the sociopolitical situation, or, to put it more accurately, in the power struggle with certain "informal" movements.

What became the chief idea here was not the appeals for confrontation, but the general opinion concerning the need to intensify party influence on the as yet inert mass of Soviet citizens, the precise separation of the extremist-minded leaders from the rank-and-file members of the informal organizations. Because at the present time approximately 5 percent of the adult population are participants in the spontaneous public movements, of whom less than 0.1 percent are active participants. Yes, many speakers admitted, the "informals," because of our sluggishness, and frequently using progressive party decisions and slogans, have seized the initiative in a few places. But the party itself has attempted to awaken the political participation of the masses. Otherwise the restructuring of all spheres of life in our society is impossible. The task today consists in teaching the party organizations the political methods for leading even these movements. In order to resolve that task, the party possesses an organization, cadres, and a material base. At such time factors that take on special importance are the unity of its ranks and organizations, ideological solidarity, and the assimilation of clearly delineated political and ideological orientation markers.

Overall interest among the audience was evinced by the experience of our Belorussian comrades in working with "informals," which experience was shared by V. Kontseva, sector chief at the Ideological Department of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. Although we are located, so to speak, in a political draft—the winds are blowing alternately from Moscow, from the Baltic republics, and from the West—the speaker said that we have nevertheless succeeded, in our opinion, to find effective forms of working in this complicated sphere. They are based on the anticipatory actions taken by party agencies and on the directing of the beneficial initiative of the spontaneous movements into a positive channel. We also are not afraid of evolutionizing in our work together with the "informals," by supporting their intelligent

undertakings. The speaker called on everyone present to anticipate actions, to conduct a frank dialogue, to let go of stereotypes, and to search for all the healthy forces of the public movements and involve them in the specific job at hand. The effectiveness of this approach was also confirmed by other representatives of the Belorussian CP obkom, where the situation, despite the constant assault landings by emissaries of the "informals" from Moscow and the Baltic republics and individual groups of USSR people's deputies, remains, on the whole, stable and businesslike.

In the statements by V. Minin, instructor at the CPSU Leningrad Obkom; A. Kosarev, inspector at the Ukrainian CP Cherkassy Obkom; V. Trifonov, instructor at the party's Kaliningrad Gorkom; and many others, the speakers cited specific tactical elaborations on the basis of the experience in conducting the election campaign. One observed there the careful choice of candidates—not only Communists, but also non-party members—and the need for them to act as a single, powerful group, and the use of untraditional propaganda means—leaflets, wall newspapers, and rallies. Incidentally, mention was made of the preference for promoting to the local agencies of power not the first secretaries, but specifically the ideological workers having more contacts with the "mobile," active segments of the population—teachers, students, and scientific and cultural workers. The speakers especially emphasized the need to increase the political work at citizens' place of residence, where the party organizations so far have weak positions.

A factor that has been recognized as one of the important pledges of success in the election campaign is the providing of the candidates with the timely services of scientists and political specialists. The speakers assigned an important role also to the creation of a moral-psychological atmosphere of support for the candidate in his collective, because not everyone is able easily to withstand the blows that are inflicted in the sometimes dog-eat-dog struggle, which, judging from an analysis of the tactics used by the "informals," is what the party candidates must be ready for.

An action that became typical of the discussion was the working out of problems in the interaction between the party organizations and the spontaneous movements over the long-term period. We must not limit ourselves to the election campaign, or "cross the T" with it. Party-political work must be carried out, and will be carried out, even after March 1990. As a result, a number of specific questions involving the restructuring of that work were discussed.

For example, the recent decision to eliminate lecturer groups at obkoms and republic-level Central Committees—that chief scientific-propaganda potential of the party agencies—was subjected to sharp criticism. It is largely for that reason that it is currently difficult to create special subdivisions to analyze the sociopolitical

situation and to work out the practical recommendations. Here, as in the questions of expanding the publishing activities of the local party agencies, that is, everywhere that the question pertains to personnel staffs and funds, the decision of the party's central agencies is necessary. That was the general opinion. O. Kopets, leader of a lecturer group at the Ukrainian CP Dnepropetrovsk Obkom, mentioned that there is a need to re-examine the frequently obsolete guidance documents issued by the Central Committee, which provide old evaluations for the informal associations. If not, the speaker emphasized, we will find ourselves in a stupid situation: the Central Committee is in favor of perestroika, the "informals" even moreso, and what are the obkoms—the conservative forces?

A large amount of debate was evoked by the question of the quota regulation of the activities of the "informals," of registering their organizations and groups. Although in a few places in the outlying groups these questions are being resolved independently, it is nevertheless necessary in this area to enact the appropriate laws, thus contributing to the creation of our law-governed state. At the same time, summing up the results of the seminar-conference, I. Zaremskiy, deputy chief of the Ideological Department of CPSU Central Committee, warned that the enactment of the appropriate laws—concerning the press and concerning spontaneous movements—will not create a comfortable situation in which the party committees can perform their work. He called upon the participants of the conference to inform their own party organizations about the discussion; and, proceeding from its results and the exchange of experience that occurred, to adjust the plans for their own work, placing the chief emphasis on the preparation for the election to the republic-level and local soviets of people's deputies, and to the 28th CPSU Congress, which has currently become task number one for the entire party.

Considering the results of the two zonal seminar-conferences that were held in Novosibirsk and Vitebsk to discuss the work with spontaneous public movements and organizations, it is necessary to isolate the following.

They were one of the products of the democratization of the sociopolitical life of Soviet society, which democratization was evoked by perestroika. The 19th All-Union Party Conference and the election of the USSR people's deputies, which aroused the broad masses of Soviet citizens, became the events that accelerated their formation.

Public spontaneous movements rapidly traveled the complicated path of their organizational and political growth. Today the people's fronts and the various associations, clubs, etc. are a real social force that exerts an influence on the frame of mind of a considerable number of the citizens who are capable of waging, and are indeed waging, the political struggle for power. Their political and social structure is extremely complicated, and when evaluating each organization it is necessary to take a differentiated approach.

It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the striving for an alternative action frequently leads the spontaneous formations to a platform of opposing the existing state, social, and party structures. Recently, in addition to constructive moments to support perestroika and democratization, there has been a sharp activation of forces which, under the cover of their slogans, are carrying out antiparty, destructive actions. Some of these organizations have occupied obviously nationalistic, separatist, and chauvinistic positions. Armed groups of revolutionary fighters, and security and protection services for these organizations, are becoming a reality. With the purpose of obtaining the political, moral, and material support, attempts are being increased to have these groups establish contacts with foreign political organizations and centers, including anti-Soviet ones.

The orientation of the spontaneous movements toward various groups of USSR people's deputies that formed in the course of the operation of the two congresses is a fact. Their interaction sometimes objectively orients the masses toward the creation of alternative social structures, if not to the organization of various destructive acts, including strikes, demonstrations, and rallies.

The party organizations and their agencies, having yielded at a definite stage the initiative in leading the sociopolitical movement of the masses, have been called upon today to carry out a fundamental re-examination of their work in this direction. It is important, proceeding from the specifics of the local conditions, for every party committee to work out a special set of forms and methods for political activity under the complicated conditions of the radical politicalization of the masses. The factors that must form their basis are tolerance toward people with a different opinion, the ability to conduct a dialogue and convince the other person of one's own correctness, and to distinguish true constructive enthusiasm from extremism, from demagoguery, and political pride, which require an immediate and efficient rebuff.

It is necessary, without looking back toward the center, to take definite organizational steps right now to transform the local party agencies into political headquarters in the struggle for the masses—a change in the staff structures, the creation of special groups to provide expert advice and analysis, the reinforcement of the printing base, and the development of television and radio broadcasting.

Under conditions when a situation of political pluralism is forming on the spur of the moment and at rapid rates, when the CPSU has to operate under conditions that are approaching a multiparty situation, and in certain regions that has already become a fact, all the party organizations and their agencies have been called upon to take the most decisive steps to reinforce the ties with the masses of the workers, and to win their confidence.

The overall opinion of the participants of both seminars was reduced to these conclusions, to the assigning of these tasks. Their rapid and consistent resolution will help the party organizations to arrive at the election to the local and republic soviets consolidated, combative, and purposeful.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Partiynaya zhizn", 1990.

Correspondents Discuss Republic Elections

90US0660A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 9,
26 Feb-4 Mar 90 p 5

[Compilation of articles: "IZVESTIYA and SOYUZ Correspondents Report on the Course of the Elections"]

[Text] Kirghizia: A Step Toward Trust; IZVESTIYA staff correspondent Gennadiy Shipitko for SOYUZ

On 25 February, over 2 million of the republic's voters participated in the election for people's deputies to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies. This is 92 percent of all the republic's voters. Residents in rural areas showed the greatest activity.

At the same time, there remained to be elected 13,500 deputies, including 350 to the highest legislative organ of Kirghizia.

The results of the election campaign have been tallied. Yet the elections themselves have not been completed. Only 248 deputies for 350 places in parliament were elected on this Sunday. Run-off elections are still to come in 86 okrugs, since no one of the candidates received more than half the votes. And new elections are being held in 16 okrugs where there were two candidates on the ballot. And this means once again a tense election fight.

Among those who received a seat in the republic's highest legislative organ is Satykhzhan-Khodzhi Kamalov, a Muslim clergyman. He was elected by a majority of voters in the 43rd Osmonkulovskiy okrug. And this is in an okrug in which a substantial portion of the population is non-Muslim. Undoubtedly a new phenomenon in our political life. His platform attracted people; it sets as one of its main tasks the unification of people not on the basis on national characteristics, but on civil positions, and active participation in resolving socioeconomic problems. Yet not only this determined the choice of the multi-national election okrug. Kamalov's proxy was Father Pakhomiy, father superior of the Voskresenskiy Cathedral. It would have been difficult to suppose such a thing even yesterday. And now, when interethnic relations have intensified, and among them, not infrequently on the basis of confession of faith, this fact is a fine example of mutual understanding and trust.

Yet the opinion of the voters was decisive in far from all of the okrugs. Even during the local soviet nomination stage, voters had no choice in 40 percent of the election

okrugs. A similar thing also occurred during nomination of candidates for the republic Supreme Soviet. One out of every eight okrugs had no alternative candidates. Thus, almost one-quarter of the deputies was nominated to the Supreme Soviet as the result of a "program of the most favorable conditions." It is not hard to guess who these are. They are the republic leaders, the party and soviet staffers.

Moldavia: The Prognosis Has Not Justified Itself;
Svetlana Gamova

In Moldavia, the first stage of the elections has been completed. A total of 84 percent of the population participated in them. Voting took place in 380 election okrugs, but candidates won the needed number of votes in only 139 of them. Thus, the fundamental struggle for candidate seats in the republic Supreme Soviet is still to come.

The pre-election campaign, which took place under complex sociopolitical circumstances, defined the two basic political forces fighting for the majority in the future parliament—the People's Front and the republic Communist Party. A change in positions and a serious loss of votes had been predicted for the Communist Party. Yet the results of the first vote showed that the supporters of the People's Front received only 43 deputy seats. The most popular candidates proved to be the three first individuals of the republic—P. Luchinskiy, Moldavian CP Central Committee first secretary, for whom 92 percent of the electorate voted; M. Snegur, Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, and P. Paskar, Council of Ministers chairman.

Among those who have already been named deputies, the overwhelming majority are leaders of the higher and middle echelon, the intelligentsia, writers, journalists, doctors; there are practically no workers or peasants.

The elections are taking place under calm circumstances: a 6-month moratorium on rallies, demonstrations, and various types of acts generating tension in the republic is in effect. The moratorium was proposed by the republic's Supreme Soviet and supported by all social movements.

Tajikistan: Together Through Adversity; IZVESTIYA
staff correspondent Aleksandr Karpov for SOYUZ

By 25 February, the day of elections for Tajik SSR people's deputies, Dushanbe was still living under the law of a state of emergency.

How will the current voting go? Will the extremists not undertake a new onslaught in order to disrupt the elections? These were hardly idle questions...

Yes, it was not without alarm that Dushanbe residents awaited 25 February. However, at 7 AM, the doors of all election precincts in the city opened. And people were immediately drawn to them. The first functional information that came to the republic election commission testified that by 11 AM, 35.2 percent of the Dushanbe electorate had voted. And while speaking at a press

conference the next day, K. Makhkamov, republic Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, noted that 79.4 percent of the adult population had participated. This was even greater than the figure for the recently-held elections to the local soviets. It is also important to note that voters expressed an absolute vote of confidence in the leaders of the party and soviet organs on the ballot in the republic's capital.

Yet it would be dishonest to assert that each and every Dushanbe resident marked the holiday of people's power lightheartedly. The drama which had quite recently been played out in the city was not entirely well-reflected in the mood of many.

"I have been a Dushanbe resident for a long time," USSR people's artist N. Volchkov told me, "I have lived in this city for over half a century. For me, everything that has happened is incredible. But I am deeply convinced that the group of extremists is not the Tajik people. And however the kids raged in the streets, they did not accomplish the main thing—discord among people of various nationalities did not occur. And together, we will survive all adversity..."

Lithuania: The Victors and the Vanquished; Nikolay
Lashkevich

Who won in the elections? Let us turn to the facts expounded by the leadership of the Republic Central Election Commission press conference which took place the other day. I will be precise: For the time being, all data are of an unofficial nature; better-grounded reports will be published in the republic press somewhat later.

Thus, of the 472 candidates aspiring to 141 deputy seats, 90 people were elected. In 2 weeks, there will be run-off elections in 45 election okrugs (no one of the candidates gained the needed quantity of votes); in 6, there will be repeat elections.

Over 70 percent of the electorate participated in the voting.

As was assumed, Lithuanians, 80 people, will represent an absolute majority in the parliament of Lithuania (not counting the 51 deputies whose names will become known later). There are five and three Poles and Russians respectively. In general, such a correlation reflects the national composition of the republic's population. If we take the distribution of political forces in the future Supreme Soviet according to parties, then the obvious advantage here goes "Sajudis." A total of 72 of the 146 candidates for deputy who were supported by the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika received deputy seats. A detail of no small significance: Of this number, 16 deputies are members of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Nine of the elected are social democrats; three, "greens"; two, Christian democrats. Thus, the Lithuanian CP is for the time being in the minority. It will be represented in the Supreme Soviet by a total of 27 deputies, although this figure is of a conditional

nature. All four secretaries of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party were elected, with party leader, current Chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A. Brazauskas having won the voters' overwhelming trust: Over 90 percent of those who participated in the elections cast their ballots for his candidacy. V. Shveda and M. Burokyavichyus, two secretaries of the temporary Lithuanian CP Central Committee (on the CPSU platform) also still have a chance of being elected; the second round of elections awaits them. For the time being, the number of Lithuanian CP members remaining within the CPSU platform who were elected deputies is not great: only four.

Such are just a few of the facts. What next? What will the weather be like in the political firmament 2 weeks from now, when new deputies will be added to the list already known? I will not hasten with political forecasts. Time will divide the political forces into the victors and the vanquished.

Uzbekistan: The Problems Remain; unnamed IZVESTIYA staff correspondent

The results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets became known in Uzbekistan. For the first time, they were conducted according to the new republic law on elections.

Were they democratic, as they had never been before? I am deeply convinced that they were. But it is also true that the apparatus of party committees and soviets worked very impressively.

These days I have managed to speak with many representatives of informal associations, from "Birlik" ("unity"), "Pamyat," the "Democratic Movement" and others. Almost everywhere, their candidates failed. "What kind of democracy can we speak of?" they asked with indignation. But nevertheless there is no paradox here. In recent years, the well organized, cohesive apparatus has gained experience, and capably realized its task under the new conditions.

Labor collectives, residents of many cities, villages, and entire rayons found no alternative candidates for themselves capable of standing up to the single candidates which had been nominated in 179 out of the republic's 500 okrugs. I note for the sake of fairness: There were among them not only party staffers, but workers, kolkhoz workers, and scientific and cultural figures.

But for the time being, over 100 of the republic Supreme Soviet seats are vacant. Run-off elections remain to be held in early March in 95 okrugs in which more than two candidates were on the ballot and none was elected. New elections will take place in 37 more okrugs.

Before me are the lists of elected Uzbek SSR people's deputies. The surnames are in alphabetical order. The list begins and ends with a party gorkom first secretary. Of course, this detail would mean nothing were it not for the fact that in the interval between "A" and "Ya" I

counted 80 more names of secretaries of various ranks, from raykom to Central Committee.

I know some of these people personally, and I am convinced that they are worthy, honest communists.

On the other hand, if all the party leaders are so good, then how come there are so many unsolved problems, how come there is social tension?

Of the 386 people's deputies of Uzbekistan, 348 are party members. Probably no one expected this—94.6 percent communists.

The Ukraine: "Equal" chances; IZVESTIYA staff correspondent Stepan Troyan for SOYUZ

Of course, if they have named you to be among those worthy of representing the working masses in a soviet of any level, from a village soviet to the republic Supreme Soviet, it will pleasantly tickle your self-esteem, let's not be hypocrites. That is apparently why some aspirants, in order to win the sympathy of the people and overcome the the thorny electoral marathon, are resorting to the most unexpected moves.

For example, KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA gives such a report: Since some candidates for deputy do not always manage to gather voters for a meeting, the director of the Yevpatoriya meat combine, A. Penkov, found an original twist. An experienced man, he knows that you can't catch the owners of the votes without honey, and that they would come in at the aroma of sausage under the conditions of a total shortage. And Anatoliy Afanasiyevich thought up direct action: He designated a regular meeting with voters in the 15th grocery store on Perekopskaya street, which is situated in the okrug of the possible deputy to the city soviet.

The meeting was accompanied by a tasting of all possible smoked sausages, roulades, and other delicacies which mere mortals have not seen in quite some time.

The program of the candidate for UkSSR people's deputy Yu. Kolesnikov, general director of the "Kontinental" cooperative association, also has a unique nuance. We will give the energetic leader and his workers their due: They are doing an excellent job of bringing natural gas to a portion of settlements which do not have it, and for this, they get a bow from all honest people. However, Yuri Vasiliyevich thought up something else to make happy those residents of Simferopol's Railroad election okrug who leave his name in their ballots: a few kilograms of shortage meat and sausage. But, since thousands have the right to vote, a great deal of both the one and the other will be required. Therefore, the general director promised, via block committees, to get his adherents 400 metric tons of meat and 20 metric tons of smoked sausage, and in coming years to raise this amount to 1,000 metric tons and even more. The first tons have already been sold. The pork and beef went straight off the transport, that is, off the truck.

Naturally, one simple question is really raised here: In order to have equal chances with Kolesnikov, where are the general director's rivals supposed to get the meat and sausage—V. Leshchenko, a machinist and instructor at the engine depot; O. Pariyenko, a university philosophy department assistant, and P. Smyk, chairman of the city soviet of war and labor veterans, as well as four other candidates for UkSSR Supreme Soviet deputy?

Moscow March of Democratic Forces Recalled

90UN0879A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by S. Kredov: "Moscow Does Not Believe in Words": "Notes by a Participant in the March of Democratic Forces That Took Place in the Capital on 4 February"]

[Text] I think it was W. Churchill who said: Those who were not radical in their young years are heartless; those who did not become conservative with age are brainless. I am walking among the multi-colored flags and multi-voiced slogans as I am trying to marry within myself my radical heart to my conservative brain.

As recently as yesterday the joy from everything that was happening would not have had the "hidden compartment." We have freedom! The seal has been removed from our lips; the slave within us was not squeezed out drop by drop but drained out at once and that left emptiness in some people or seeds of support in others. Both the militia and the special purpose units are different from what they were before. They are standing in a line two-deep all along the 4-kilometer stretch of the march; they do not show any interest in the meaning of the slogans; they display just one intention—to preserve order.

But today something prevents us from plunging carefree into the euphoria of freedom. And that something is the fully realistic threat of chaos, the threat of civil war which has already become a fact for some people. I am not the only one, probably, who senses in these troubled times that the avalanche of a catastrophe is gathering strength somewhere and might roll down and bury everyone right in the middle of the feast: the left and the right, the authorities and the opposition, the radicals and the conservatives. Do we bear any responsibility to our own future? Are those who have led the force of 200,000 people responsible to it in full measure?

During the 3 hours we heard, in essence, just different variations of one and the same point of view.

Every honest, daring, and bright idea delivered in Manezhnaya Square should become a contribution to the perestroika fund; it should be heard behind the Kremlin walls. But I am not talking now about what elated me or made me wish to "be a part of this force." I want to mention something that made me feel lonely in the midst of thousands of people. An ancient maxim served as the only consolation: The biggest part is not always the best.

How rapid was the change in our attitude to the Majority! So recently irony and skepticism were the fashion among the intelligentsia. Today most shameless types of flattery are flourishing in the streets. We have forgotten in no time that in ancient Greece Socrates was sentenced to death by a "referendum", and in Judea the same happened to Christ. Whoever is organizing the meetings, they have become a market where the consumer's dictatorship is complete, and that is quite unlike our economy.

The subjects have been chosen long ago: Article 6, the responsibility of the center to the people of Transcaucasia, the opposition of the bureaucracy to perestroika, Russian chauvinism, etc.

The longer I listen to the applause, the more often I recall A. Pushkin's words: "To depend on the tsar? To depend on the people? What is the difference for us?" (I quote from memory). Our former shameful dependence on those in power is being replaced by a dependence on the meetings which is not more honorable. Honestly speaking, I am tired of waiting for Yu. Afanasyev, for instance, to say something not welcome by his own audience. In this respect, one has to reassess the gigantic image of A. Sakharov. At our present stage we miss Andrey Dmitriyevich so much! He was not the one to flatter the people as he had not flattered those in power.

Speaking of Russian chauvinism: We admit that it already does shamefully manifest itself in our society as it also happens in other countries and republics with "big" and "small" nationalities. It is worth talking about, but why has not a word been said yet about the feat of the Russian soldier who stood up between an Armenian and an Azerbaijani? What about the Smolensk peasant who sheltered a Meskhetian Turk? And the answer is: This is not fashionable; this would not call for applause. To sum up: Russia receives refugees from all the republics but from the platforms we can only hear about some disorder caused by a few "Pamyat" hoodlums in the Central House of Writers.

I would like also to object to the eloquent deputy who appealed to the center to repent for all that happened in Transcaucasia. He should have repented himself. If one could analyze all the pronouncements of this deputy about Nagorno-Karabakh and his thick-headed, to put it mildly, stance, then one could figure out who it was who in reality had convicted half a million Armenians from the interethnic Baku. It is not fashionable.

I considered very wise the speech of Chalikova from MOSKOVSKAYA TRIBUNA. She reminded us, in particular, of an idea of A. Solzhenitsyn: Unfortunate is the government that does not heed the opposition, but just as unfortunate is the opposition that does not want to understand the position of the government. This statement did not bring any applause, which only emphasizes how deep it is. It sharply outlines the tactical flaws of some part of our parliamentary opposition; unfortunately, they remove themselves from power and

renounce any responsibility for what is happening in the country. They call upon the center to repent, but do not provide any example of admitting their own mistakes, which have already showed considerable effect.

I wanted to conclude these joyless notes by rephrasing one of the slogans: He who wants to exchange security for freedom will never get either.

And, finally, here is a blitz-interview with G. Postoyuk, militia major general, head of the Moscow UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] Public Order Administration.

[S. Kredov] Georgiy Vasilyevich, how many militiamen were deployed for preserving order at the meeting?

[G. Postoyuk] Very many; the exact number is a secret.

[S. Kredov] Was it easy?

[G. Postoyuk] In general, nothing out of the ordinary happened. We had agreed with the organizers that they would not fire up emotions. As you can see, the militiamen were not armed. We did not bring in any additional units.

[S. Kredov] What are your wishes for the future?

[G. Postoyuk] I wish the organizers themselves to be responsible for the conduct of the meetings. That is the way in other countries.

Leningrad Political, Economic Woes Noted

90UN0802B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report on speech by V.G. Ivanov, planing machine operator at Leningrad's Izhorskiy Zavod Production Association, to an all-union meeting of representatives of the working class, the peasantry, and scientific and technical workers; place and date not given]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! I represent here at our conference the 30,000-man collective of the Izhorskiy Zavod Production Association. But, taking into account the fact that our congress promises to be very tightly scheduled and apparently delegates from all republics and all oblasts wish to speak, our delegation, the Leningrad delegation, instructed me to speak on behalf of the enterprises that are represented in this delegation.

I am afraid that if I begin to speak now about the difficulties, complexities, and various misunderstandings at each of the Leningrad enterprises, we shall probably be bogged down here and never reach a solution. Therefore I have decided to express the problems we Leningraders have in common, the more so since, unfortunately, we have not had time to prepare. Mikhail Sergeyevich probably had time to prepare for a 45-minute introduction but we did not have this kind of time. In general this will be impromptu.

[M.S. Gorbachev] Yes, I have a lot of time. (Laughter).

[V.G. Ivanov] Well, we had no time at all; we did not find out until 0900 what the theme of the conference would be and therefore in principle this will be impromptu although I must say that the things that bother the Leningraders at each enterprise and in each institution—all this is in the air and there is no need for any special preparation here. This is bothering us, we are all quite familiar with it, and therefore I shall get right down to business.

I wish to describe the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast. It can be described as extremely tense. What brought this about? It is primarily, of course, the lack—one can even say the complete lack—of industrial goods. This begins with men's socks and women's hose and ends with television sets, automobiles, tape recorders, and videotape recorders, about which Mikhail Sergeyevich said that their output is constantly increasing but, alas, this cannot be seen on the shelves of our stores. Furniture stores are completely empty; not only are there no cupboards but you cannot even find a chair to sit on and you have to sit on the floor while waiting.

Moreover, Leningraders are bothered by the shortage of food. This is not the first year we are faced with this problem. And now it has become even worse. In one of the speeches Mikhail Sergeyevich made while he was in Lithuania—and we all saw this on television—this sentence was heard from a worker: "We are afraid of a blockade from Leningrad, from the Russian Federation and other republics." Quite the opposite situation emerged, however. The blockade began from the Baltic republics against Leningrad. They are failing to deliver 40,000 tons of meat to us. For the first quarter it was planned for the Baltic republics to deliver 15,000 tons of meat to us and Lithuania alone agreed to deliver only 1,000 tons of meat. The situation is the same with respect to other oblasts surrounding Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast. So far, unfortunately, Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast are probably not in a position to provide all of their own food.

Further, the immense dissatisfaction and the aggravation that sometimes exceeds all bounds are causing crime to be on the rise. And the most typical feature is the unprecedented growth of speculation. It has apparently never been this bad in the country before and I can tell you myself that Leningrad has never known such an outbreak before. Just look, we have reached a point where soon we will have two prices for each kind of product. And the sales personnel and the store workers do not even try to hide it: 100 percent markup—the cost plus 100 percent from above. You understand, they tell you this straight to your face and there is nothing you can do about it. I think that ultimately we shall reach a point where, in spite of the fact that we are proceeding toward a law-governed state, dissatisfaction is growing to such a point that soon mob law will begin and punishment will be meted out on the spot because the workers are already so disturbed that the smallest spark could start such a sequence of events that it will be difficult to predict or,

rather, one can predict how it will end. Moreover, apparently, these questions of speculation, you know what caused all this: the incorrect policy with respect to cooperatives when the program for the creation of cooperatives itself was being developed; the system was created so incorrectly that in the very first stages there were unequal conditions, for they were not given the same opportunities as state enterprises to buy processed materials, all kinds of energy, and so forth. Naturally, excuse me, but it would take a real fool to work for no profit. Naturally, they raised the prices and this caused general dissatisfaction, and now for any civilized or uncivilized person the word "cooperator" evokes a negative reaction and the same is true of any worker. They were forced to crawl through the enterprises, certain machinations began at industrial enterprises, and the leaders of these enterprises, the ones who in general have nothing against picking up an extra ruble, fell in along with them. All this subsequently caused the corresponding reaction from the OBKhSS [department for combating theft of socialist property and speculation].

Further. The growth of the cost of living. Supposedly one might say that it is not very noticeable, but there is gold of course, But basically this is not noticed. And yet, look, there is not enough money to feed your family. One could say that at the plant our earnings are very good. Maybe not for everyone, but for the basic workers the earnings are somewhere around 500- 600 rubles [R]. (Noise) But there is no reason for you to make noise. These are not earnings but payment. Do not think that the workers earn this money in 8 normal work hours. Nothing of the kind. These are those same 12-14-hour work days. You understand? And it is the same thing for the cooperator. You do not start making noise when you hear that the cooperator receives R500-R600. Well we also receive R500-R600, but it is for a 12- hour work day. And, moreover, during the period beginning in autumn, in September or October, when the summer period ends, right up until spring, we do not have normal Saturdays, we do not rest, we work every Saturday. Although officially they are supposed to be days of rest. This is where we get our high earnings. But I must say that we do produce products. All the time they are telling us that we are working poorly, that the way we work is the way we live. I can tell you that I have been working at the Izhoriski plant for 22 years; we began to produce excavators in 1965. We would produce 17 of them, and then 70, and then 162, and now we have begun to produce new machines but still our output was 142 excavators, and this was in the first year, you understand? So there is still an increase in labor productivity, and a considerable one. And you see how they have driven us, all of the workers, into a corner during these past 20 years? Yet they were always holding this six-percent reduction of labor-intensiveness in front of us while they did not reduce anything else; the only thing that was reduced over these 20 years has been the weight of my sledge hammer. And yet we have received nothing, neither new technical equipment, nor new technology, nor fittings—nothing.

Here I shall move on to problems that affect, one might say, not only the Izhoriski plant; they are problems faced by any enterprise. We have been hit very hard by the conversion. Of course one cannot say and nobody would say that we are against this policy that is being implemented by the party and the state, a policy of peace. But I think probably that such a radical decision about conversion was poorly thought out. Immense capacities are standing idle at the Izhoriski Zavod and Arsenal associations. You understand that we have plenty of defense enterprises there. We have been unable to change them over rapidly to produce certain civilian products but they are operating to some degree. For instance, they produced nuclear reactors and the Chernobyl disaster also led us into a blind alley. We are now making some kinds of gasoline tanks, but, you understand, they are incompatible things! This is unique equipment for which one can no longer find machine tools anywhere, not at a single enterprise in the union. Of the four or, rather, five productions of the association, only two are actually operating at the plant. And one of them, the metallurgical production, is one in which the blast furnaces have been there since the "times of the [fall] of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea," and in the overall fleet of machine tools from the end of the last century and the beginning of this one there is extremely little modern machinery. But still, look, we are making products, we need products.

Now comes the next wave again. The "greens" are applying pressure and saying that we must save the land. Of course we must! But, Comrades, perhaps we should approach this problem reasonably. Perhaps we do not need coal and we do not need electricity?! Of course the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was extraordinarily severe but we can hardly go back to candles. And we will hardly be able in the near future to provide energy for our entire country with solar energy or from other sources. So we will still probably have to make better nuclear energy plants even if a complete idiot is in charge of this plant, he will still be unable to put it in a condition reached by the fourth block.

There is something else I wish to discuss as well. So that my speech will not be simply a recording of facts I wish to make a particular concrete suggestion. We have already heard here what is needed. I, of course, am not an economist, I am an ordinary machine tool operator. But I think that everyone has enough common sense to understand, and it has been heard here in the speeches, that we need independence, and there should be independence for the enterprises, rayons, and the oblast. This is where we should begin. The state is not here in Moscow—we out there are the state. And the chain should begin namely from below. This is regional cost accounting but not cost accounting with fences around the oblasts and not with identification cards. I am a Leningrader and I am ashamed—regardless of what necessity might explain the need for this extreme measure—but I am ashamed that we are introducing identification cards in Leningrad, you understand? Against

whom? People from Pskov, Novgorod, Kalinin, Vologda, those who drive their herds to Leningrad. And we do not give them the meat. But they gather up everything they have and give it to us. And we place such restrictions on them. Although in general I must say that there are 5 million people in Leningrad and it has grown up not as a result of the birth rate but as result of the influx of these peasants from these oblasts here, people who have left the land. That is, the state policy that was conducted with respect to agriculture has led to this outflow of people from rural areas and to an influx into Leningrad as well as to the growth of the population to more than 5 million. I am finishing, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

So, what else is bothering us and what else would I like to say? I have already mentioned economic accountability, yes? The unreasonableness of certain laws. Well, you can see quite clearly how the laws can be used either one way or another. But the main thing, you know, is that if laws have been adopted, they must be faithfully obeyed. We have elected deputies to the congress and they have adopted certain laws. So let us obey these laws anyway, for otherwise they could enact thousands of laws but if the laws are not obeyed they will never lead to anything.

Now a couple of words about tightening the screws. Yesterday I heard a speech here—an interview. The comrade was against tightening the screws. I think this way, I am absolutely not against it, I have already tightened my screws as far as they will go, myself! And I do not think it is so terrible if when it comes to labor discipline and social discipline the screws are tightened all the way, nobody will suffer from that except people who have been slacking off. A normal (applause) worker is not threatened by anything. In some places we have skipped over the democracy toward which we have striven so hard and jumped right into anarchy, you understand? Well, that will not do either. What is this? Have we really come to this? Do we really need democracy with a knife at our throats as is the case in certain republics? Our children are dying there! I have a son in the paratroopers now and I do not want him to go there and kill people and then be killed himself. And the mothers in these republics? Do they want their children to die there? Who needs this? I think we should have taken resolute measures promptly. We are not scoring direct hits. If we had taken resolute measures on time, things would probably not have come to such a sad end. (Applause) How do we assess this, when will it be time to get out, yes?

Well, a couple more words. I think that is what the state is all about. And we must move on from word to deed. Nobody has abolished state authority, you understand, and it should uphold the laws that have been adopted to the letter, the state should implement them with a strong arm. But explain to me, please, what we are doing here. Again this same, as they say, strong arm, it does not affect those people who do not have to be called to anything, who do not have to be driven, who do not have to be pushed, it affects only those who quite deliberately

do not wish to work normally, who do not want to conduct themselves normally, who do not want to live according to our laws, you understand?

And the last question. I am a communist and I represent the detachment of 5,000 Izhorsk communists. They did not give me anything, they simply ordered me to bring to the Central Committee (this conference was still convened by the party Central Committee) thoughts, ideas, and suggestions from our party organization. Therefore I cannot but discuss the pain being experienced by all communists and the situation that has developed in the party.

You will note and you already know that we have all come from enterprises, from the lower levels, and you know the current attitude toward the CPSU. People are leaving. I am a member of the bureau of the party committee and we hold bureau meetings twice a month. And each month 19 or 20 of our members leave, and what people they are! While we used to be able to say that the people who were leaving were just drunks, people who just happened to wind up in the party, and people who entered the party for particular benefits, now I can responsibly tell you that the people who are leaving are workers, real workers, on whom the party was built, and they are leaving because they have no faith in the Central Committee. It is as though the party is there, below, and the Central Committee is here, above, with its own organization and it is living its own life. In spite of the fact that the Central Committee has decreed not to hold conferences and neither report nor report-election meetings at the end of the year, a conference was held at the Izhorskiy Zavod. And it adopted a number of documents that are directed toward improving the situation in the party. And the situation in the party is very serious, you understand, and we must consolidate our ranks, and not simply in words.

Therefore in order for my speech not to be unsubstantiated, I have been instructed to give these documents to Mikhail Sergeyevich personally because we have already sent these documents to the Central Committee and the response was, alas, nothing. The only thing that we see now, in the last speech in Lithuania at the aktiv meeting, was that documents will be prepared for elections on an alternative basis by the time of the plenum. But still I have been instructed by the communists, and I am accustomed to carrying out party instructions, and I am carrying them out. This is a packet of documents with suggestions for changing the party regulations. Further. Concretely according to the system of elections on an alternative basis, by direct secret voting of delegates, right down to the point where at some stage we shall have to elect the Central Committee this way [sentence as published]. But then this will probably be decided by a plenum, an expanded one. And another thing—that status of the delegate to the congress. Here is this packet of documents and the speeches which our Leningrad delegates will apparently not been able to make although they have their own pent-up concerns and worries, and I

am giving them to Mikhail Sergeyevich personally and I think that I am carrying out fully my mission here. (Applause.)

Armenian Gosplan Chairman on Republic's Draft Economic Independence Plan

90US0584A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
2 Feb 90 p 2

["Draft of the Concept for the Economic Independence of Armenian SSR"]

[Text] **Armenian SSR Gosplan has prepared a draft for the concept of the republic's economic independence. The draft represents the synthesis of three alternative versions that were developed on public-initiative principles by scientific groups made up of economic scientists at the Institute of Economics, Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences; NIIEP, under Armenian SSR Gosplan; Yerevan State University; and Yerevan Institute of the National Economy.**

At the request of an Armenpress correspondent, M. Ts. Mkrtchyan, deputy chairman of Armenian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan, discussed the work that has been done and the paths for Armenia's economic and social development, the implementation which forms the basis of the concept.

When the concept was being developed, alternative versions were proposed for a number of fundamental positions that are close to one another. The existing differences in points of view concerning various questions were reduced by us into a general point of view with a consideration of the discussions that had taken place at sessions of the republic's commission to improve the economic mechanism.

Leading scientists participated in the discussions and, when the draft was being prepared, use was made of the experience gained by the union republics.

Today our republic's national economy, despite the slight positive shifts as compared with 1988, is in a critical situation. There has been a serious delay in social and economic development; social injustice has become aggravated; the illicit economy has become stronger; the balance between supply and demand and between production and consumption has been disturbed; no steps have been taken to provide a considerable segment of the population with income above the subsistence level; and there has been an increase in the ecological tension.

The republic's socioeconomic complex has proven to be in a disorganized condition. But its rising to a new and qualitatively higher level of functioning, while preserving the old economic mechanism and structures and the old leadership and administration, is impossible.

All this forces us to seek the resolution of the problems not by standard methods, but to proceed along the path of creating a new economic mechanism, a new system of

administering the national economy, a system that presupposes the republic's economic independence.

Proceeding from the situation that has developed, we feel that the basic and most important tasks confronting the republic are the overcoming of the consequences of the earthquake, the damage from which exceeds 13 billion rubles; the resolution of the problems linked with the events of the past two years and Artsakh, and also with the deportation of more than 240,000 Armenians from a neighboring republic, which sharply aggravated all our social, economic, and political problems.

The concept draft contains the basic principles, elements, and links of the mechanism of Armenian SSR's economic independence and is a description of the desired condition to which we are striving.

The implementation of the concept creates the necessary economic prerequisites for bringing our republic out of its critical state, for speeding up the socioeconomic development, for the financial improvement of the economy, and for the rapid restoration of the cities and rayons that were destroyed by the earthquake.

It will make it possible to guarantee the employment rate of the able-bodied population, including the refugees, will raise the nation's standard of living and its material and spiritual welfare, and will also guarantee the rise in the technical level, quality, and competitiveness of output, the development of the citizens' creative initiative and participation, the expansion of their economic freedom, and the buildup of the spiritual, creative, and economic potential of the Armenians living in other regions of the USSR and in the foreign Diaspora.

Finally, the concept will serve the complete spiritual and economic integration with NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], the improvement of the environment, its protection and reproduction, as well as the republic's integration in the system of world-economy ties, the development of new transportation paths, and the increase in the autonomy of the functioning of Armenian SSR.

The economic independence of Armenian SSR presupposes that our republic will resolve in a sovereign manner the questions of the strategy and tactics of its functioning and socioeconomic development, the formation of an economic system of administration its regulation, and the establishment and development of economic ties with partners outside of the republic.

The economic relations that the economic entities of Armenian SSR have with other republics and foreign states must be carried out on the basis of the principle of equivalency.

The concept stipulates the existence on the territory of Armenian SSR of varied forms of ownership, and their legal and economic equality, as well as the free choice by the economic entities of the specific form of ownership

within the boundaries established by the legislation enacted by the republic and the country.

Entities that act as the owners of property are the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies, public organizations, enterprises, individual citizens, as well as foreign states, companies, organizations, and citizens—in a word, all legal entities. They also have the right to establish enterprises in the procedure established by the republic's legislation.

The economic activities of the property-owning entities are based on the principle of free enterprise.

Thus, equal opportunities are created for all entities, irrespective of the forms of ownership, and the condition that becomes the chief one for successful functioning is the gauge of economic effectiveness, the evaluation of which is provided by the market.

All the other economic relations are constructed in conformity with this initial position.

For example, directive-type, specifically addressed planning of the enterprises' activities is abolished. The state regulation of their activities is carried out by way of regulation in accordance with legislative norms and by way of a system of state production orders, and also, chiefly, by means of economic levers—pricing, taxation, credit and investment policy, etc.

The factor that must be the central link in the republic's interrelationships with the Union is the system of budgets. The concept stipulates the accumulation of all taxes paid into the republic budget and the local budgets. It is planned for deductions to be paid into the union budget from the republic budget according to a quota that has been coordinated with union agencies.

It is also planned to create a market mechanism with all its attributes and specific problems. The specific ways to resolve them must be developed and implemented in the transitional period that has been stipulated by the concept, which period consists of three stages and which is intended to create the necessary conditions and prerequisites for the functioning of the economic-independence mechanism.

During the first stage, before the end of 1990, the necessary legislative and methodology-standards documents are being prepared. Simultaneously the appropriate preparatory work to introduce the new mechanism is being carried out.

During the second stage, 1991-1995, that mechanism will be introduced gradually—additional legislative acts and methodology-standards documents are being prepared, and the previously approved documents are being reconsidered, proceeding from the experience of their practical application.

In the third stage, until the year 2000, it will be necessary to create completely a qualitatively new system of management that synthesizes the principles of free enterprise and the state-planning regulation of the economy.

The concept consists of 18 sections. One of them is devoted to foreign-economic ties and to relations with the Armenian Diaspora.

Armenian Government Details Economic Aspects of Refugee Resettlement

90US0584B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
7 Feb 90 p 1

["Explanation" by Armenian government officials of USSR Council of Ministers decree implementation]

[Text] **Armenian SSR Ministry of Finance, Armenian SSR Ministry of Social Security, Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, and Armenian SSR State Committee to Accept and Assist Returning Armenians provide the following explanation.**

In conformity with the 17 January 1990 USSR Council of Ministers decree, entitled "Measures to Provide Immediate Assistance to Citizens Who Were Forced to Leave Azerbaijan SSR as a Result of the Aggravation of the Interethnic Relations" (formalized by 19 January 1990 decree of Armenian SSR Council of Ministers), provision has been made for a number of measures to pay refugees lump-sum grants in aid, their expenses incurred in purchasing necessities of life, pensions, etc.

In the process of carrying out these measures, there arise questions that require a lengthy explanation, which is of greatest interest to the citizens who were forced to leave their places of permanent residency after 1 January 1990.

[Question] How is the lump-sum grant in aid, in the amount of 100 rubles per person, paid?

[Answer] The grant in aid is paid by commissions that have been created under the ispolkoms of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies on whose territory citizens who were forced to leave their places of permanent residency are being housed permanently or temporarily. In order for a person to receive the grant in aid, it is necessary to present the refugee's registration card, in which the appropriate notation concerning the receipt of the amount of money is made.

[Question] What procedure has been established for needy refugees to purchase necessities of life?

[Answer] The government's decree has instructed the ispolkoms of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies to make expenditures for the purchase of outer clothing, footwear, and other necessities of life for needy refugees in the amount of up to 200 rubles per person. For that purpose the commissions at the ispolkoms of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies issue to the refugees, on the basis of the refugee's registration

card, special coupons, upon presentation of which at specially designated stores, the refugees can purchase commodities valued at the indicated amount. The store addresses are furnished by the commissions.

[Question] What method will be used to pay the lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of up to three months' wages for citizens who have left their places of permanent residency in Azerbaijan, beginning in January 1990, taking into consideration the fact that almost all the refugees in the previous waves received those grants in aid?

[Answer] In this instance also all the questions are resolved by the commissions at the ispolkoms of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies which, guided by the 20 October 1989 order issued by Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, must pay the lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of up to three months' wages.

[Question] Taking into consideration the fact that not all the refugees in the January wave are familiar with the procedure for receiving the lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of three months' wages, would it not seem to be necessary to state the basic parameters of that procedure?

[Answer] In order to receive the grant in aid, it is necessary first of all to present to the commission an excerpt from the person's work-record book or any other document that certifies the person's place of previous work and the amount of his wages. If documents attesting to the occupied position and amount of wages are not presented, the grant in aid is paid to urban residents at the rate of 150 rubles a month, and to urban residents at the rate of 100 rubles a month. Payment is made on the basis of the actual duration of the break in employment: if the break in employment is less than one month, the payment is made in the amount of a month's wages; less than two months, two months' wages; and more than two months, three months' wages. Working pension-recipients are paid these grants in aid, as are persons of able-bodied age, provided they present any documents confirming that they were involved in labor relations as of the moment of their departure.

[Question] How will the old-age and disability pensions be paid to the refugees? How will the questions linked with VTEK's [medical boards for establishing occupational disabilities] be resolved?

[Answer] The republic's Ministry of Social Security has established a procedure in accordance with which refugees who are recipients of pensions must get in touch with the rayon or city social-security department in the rayon or city where they are residing permanent or temporarily. Upon the presentation of the pension identification document, the payment will be made in the amount indicated in the document. If no identification document is presented, the pension will be paid on the basis of a statement made by the recipient of the pension, as follows: persons receiving old-age pensions or Category II disability pensions will be paid in the amount of

70 rubles a month; Category I, 85 rubles a month; and all others, 60 rubles a month. The social-security departments where refugees are residing temporarily or permanently are required immediately (within 3 days) to resolve all questions of interest to disabled refugees, including those who had the right to receive a Zaporozhets automobile free of charge.

[Question] What assistance can Armenian SSR Gosstrakh [Main Administration of State Insurance] provide to enable the refugees to receive insurance payments for lost household property that had been insured in Azerbaijan SSR?

[Answer] In the USSR, state insurance is carried out in a uniform procedure. Consequently, USSR Gosstrakh bears full responsibility for contracts concluded with agencies of AzSSR Gosstrakh. At the present time Armenian SSR Gosstrakh is carrying out intensive work to resolve these questions, and a supplementary report concerning this will be issued.

[Question] Many refugees were unable to withdraw their money from savings banks in Azerbaijan SSR. What are they to do?

[Answer] It is necessary for them to send a written statement to that effect to the savings-bank branch in the rayon or city where the depositor is residing temporarily or permanently.

[Question] How will the citizens who were forced to leave their places of permanent residency be compensated for the value of property that was lost?

[Answer] In this matter there are large difficulties as a result of the lack of any precise mechanism for resolving the question. The Armenian SSR government is carrying out work to smooth out the problems in employing this mechanism, and a supplementary report on this will be issued. It is necessary to send a written statement immediately to the ispolkom commission, indicating the extent of the household property that was lost.

[Question] What is being done to get the refugees settled?

[Answer] At the present time there are almost 4000 empty buildings in the republic, including those in Vardenisskiy, Kafanskiy, Sisianskiy, Gorisskiy, Kalininskiy, and other rayons. The ispolkoms of the rayon and rural soviets of people's deputies, by their own efforts, are repairing them and putting them into the proper technical condition. In addition, loans in the amount of up to 4000 rubles are offered to refugees for these purposes. In all rural areas of dense population, the refugees are allocated plots of land with the purposes of organizing the construction of individual housing, with a loan being offered in the amount of 20,000 rubles. In order to expand and create additional jobs, branches and new entities of industrial enterprises are being organized in the inhabited places where large numbers of refugees are living.

Estonian Democratic Party Goals Described

90UN0962A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Oleg Gogin, representative of the Democratic Party's program committee, by A. Podvezko: "The Party Which Does Not Exist Yet"]

[Text] As the moment approaches when the article which guarantees the Estonian Communist Party the leading role in society is to be removed from the constitution of the Estonian SSR, a real foundation for a multiparty system is being created in the republic. Almost every month we learn about the creation of a new political party. Recently in the newspaper "Molodezh Estonii" the theses of the Democratic Party were published and members of that organization were candidates in the elections to the Tallinn city soviet.

Whom does this party bring together? What political objectives does it pursue? Representative of the Democratic Party's program committee Oleg Gogin answers these as well as other questions.

[Podvezko] Why was it necessary to create this new party?

[Gogin] The parties and movements in the republic which promote the democratic development of Estonia bring together mainly Estonians in their ranks. Naturally, they place solutions to nationalist problems at the top of the list of their activities.

I'm not saying this in reproach but I'm giving the reason why the Russian-speaking population of the republic views passively (in the best of cases) the democratization processes in Estonia. If the situation in this regard doesn't change in the near future, perestroika in Estonia will slow down and finally come to a halt.

Therefore, the goal of the Democratic Party's creation is to involve the Russian-speaking population in the democratic processes taking place in the republic and simultaneously to find expression for their interests in the political sphere.

[Podvezko] And what can you offer people as far as a political platform is concerned?

[Gogin] Approximately the same as the other democratically oriented parties but without the nationalist overtones.

A sovereign Estonia. A representative, independent parliament which decides all questions concerning the republic. A multiparty system, not just the repudiation of article 6, but the creation of legal prerequisites so that parties are truly political organizations and not part of the state-party apparatus.

In the economic sphere it is necessary to eliminate the kind of situation in which property belongs to "nobody." For this purpose we need to accurately identify what is included in state property at all levels of government, from the village Soviet to the Supreme Soviet. Transfer enterprises to the collective ownership of the people who work at them. And

let them figure out what to do with it in the future; work and receive the profits or sell it. Guarantee equality in the economic conditions for all forms of ownership, including private ownership. And so on.

But we do have differences with other parties regarding our views on the present political situation. In particular, we are for the "zero" option of the law on citizenship. That is, any person who resides permanently in the republic can become (if he wants to) a citizen of Estonia.

[Podvezko] You spoke about a sovereign Estonia. In what forms, in your opinion, should this sovereignty be implemented?

[Gogin] I don't agree with those who state that it can only be realized by separating from the Union. That question can come up only if we see a definite turnabout in the country towards a command-administrative regime. And then, I think, not only the majority of Estonians but Russians as well will refuse to live like they used to.

But if democratization in the Soviet Union continues its step-by-step development, I don't believe that there is any necessity either from a political or economic point of view to leave it.

As far as possible variations of the state status of Estonia as part of the Union is concerned, I see two possibilities. If the "center" does not limit the republic Supreme Soviet in making decisions, then it is quite acceptable to remain within the framework of a federation. If, however, it forces unacceptable decisions and pressures the republic, then it becomes necessary to pose the question of a confederation. That is to say, once again I am linking the sovereignty of Estonia to the overall political situation in the Union.

I would add that whether the Union is a federation or a confederation, the relations between republics must be constructed on the basis of a union agreement which they sign.

[Podvezko] A few words about how your party was formed and what it represents now in an organizational sense?

[Gogin] Like any of the parties existing in the republic today, we began as a social movement. Half of the members of our party participated at one time or another in Intermovement. We went in that direction, indignant over the rash of news publications about immigrants. But when it became clear that the leaders of that movement, instead of doing or suggesting something, began to oppose everything new and to look for discrimination in everything and to build an organization on the principle of strict centralism (personal responsibility was assumed for failing to obey orders from above), we separated from Intermovement and created a new organization, "October Interfront." That was in May of last year.

"October" because we had the Intermovement soviet of the Oktyabr rayon. And "Interfront" because we wanted to show that the name was not important since the stereotype that Intermovement (ID) was made up of stalinists and other holdovers was being formed.

We lasted half a year under that name but when the presidium of ID's coordinating soviet announced its intention of creating an autonomous republic in Estonia, it became impossible for us to keep the name "inter-front" any longer. By that time we had already progressed to the point of creating a new party.

Right now there is still no party. Legally. There is a social- political organization called the Democratic Party (registered), the members of which plan to create a party. A program and charter are being worked out. When this is finished a congress or conference will be convened which will establish the new party.

But we must work now to clarify our positions, to conduct organizational work, to participate in the elections. Therefore, we consider ourselves already members of the party and pay membership dues.

[Podvezko] How many people are there who consider themselves party members?

[Gogin] Thirty people. That includes those who are already working. And there are more than a hundred potential members who have expressed the desire to join the party as soon as it is formed. In the future everything will depend on how active we are. Anyone who shares our party's program and who pays membership dues can become a member. We have no "actively participates in the work" formula.

[Podvezko] And the last question. What social base are you counting on?

[Gogin] I think that we will be supported by many workers and members of the technical intelligentsia. Those who are tired of all the kinds of bureaucrats who decide our fates for us, those who want to work and live with dignity according to the results of their own labor.

The situation with the creative intelligentsia is more complex. They are sort of apolitical here. But I think that at any rate sooner or later they will have to make their political choice. And then, if our words don't turn out to be empty talk, and the Democratic Party too turns into a real political force which professes practical politics, many representatives of the creative intelligentsia will support us too.

Estonian Draft Law on Political Parties

90UN0900A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[Draft: "Estonian SSR Law on Parties"]

[Text] Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, guided by the fact that the party is an inseparable part of the state structure based on the power of the nation, decrees the enactment of the USSR Law on Parties in the following version:

I. Concept of the Party

1. A party is a registered voluntary association of people that is based on membership and that has as its goal, by means of representative agencies that have been elected

by the nation in conformity with the laws, the monitoring and influencing of the activities of the government of Estonian SSR, as well as the soviets in the districts and cities of republic subordination.

2. Rules that extend to citizen associations operate with respect to parties, to the extent that this has been stipulated by the present law and by other legislative acts.

II. Independence of the Party

A party cannot be part of a party that is located outside Estonian SSR, or be subordinate in any other way to that party.

III. Equality of Parties

Parties are equal before the law.

IV. Activities Prohibited to Parties

A party is prohibited from engaging in any illegal activities, including:

- 1) attempting to change the state structure of Estonian SSR by unconstitutional means;
- 2) operating as a secret association;
- 3) possessing weapons and having ties with armed organizations;
- 4) resorting to violence and having ties with organizations that use violence;
- 5) inciting enmity among nations, believers, or other social groups;
- 6) taking advantage, directly or indirectly, of economic aid from foreign countries.

V. Party Rules and Program

1. A party must have rules and a program that have been adopted by its highest agency.
2. The party program and rules must be made public knowledge.

VI. Membership in the Party

1. Any citizen of Estonian SSR who has reached the age of 18 years can be a party member.
2. (Version 1) It is forbidden for judges or people's assessors to belong to the party.
2. (Version 2) The right to be a party member can be limited by law for certain categories of state officials.

VII. Creation of the Party

1. A party is considered to be created as of the day of registration of its rules, which have been adopted by no fewer than 100 citizens of Estonian SSR.

2. The party's rules are registered in the procedure that is in effect for registering public movements in more than one district or city of republic subordination.

VIII. Party Property

1. Party property includes its enterprises, buildings, and structures, membership dues, financing from the state or local budget, income from party enterprises and institutions, as well as other property and income.

2. The party has the right to create enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as societies, to be a shareholder in enterprises, and to establish charitable and other foundations.

3. The party can keep its money in banks that it has selected, to receive interest on deposits, to possess stock, and to grant credit.

4. The party's economic-financial activities are subject to monitoring by state agencies in the instances and procedure stipulated by law.

IX. Financing of the Party from State and Local Budgets

1. The republic's government finances, from the state budget, parties that have received at the most recent universal election to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet the support of no less than 5 percent of the votes, corresponding to their representation in the Supreme Soviet. For this purpose, ... percent of the income paid into the state budget is to be allocated annually. The Estonian SSR government finances the parties quarterly in equal shares, transferring the money to the party's bank account prior to the 15th day of the first month in the quarter. For the quarter preceding the next regular election to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the financing is doubled. During an election year there is a corresponding increase in the amount of budgetary deductions paid to the parties.

2. The soviets of districts and of cities of republic subordination can, at their discretion, render to parties lump-sum financial assistance from the local budget in accordance with their representation in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, as indicated in Section 1.

X. Party Reporting

1. Annually, by 15 January, the party reports to the Presidium of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet concerning the number of its members as of the end of the previous calendar year and gives the Estonian SSR government a report on its economic-financial activities during the previous calendar year. By the same date the party submits this information for publication in the RAKHVA KHYAEL and SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA newspapers.

2. Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet issues an instructional guide dealing with the form and preparation of the report on the party's economic-financial activities.

XI. Temporary Suspension of Party's Activities

During a state of emergency, the Presidium of Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet can temporarily suspend the political activities of parties and the acceptance of new members into them. This decision extends to all parties.

XII. Party's Responsibility and Cessation of Activities

1. If a party's activities contradict the law or the party rules, the court can issue a warning; can suspend for a period of up to 3 months the party's right to use its bank accounts or to accept new members; or can ban the party. The temporary suspension of the right to use bank accounts does not extend to settlements in accordance with a labor contract or an obligation to compensate for damages, or to the fulfillment of obligations that arose prior to the moment when the court's decision went into effect.

2. The agency that has been empowered to do so by the rules temporarily suspends the party's activities at its own discretion or if the number of its members falls below 1000 persons as of the end of any calendar year following the party's year of organization.

3. The court stops the party's activities if:

1) the party has been deemed to be insolvent in the legally stipulated procedure;

2) the party's activities are directed chiefly at obtained economic profit;

3) its activities cannot be stopped by virtue of the fact that it lacks an agency that has been empowered to do so by the rules;

4) the party has not officially announced its actually discontinued activities;

5) despite the reduction in the number of members (XII, 2), the party has not ceased its activities.

4. The reduction in the number of members or the cessation of the party's activities as a consequence of the temporary suspension of its political activities (XI) does not provide justification for employing paragraphs 4 and 5 of XII, Section 3 earlier than the end of the calendar year that follows the renewal of the party's political activities. During that period of time, if the number of members has fallen, the party is not required to cease its activities on the basis of XII, Section 2.

5. A commission to liquidate the party is appointed by the agency that has banned or temporarily suspended the party's activities.

6. The court requests the party to reply, or stops its activities, in the legally stipulated procedure.

Estonian Union of Labor Collectives Election Platform

90UN0903A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 3

["Election Platform of the Estonian Union of Labor Collectives"]

[Text] We are striving for:

- the democratization of power;
- private ownership and the freedom of enterprise;
- equal rights for all citizens;
- an internationally recognized independent Estonian republic (*de facto*).

The irreversible processes of self-determination in Europe have overtaken the Baltic states. Whether one wishes it or not, this is creating a new and fundamentally different point of departure in the political situation in Estonia on the eve of the election to the supreme agency of authority. The change in the situation marks the transition of society in Estonia from the level of abstract political declarations to practical work.

At this moment that is so important for the nation of Estonia, the Estonian Union of Labor Collectives (STKE) expresses its striving to participate in the activities of all the democratic forces that are striving toward the single goal—the restoration of an internationally recognized independent Estonian state. While proclaiming that it is only in this manner and in no other way that Estonia can be brought out of the overall crisis, the most critical one in its history, STKE shares the responsibility for the future of Estonia's society.

STKE sees one of the possibilities for achieving the goals stated in its platform in the renewal of the existing structure of authority, and sees the culmination of the political events at the present stage of the development of society in the 18 March 1990 election to Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. The highest legislative representation of Estonian SSR that has been created as a result of this election, despite the limited nature of its status according to state law, must be free to make decisions that guarantee the implementation of the progressive strivings of Estonian society. In practice, this means the precise definition of the specific tasks of developing all areas of life, and their comprehensive implementation at the highest level of the renewed authority.

Estonia's Political Development

STKE feels that, at the present stage in the development of society, the question of state independence is the basic question of Estonia's political, economic, and social renewal. Therefore it is reasonable in this regard to

consider the problems involved in Estonia's political development as being of priority importance.

Acting as part of Estonia's political system, STKE sees the possibility of resolving the tasks confronting society by means of the democratized structure of an authority from which amoral privileges have been removed.

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is obliged:

- to define Estonia's status according to state law, relying upon the lawful succession of the Estonian republic and the terms of the Tartu Peace;
- in conformity with diplomatic etiquette, to request the USSR to recognize Estonia's *de facto* independence, and to recommend to the USSR the immediate initiation of negotiations concerning the methods and stages in restoring Estonia's independence and concerning the withdrawal of troops;
- to assume the responsibility for Estonia's state security, the security of its citizens, defense, and foreign policy;
- to begin immediately to develop a new constitution;
- to be ready to cease its activity and transfer the authority to a Constituent Assembly of the Estonian Republic.

Estonia's Economic Development

STKE feels that Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and the government were unable satisfactorily to carry out the preparatory stage of IME [Self Managing Estonia], as a result of which the transition to cost accountability is being postponed indefinitely. There are no real political conditions for the radical renewal of the economy or the transition to market relations. In this situation, people are being increasingly to sense a lack of prospects, a feeling of being defenseless in facing the future, as well as a feeling of dissatisfaction and pessimism. It is also necessary to mention the continuing worsening of the economic crisis. The attitude taken by the partocracy and the bureaucracy to the situation gives foundation for only one conclusion: the economic *status quo* completely satisfied them.

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is obliged:

- to strive for the restoration of Estonia's property, to guarantee the independence of Estonia's property;
- to create constitutional guarantees for the property of other states and foreign entrepreneurs and citizens, and to define the terms and scope for the ownership of property in Estonia;
- to guarantee constitutionally the equal rights of all forms of property and their identical protection by the law;

- to put an end to the excessive controlling and excessive regulating of economic relations, and to promote the self-regulation of the economy;
- to guarantee to all citizens and enterprises equal freedom of enterprise, and to stop the action of all-union laws and decrees that regulate Estonia's economy;
- to guarantee the most rapid introduction of Estonia's own money;
- to reorganize land relations, to legalize private ownership of the land, and to guarantee equivalent commodity exchange between the city and the countryside;
- to carry out a series of economic and administrative measures to defend Estonia's domestic market.

Estonia's Social Development

STKE feels that the state must serve people and in its actions must be guided by the nation's interests. Only democratically organized profit-oriented enterprise can realistically guarantee a social policy that satisfies society as a whole. The basis of society's viability and prosperity is the viability and prosperity of each individual. The complete overcoming of the current sociopolitical crisis is possibly only in an independent Estonia.

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet is obliged:

- to recognize unconditionally the social injustice in the past, to announce publicly the names of the guilty individuals, and to cancel their benefits and privileges;
- to compensate citizens for the damages inflicted by the crimes committed by the authority, and to demand from the USSR compensation for the damage inflicted on Estonia as a result of its annexation;
- to guarantee human conditions of existence for all social segments, including the poor, the elderly, the sick, and those who have stumbled;
- to guarantee the equal defense by the law of all citizens, irrespective of their nationality, political views, or religious affiliation;
- to form legislatively a socially respectful attitude toward women as mothers and the guardians of hearth and home, and to create economic guarantees for this;
- to create a legal procedure for regulating wages, pensions, scholarships, and other income, which procedure corresponds to the cost of living, and to make the wages paid to persons employed in the nonproduction sphere equal to those in the production sphere;
- to form a policy in the area of education and science that corresponds to the world level, while avoiding its ideologization;

—to recognize the place of the church as an institution for forming a person's spiritual world, and for his ethical and esthetic education;

—to abolish the system of state, political, economic, and other privileges, and to guarantee equal rights and the identical defense of citizens by the law.

ONLY A FREE ESTONIA CAN HOPE FOR THE FUTURE!

Estonian United Council of Labor Collectives Election Platform

90UN0904A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 3

["Election Platform of Estonian United Council of Labor Collectives"]

[Text] Perestroika in the country and in Estonia has reached a critical point. Estonian society is facing by a historic election. On 18 March the nation not only will elect the republic's parliament. On that day the nation will choose the path along which Estonia will enter the twenty-first century.

There are only two paths: either, together with all the nations of the renewed federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, constructing a society on socialist principles of happiness for all, a society of freedom, equality, and brotherhood; or the breaking of ties with the USSR, a break that leads down a blind alley and to isolation—the secession of Estonia from the Union. There is no other third path. The Estonian United Council of Labor Collectives (OSTK) sees Estonia's path in implementing this platform, which expresses the fundamental interests of the working nation.

I. Estonia's Status and State and Social System

1. Estonia is and remains a component part of the federative USSR, a part that is legally equal to all the other union republics.

In conformity with Article 5 of the USSR Constitution, Article 5 of the Estonian SSR Constitution, and Article 1 of the 16 December 1966 United Nations Pact, the right to change this existing status of Estonia belongs only to its nation, which is understood as the totality of the entire population of the republic, and only by means of a referendum (nationwide vote).

2. Estonian SSR possesses political and economic sovereignty that is voluntarily limited by the transferral to the federative USSR of part of its rights to conduct affairs that are common for the entire federation.

The limitation of the competency of the Union and the republics is firmly established in the USSR and Estonian SSR Constitutions.

The legislative and executive authority of the Union and the republics operates within the confines of their competency, thus precluding conflicts between them and

assuring the priority of the unionwide Laws, and guaranteeing the republics' sovereignty within the confines of their competency.

From the constitutional formulation of the right to self-determination "up to and including secession," it follows that self-determination does not mean mandatory secession.

A sovereign republic as part of a federation is a form of the state self-determination of the nation.

Estonia's economic sovereignty is guaranteed by the Law Governing the Economic Self-Determination of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The realization of economic sovereignty will prove to be impossible without the preservation of the economic ties or the division of labor that have developed with the other union republics. The breaking of ties will immediately lead to a sharp decrease in the workers' standard of living.

OSTK categorically rejects the pseudodemocratic slogan of the separatist forces: "better poor, but free." The only one who will prove to be poor are the ordinary workers, rather than those who proclaim that slogan.

The question of the political sovereignty of all republics, including Estonia, is resolved on the paths of the fundamental renewal of the federation, on a constitutional level.

The geopolitical situation attests to the fact that political sovereignty and the freedom of the Estonian nation can be guaranteed only as part of a strong federation.

3. The bearer of sovereignty is the nation, which has priority status with respect to the state.

The entire completeness of the authority in the center and in the outlying areas belongs to the nation in the person of its elected representative agencies—the soviets of people's deputies.

All the workers in the agencies of state and local authority and the administrative apparatus serve the nation. The nation must not allow a situation in which the state and its apparatus stand above the nation and the apparatus employees are changed from servants of the nation into the nation's masters who sit on its neck. For this purpose the state apparatus must be reduced to the actually necessary minimum, and must be staffed on a competitive basis by competent and honest people. There must be absolutely no privileges for any official who is in state service.

The state and its apparatus must be monitored by the nation, for which purpose it is necessary to establish a public overview agency and to guarantee complete information about the activities of the state.

4. Just as between the USSR and the republics, there must be established a precise delimitation of the competency between the republic and local agencies of authority. The real power of the local soviets must be guaranteed economically.

5. All the agencies of state authority and local self-government are elected on the basis of universal and direct election with secret voting.

The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers are elected directly by the nation.

The results of the elections of mayors of cities of republic subordination and of district elders must be recognized as being final and must not be subject to approval by Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

6. Estonia's political social system is socialism in its Marxist-Leninist understanding—socialism as the path of perestroika, as a condition for the absolutely complete development of the individual.

7. OSTK recognizes the possibility of the multiparty system and the need to amend Article 6 in the USSR and Estonian SSR Constitutions in such a way that no one party, including the CPSU, can appropriate or directly carry out the functions of authority.

8. Estonian SSR must become a law-governed state.

All the physical and legal persons, including agencies of state and local authority and administrations, operate within the limits of the Law and are equal before the Law.

All the physical and legal persons must be guaranteed the legal defense of their rights and lawful interests.

OSTK considers as the first-priority task of the state and society the reinforcement of legality and law and order, the unremitting struggle against crime, primarily against organized crime, corruption, and other white-collar crime.

It is necessary to raise the level of cultivation of justice, to raise the professional level and increase the amount of technical support provided to the law-enforcement agencies, and to withdraw investigation from the jurisdiction of the procuracy and the MVD.

To support the implementation of what has been stated, OSTK will strive for the reconsideration of all Laws and other normative acts enacted by the Supreme Soviet and the republic's government from 16 November 1988 until the present time, and for the removal from them of all statements that limit the rights of the republic's civilian population and military personnel, as well as all other statements that contradict the USSR Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 16 December 1966 United Nations Pact concerning the individual's civic and political rights.

II. In the Socioeconomic Area

OSTK considers the purpose of the organization and practical activity of the republic's economy to be the increase in labor productivity and the effectiveness of production to the level of the developed countries, both by introducing into production the achievements of NTR [scientific-technical revolution] and by sharply increasing discipline and the quality of labor.

These goals must be achieved in the interests of man, in order to satisfy his needs and to raise the standard of living.

For these purposes OSTK considers the following actions to be necessary:

1. Economic policy must be given social directedness and the tasks that must be considered to be the first-priority ones are: the resolution of the housing and food problems; the saturation of the consumer market with high-grade industrial commodities; the resolution of problems of the ecology, public health, education, social protection, and the social security of the elderly, women, children, the family, and military personnel.

OSTK will strive:

- to increase the duration of paid maternity leave for the mother to care for her child; and to preclude completely the use of female labor in operations that are heavy or hazardous for females, as well as work on night shifts;
- to develop, by using the efforts of scientists and the public, comprehensive programs to protect the environment and people's health;
- to attract money from the social funds of enterprises and trade unions and from the state budget to improve the conditions in which patients are maintained in therapeutic institutions;
- to take all steps to improve the everyday living conditions of military personnel who are serving on the territory of Estonia, and members of their families;
- to eradicate completely the national discrimination on the part of agencies of state authority, especially in the area of labor, education, and other social rights of the members of society;
- to guarantee equal conditions for young men and women of all nationalities to obtain an education;
- to guarantee an employment rate in production for young people and all the able-bodied population, and in the 13th Five-Year Plan, to open the Russian University in the city of Tallinn;
- to convert all the special bases for recreational use by the party and governmental apparatus into homes for the use of veterans, disabled individuals, and orphans;

—to convert, free of charge, the new House of Political Education in Tallinn into a facility that meets the population's social needs.

These tasks can be implemented only by creating a mechanism that would give a self-interest to every worker in productive and high-quality work. We see this kind of mechanism in a market economy that is monitored and regulated by the state.

2. The independence of the economy and the republic's cost accountability and self-financing should be built from bottom to top—from the independence of the primary links of the economy: the enterprise, cooperative, sovkhoz, kolkhoz, lessor, farmer, etc. The relations between the state and them should be built on the basis of partnership, in accordance with a contract.

3. The completely equal existence of all social and legal-economic forms of production should be permitted; everyone should be guaranteed equal tax conditions and equal opportunities in supply and sales.

In tax policy, steps should be taken to encourage the production of high-grade food commodities, mass-demand commodities and the construction of housing and structures intended for social and cultural purposes.

4. All forms of ownership that preclude the exploitation of man by man should be allowed.

5. All forms of agriculture should be provided with modern highly productive technology, gear, and technological equipment. The labor collectives of OSTK are ready to cooperate for such purposes with sovkhozes, kolkhozes, lessors, and farmers on mutually advantageous contractual terms.

6. In agriculture, steps must be taken to reject the abuse of chemical stimulants, in order to preclude the production of output that dangerous to people's health. Comprehensive steps must be taken immediately to prevent losses of the harvest that has been grown.

7. In conformity with the USSR Law Governing Cooperatives, agencies of the central and local authority must discontinue the unauthorized activities of the cooperatives, concealed forms of speculation, and the obtaining of nonlabor income; the merging with the shady economy; the laundering of profits that have been criminally acquired; and other abuses.

8. When forming the wholesale prices, and especially the retail prices, there must be no lowering of the workers' standard of living. [End of platform]

Whatever is said about the historic causes of the process of formation of today's population makeup, and however that process is evaluated, the reality consists in that all of us together constitute a single society, a single working nation.

We are one because we are united by labor—the very basis of the existence of man, the family, and society.

We are one because we have identical human needs and striving for happiness for ourselves and for our children and grandchildren, and because we all identically cherish universal human ideals and values.

We are one in the common dissatisfaction with the existing living conditions and in the striving to improve life and restructure it on the basis of the humanitarian principles of socialism.

We are also one because we people of labor do not have anything that would disunite us.

A different language, a different culture, a different nationality—none of these disunite people, do not oppose some people to others, but only **DIFFERENTIATES** some from others.

And USSR People's Deputy, USSR People's Performing Artist Mikk Mikiver was a thousand times correct when he said, "When the topic of discussion in culture, let's talk about Estonians, Russians, Ukrainians, about each culture individually. But when the topic is life, then we ought not to engage in divisive actions."

We might add: not only "ought not to," but "must not."

OSTK addresses its election platform not only to its collectives, but also to all the workers in cities and villages, to that single, multinational working nation of Estonia.

Passed by the OSTK Council of Representatives, 23 January 1990.

Rival Estonian Labor Groups On Independence Declaration

90UN0993A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 4 Feb 90 p 2

[Report and interviews by V. Ivanov: "Press Conference Report"]

[Text] At approximately 19:45, a press conference began for journalists from republic, all-union, and foreign publications and news agencies. Their questions were answered by Indrek Toome, Enn-Arno Sillari, Maryu Lauristin, Myart Myuyur, Yulo Nugis, Arnold Ryuytel, Yuri Raydla, and Mikk Titma.

We're not going to strictly adhere to the sequence in which the questions were asked or reproduce the answers with verbatim precision. Our aim is to convey the thrust of the discussion, which was not only a continuation but also a detailed elaboration of the deputies' meeting as a whole.

One of the first questions concerned the possible reaction of "official Moscow" to the adopted Declaration, as well as the composition of the commission formed for talks with the USSR Government.

A. Ryuytel emphasized that he had had several discussions with both M. S. Gorbachev and other national

leaders, in person as well as by telephone, in which he assured them that the republic Supreme Soviet sees the purpose of its activities as expressing the people's will. This also accounts for the nature of the laws enacted over the past two years. The Chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium stressed that the only correct path in the present situation is the path of political realism.

The makeup of the representative commission was announced as well. It consists of: A. Ryuytel (chairman), A. Almann, M. Bronshteyn, V. Vare, T. Varek, T. Velliste, V. Veskivyal, A. Vyali, V. Vyalyas, G. Golubkov, A. Gren, I. Gryazin, S. Kallas, A. Keyerna, T. Kelam, K. Kiysk, A. Kiris, Yu. Kyarner, M. Lauristin, E. Lippmaa, N. Mikheyeva, M. Mikiver, E. Myandmaa, Yu. Nugis, R. Otsason, K. Payula, E. Pyldroos, O. Saveli, E. Savisaar, E.-A. Sillari, B. Tamm, M. Titma, I. Toome, Yu. Uluots, E. Cherevashko, and Kh. Sheyn. However, this list is a preliminary one. The final decision will be taken and confirmed by the republic Supreme Soviet.

Those present in the press conference presidium were asked how they view the speech by Trivimi Velliste at a rally in Zamkovyy Park in Toompea. Although the speech was published yesterday, we will remind readers that T. Velliste essentially called for a boycott of the elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on the grounds that it is a body that lacks the power to decide the fate of an independent Estonia. All those who responded to this question essentially agreed that the speech in question fails to serve the present-day interests of Estonia and its people and is extremist. That term may not have been used in all the answers, but the thrust of the answers amounted to such an interpretation of Velliste's speech.

M. Lauristin and many other press conference participants conceded that, in the course of the political transformations in the republic, extraordinarily little attention has been devoted to explaining the mass national movements' goals among the republic's non-Estonian population. This is what has caused mounting alarm, conjecture and rumors, and concern among Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonian for their fate.

A small digression. Last fall, I had a conversation with employees of major union enterprises in Tallinn. And one of them (I won't give his name, but he was a real, not fictitious person), a highly skilled worker, an adjuster of machine tools with digital program control, said roughly the following: If the leaders of the People's Front had not ignored, from the very outset of their activities, the working class of the Russian-speaking regions and enterprises, but instead performed constant work among them, explaining their goals and trying to prove their validity, then, as he put it, almost half of the non-Estonian workers would have shared their views and supported the idea of political and state independence for Estonia. This was spoken by a man who knew the people he was talking about not by hearsay but **from within**, and who was himself one of them. And another

person with whom I spoke, also a person who has constant dealings with the employees of union enterprises, supported his view.

It's a bit of a pity that this realization has come to the leaders of the Estonian People's Front themselves a little late.

The aforementioned M. Lauristin, speaking of an incident involving the representative of Sillamyaie at the meeting that was held, expressed sincere regret over it, emphasizing that not everyone has fully assimilated the lessons of democracy as yet and that the process of developing political culture continues. "I was ashamed of the way the envoy from Sillamyaie was treated," she said.

Many journalists—above all Western ones—wondered whether Gorbachev's policies and perestroika as a whole in the USSR might not be hurt by a certain haste with which changes are taking place in the Baltic region and in Estonia in particular. The answer can be summarized as follows (I am not quoting anyone in particular but giving the general thrust): "We understand the West's concern for the fate of perestroika and stability in Europe and the world. But the West must also understand us. It is impossible to build a common home that is comfortable for everyone if some peoples in it are denied the right to decide their fate themselves. Of course, the interests of great and small powers and peoples do not always coincide. To reconcile them, it is necessary to hold detailed and patient negotiations. Gorbachev is a realistic politician, and we support him in the cause of change and renewal, including with respect to international relations. On a basis of justice and equal rights. As for haste in changes in the Baltic regions, perhaps excessively slow and half-hearted decisions are exactly what has caused the sharp exacerbation in the Transcaucasian republics..."

In response to a question about the future of the non-Estonian population, M. Titma and other participants in the press conference said that the time has come to put an end to hysteria. One must not overestimate the statements of certain groups that hold extremist positions. The Russian-speaking population has the right to choose from among three options: to be a citizen of the Estonian Republic or to apply for Estonian citizenship; to live and work here while being a citizen of another state; or, on a strictly voluntary basis, to leave Estonia. "From journalists, we expect more help in fostering objective coverage and discussion of the problems," said M. Titma in conclusion.

The discussion also touched on the activities of the Civilian Committees, the Estonian Congress and the holding of a referendum, the prospects for a troop withdrawal from certain regions of the republic, and much else.

The press conference ended after midnight.

That evening I conducted two brief interviews with USSR People's Deputies Yulo Nugis and Vladimir Yarovoy. I put the same questions to both, although separately:

What is their impression of the just-held meeting of Estonian SSR Deputies?

Do they see today a possibility of cooperation between the United Council of Labor Collectives and the Union of Estonian Labor Collectives, since both organizations, on coming into being, called for long-term cooperation in solving the republic's socioeconomic problems? [Vladimir Yarovoy] I understand perfectly that it is necessary to speak of broadening the union republics' autonomy. But I view this question from the standpoint of preserving a united federation—the USSR. A renewed federation, of course, not in the form in which we have inherited it, since in earlier years there were indeed infringements on the union republics' interests. But this question must be resolved with due regard also for the interests of the nonindigenous population inhabiting the territory of Estonia. We who are here today are doubtless not to blame for the fact that unwarranted migration processes took place; nonetheless, we are talking about 40 percent of the republic's inhabitants, and this cannot be ignored.

The Declaration that was adopted here today by a clear majority takes into account the interests of the "purely" Estonian people. Furthermore, the Declaration makes reference to the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty as an indisputably legal. And it is necessary only to recognize it de facto, for which there are plans for further political actions aimed at secession from the USSR. I do not agree in principle with this Declaration.

Although, I repeat, the Estonian people, like any other republic, have the right to broaden their autonomy. But my position is that this must be done within the framework of the federation, unequivocally.

The fact that the adopted Declaration is supported by the majority of Estonian Deputies... Obviously, this is a fact that must be reckoned with. And let us say that they, from their viewpoint, in principle, are correct. But we must be taken into consideration as well. Yet today in both the republic Supreme Soviet and the elections to local Soviets, decisions are being made that take into account only the views, I repeat, of the indigenous population.

I see no possibilities for practical cooperation with the Union of Estonian Labor Collectives!

[Yulo Nugis] As for my impression of the just-held meeting, to be honest, we, its initiators and organizers, were prepared for anything. I refer to the fact that we did not exclude the possibility that disagreements might arise in the hall. And if you noticed, we were attacked—albeit by allusion, in a mild form—from both left and

right. Nor did we exclude the possibility that our political opponents might take more vigorous actions aimed against the meeting. Which is what happened.

(In front of the entrance to Gorkholl, before the meeting began, there was indeed an attempt to set up a picket and to penetrate the building. True, after it became clear that the attempt was unsuccessful, these people soon withdrew, and no disturbances took place.—Author)

I consider this a major violation of the "rules of play," and we have never done any such thing.

Despite all this, I would say that in general everything went well. It is regrettable only that, at the very end, after the Declaration was adopted, we lacked sufficient tolerance (reference is to the fact that for a long time, a representative of the Russian-speaking group of Deputies was not allowed to take the floor in order to read an alternative version of the Declaration.—Author). We could have acted in a more cultured and more diplomatic fashion. I can say the same for the incident involving the Sillamyae representative.

This can be explained in part by the rather rigid rules adopted from the very outset. If we had heard all who wanted to speak, the meeting would have dragged on interminably.

(For the sake of fairness, we should also note that the presiding officer also interrupted several times the speeches of other speakers who were dragging out their remarks.—Author)

It is also true that people wanted to present the alternative version after the main Declaration had already been adopted, when there was an entirely different emotional backdrop. In a certain sense, then, there was a justification. Still, I consider what happened to be defective work on our part. Had we also handled that epilogue well, I would be quite satisfied.

I see no possibilities for cooperation with the United Council of Labor Collectives. A year ago, the situation was different, but today we are already a different organization. Let's put it this way: We are a political party. And it has different functions. So I do not see any real points of contact. Including with respect to socioeconomic issues.

Georgian Election Boycott Plans Criticized

*18130069A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI
in Georgian 25 Jan 90 pp 2-3*

[Article by Dato Usupashvili, third year student in the Juridical Faculty, Tbilisi Ivane Dzhavakhishvili State University: "A Historic Chance..."]

[Text] There are just two months before the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet. The election campaign is mounting and reaching its critical phase. With the help of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and certain social organizations and movements, the Central Election

Commission has managed to overcome difficulties due to the shortage of time and the newness of the election law. Most of the district election commissions have also, so far, been able to cope with their lawful functions. Now they are busy organizing the election precincts and precinct commissions and dealing with matters relating to the nomination of deputy candidates in the districts.

Outwardly everything seems to be in order, and there would seem to be no cause for disquiet. In reality, however, the election campaign has been marked by a particularly significant shortcoming—a rather large part of the electorate's lack of interest in the results of the elections. This is most clearly attested by data from a poll of citizens nominated as deputy candidates. Everyone has equal rights in regard to participation in the elections, and it is very good that party and economic officials are actively involved in the election campaign and wish to submit their accomplishments to the judgment of the people. What worries us, however, is the fact that we are seeing very few candidates truly nominated by the people along with them, and the unanimous involvement of the officials themselves in the elections has a tinge of artificiality and forced consent.

It is true that a number of social organizations have yet to have their own decisive say, but it is obvious that by themselves they cannot do much unless they receive the support of the voters.

It is impossible to talk about the coming elections to the Supreme Soviet today without commenting on the idea of a boycott of the elections, which is quite popular among some segments of the population. It is well known that this position has been taken by the majority of informal organizations, and there are many who think just like them. Elections are free in this country, and, unlike some foreign states, a citizen who refuses to take part in elections will not be called to account for it. Hence, every one of us has the perfect right to act as he sees fit, but because the boycott idea is rather widespread, and its advocates' main arguments have already become clear, I take the liberty of expressing a few of my own opinions.

Obviously, advocates of boycotting the election do not deny the necessity of creating a supreme organ of authority as such. The difference in views is over the name of such an organ and the mechanism by which it is created, in other words the present election system. This conflict emerged during work on the draft constitutional amendments and election laws. It became clear during that period that most of the informal organizations are in favor of a proportional electoral system on a multi-party basis. Although we are perfectly in agreement with their thesis concerning a more democratic and perfected electoral system as such—and, moreover, we think that the multi-party principle must certainly become the basis in the near future for the electoral system of a law-governed Georgian state, it seems to us, nevertheless, that under the current political conditions in the USSR and the world today, a "closed" political game is essential—that is, the main focus should be on the content

of events, and sometimes we must disguise an event whose content is favorable to us in a form that is pleasing to our opponent.

It has been emphasized in the past, and I now repeat, that the election law now in effect is not something we perceive as an ideal version of the election law, and we cannot view the present electoral system as the most democratic electoral system. You can certainly agree that it would not be very difficult to translate the analogous laws of the world's most democratic states and submit them to the session of the Supreme Soviet. But then we would have to answer at least two questions: just how realistic would the passage of such a law by the present membership of the Supreme Soviet and the republic's actual leadership be? And, to what extent would the Georgian population's level of ideological-political and legal consciousness coincide with the requirements imposed on them by that most democratic electoral system? I think that the answer to these questions can only be negative.

Now let us answer the question, what has been our main, all-decisive goal—a hard struggle to legalize the world's best electoral system and then strut around waving this scrap of paper that is doomed to "inaction," or to install in the country's highest organ of government authoritative wise persons taking a firm national stance and approved by the people? We think the realistic politician will unhesitatingly choose the second goal and will search for the most painless way to accomplish it. The painlessness of the chosen path—the present electoral system—lies in the fact that outwardly it is "prettified" by a facade that is acceptable in our opponents' eyes, and inwardly too it is abundantly "decorated" with the traditional concepts and propositions so pleasing to our political opponents, while in reality it promises a transition to the multi-party political system and makes it possible to launch honest political struggle among the parties. This requires one thing—members of the registered or unregistered political associations must make a careful study of the law and turn to their own advantage the numerous nuances which are in it (and which are to a certain extent left to them) that are only perceptible to the clever politician. In addition to making maximum effort, of course, all of this requires maneuverability and the temporary renunciation of certain moral principles (rejection of the regime installed by occupation forces etc.), because politics has always been and will ever remain a most "amoral" game, and like it or not, the basic principle of serious political struggle remains the same—the nobler goal justifies the less noble means.

Hence, the boycott advocates' own decision is not justified by the arguments alleging that the present electoral system makes it impossible to carry out a democratic election campaign and install persons truly chosen by the people in the highest organ of government.

We also dispute the notion that it is wrong to take part in the formation of an illegal organ of government. Even if we were to acknowledge uncritically the thesis that the

elective organ of government is illegal, it is illegal only to us; the center and foreign states recognize it alone as legal. Therefore, we must think about which is politically more advantageous to the people—to install dedicated patriots in an illegal organ (legal to the center) and, through them, to prepare the necessary juridical base for the creation of an organ of government that is legal in the people's eyes, or to reject the easiest means of establishing popular government and conduct the national movement in a direction that has the same goal but is fraught with a thousand obstacles.

Now let us see what goals an election boycott might have. From the available information, two main goals stand out: the moral one of rejecting the regime installed by occupation forces and thereby effecting a kind of moral cleansing, or thwarting the political elections, thereby provoking a crisis of Soviet rule and seizing power.

In real terms, these two goals are linked and seemingly constitute two expectable results of the same process, but in fact the question of which one becomes the main goal is of great importance.

If the main focus is on the moral goal, what we will have is a passive boycott of the elections, meaning that the political associations advocating it, and their allies, will take no part in the election campaign but will not hinder anyone else either. As a result, the boycotters will achieve a moral victory and have a clear conscience thanks to their fidelity to moral principles. I think, however, that their victory will cost the people dearly, because society's most politically active, most progressively thinking, most militant stratum will be out of the election campaign. As a result, other progressive social organizations taking part in the elections will have a hard time of it in the struggle against reactionary forces, because these latter will have no difficulty at all in once more deceiving voters who are not very knowledgeable about political problems. What we will get, then, is a situation in which the helm of the republic's leadership will basically be taken by persons who identify the process of democratization with the legalization of their own millions. And it should not be difficult to imagine what the nation will gain from such a helmsman, on the one hand, and the much worsened opposition between the people and the government, on the other.

What will result from the shift of emphasis onto the political goal? Something even worse, I think. To cause a collapse of the elections will require an active boycott—that is, hindering those who do not share the boycott idea. It is hardly likely that in carrying out an active boycott its advocates would actually resort to direct means of thwarting the election campaign—that is, attempting to blockade the election commission buildings and polling places, applying physical and mental coercion against the voters, and so on. Theoretically such a method is quite simple, but practical implementation of it involves a great many difficulties. Indirect means of thwarting the elections would be more profitable. The theoretical formulation of the measures to be carried out would take a great deal of time and energy,

but it would yield considerably more practical effect. What specific indirect means are chosen is impossible to determine in advance, because the political situation in Georgia, Caucasia, and the USSR as a whole offers a broad choice. What results will come from any attempt at an active boycott? Quite negative ones, we think. Any active boycott would inevitably entail both extreme confrontation between internal political forces and provocations organized on rather fertile soil by the Center, which would result in the flames which have flared up in Caucasia spilling over into Georgia. It is hard to calculate who would get what out of all of this, but I have no doubt whatever that the Georgian nation would suffer the worst.

Hence, it is possible to accomplish the moral goal of a boycott. It will be morally profitable to its authors, but in the final analysis it will be a losing proposition for them as well, because the nation will lose. And the boycott's political goal is practically unattainable, but even the attempt to carry it off will result in extremely grave consequences both to the people and, consequently, its authors.

If we take a look at the history of the political parties in various countries of the world, we can see that the problem of whether or not to take part by some means or other in the formation of the organs of government is not a new one for opposition parties. Parties of various political leanings in various countries and under various historical circumstances have decided this problem in various ways, guided by their own worldview and the specific situation in the country.

Our own political currents also ought to have complete freedom of choice. Which of their positions turns out to be the right one is something time will tell. I do not rule out the possibility that I might be wrong and that, given today's situation, an election boycott is objectively the best step to take. Time will tell.... At this point, however, I firmly believe that an election boycott on the part of the leading forces of the national movement (whether passive or active) would take a "place of honor" among the gravest political errors committed by the nation's political leaders in the history of Georgian statehood.

I know I may sound like a hopeless mossback, but I have to say this:

It's still not too late.... Candidates for deputy can be nominated until 8 February. Let us not lose the historic chance to establish a popular government by peaceful means!

Georgia's Development of Black Sea Area to Aid Economic Independence

*90US0611A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 Feb 90 p 4*

[Interview of Georgian Gosplan official Bakur Davidovich Gulua by GRUZINFORM: "And The Sea Will Be Ours, And the Profits, And the Blessings: or, Several Words about the Draft Maritime Conception for Georgia"]

[Text] A national maritime conception is being developed within our republic. It is destined to play an important role in the life of Georgia, for, throughout the entire history of mankind, maritime countries have had an advantage over "land-locked" states in the tempo of their political, economic, social, and cultural development and in establishing international contacts and trade. In our distant past, this accounted for the flourishing of Colchis, Phasis, and Dioscuria on the shores of the Black Sea.

Many centuries have passed since that time and a sea of problems has appeared around Ponta Evksin. And not only in the ecological sense, but in an entire aggregate of problems that are vitally important for the development of a coastal state and its economy. All this, naturally, is disturbing to the public and dictates a necessity to speak out publicly, to introduce our own proposals.

A GRUZINFORM correspondent met with the First Deputy Chairman of the republic's Gosplan, Bakur Davidovich Gulua, who heads the Republic Coordination Commission for developing the draft national maritime conception, and asked him to talk about the conception's goals and tasks.

[Correspondent] How is work going on drawing up the draft?

[Gulua] In truth, the Presidium of the Georgian Council of Ministers still has not officially confirmed the new commission. However, it has been functioning as a working unit since the first days the government began to work on a conception for the economic development of the republic.

The problem placed before the commission is a complicated one, both in terms of scale and of time. Within a short time-frame, before 1 March of this year, we are must present the government with the draft of a national maritime conception and, by 10 May, with a complex program for its realization.

This decision is not one that was made today or yesterday. The task of developing a maritime conception was specifically formulated back on 18 November 1989, in an address by the Chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, N.A. Chitanav, at a session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, as one of a series of transformations being planned by the government on the republic's way to economic sovereignty.

Effective utilization of the sea's potentials is of fundamental importance for development of the national economy, it was declared from the tribune of the session. For clarity, I consider it necessary to present the position of the government on this question in its entirety,

I quote: "Development of the Black Sea, of the geographic and economic belt along the coast, is not restricted merely to development of subtropical crops or tourism, to the creation of a broad network of resort facilities and to Georgian shipping operations. The question of the further development and utilization of this

region is an exceptionally important and long-range one. Its solution requires the joint efforts of scientific organizations, Gosplan, and appropriate ministries and departments, inasmuch as its significance is complex and encompasses problems that range from the diverse channels of international relations to industry, trade, navigation, and exploitation of the sea's riches. And, all the time, special attention must be devoted to its main function, that of tying Georgia to the outside world."

These ideas became the basis for the creation of a national maritime conception and took on real direction from the day that the republic coordination commission was established for its development.

Based on the spectrum of questions being studied by it, on the variety of themes going into it, and, most important, based on its staff of scholars, economists, jurists, and specialists from various sectors of the national economy, on the representation of republic organs, ministries, departments, and scientific research collectives, one can judge the universality of its scale and of the measures being taken to deal with the problems of the Black Sea and to put the sea to work for the economy of the Georgian SSR.

It is sufficient to say that, along with Gosplan, Tbilisi State University, the Georgian SSSR Academy of Sciences, its scientific research institute for geography imeni Vakhushti Bagrationi, the Association for Protection of the Georgian Coast (Gruzbergozashchita), the State Committee for Protection of Nature and Forestry, the Georgian Technical University, the Georgian SSR Administration of Geology (Gruzgeologiya), the Georgian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, the Georgian SSR Administration for the Fishing Industry (Gruzrybprom), the Ministry of Justice, the Georgian Maritime Shipping Company, and many other of the republic's scientific, creative, and labor collectives are collective members of the commission.

[Correspondent] How, organizationally, is it planned to solve these tasks in such a short periods of time?

A temporary creative collective, financed by the government, has been established within the coordination commission. It includes ten creative groups that are working in accordance with the basic overall directions of the national maritime conception. Naturally, the institutes, associations, organizations and individual scholars that belong to these working groups will also have specific tasks with regard to elaboration of themes and questions. This, specifically, is what we are doing today. In the future, it is planned to establish a single maritime center and associations, which will carry out work on the study and solution of all problems connected with the Black Sea. Indeed, the question that arises today is not about how to rectify the destructive consequences resulting from violation of the ecological balance of both the water area of the sea and of its shores, but about how to save the sea as such, having revived its healthy functions.

Destructive inertia is so deep that it is not possible by prohibitions alone, let us say, on relocating the Batumi petroleum processing plant, or by intermittent shore-reinforcement operations, to save the overall situation. We need to resolve, and urgently, an entire complex of scientific, economic, and national economic problems.

This is to say nothing about the need to expand reconstruction and technical modernization of ports to contemporary standards, without which no littoral state can conceivably function normally today.

Only all-round, regulated economic and scientific and technical decisions with regard to renewal of the region's infrastructure will be able to ensure both a modern level in the development of tourism and a high level of fertility for the Black Sea littoral in the Caucasus.

All these and other questions, naturally, demand improvement of the management structure and of the mechanism of economic incentives, large investments, and, most important, the efforts of all society. The task of the republic coordination commission is to present for general discussion the most optimal and effective program for its realization.

[Correspondent] Is it not possible in this connection to define specifically certain aspects of the draft for the future national maritime conception?

[Gulua] The essence of this multi-level, statewide, and nationwide task can be formulated briefly: On the path toward economic sovereignty, it is not enough for the republic to become the fully-empowered owner, protector, and manager of its own part of the sea's wealth.

It is first of all necessary to solve the problem of increasing Georgia's role as a coastal state, one which possesses sovereign maritime rights and which makes its own specific contribution to international cooperation and trade and to economic development and a division of labor on the international and republic levels.

Solution of the problem of the sea as a sphere for the development of trade with bordering regions [prigranichnaya trgovlya]—and, most important, of maximum and careful utilization and reproduction of marine resources for achieving the food program—is coming to acquire particularly important significance for the republic.

Rational use of the sea as an alternative source of energy, as well as of its mineral resources and recreational potential, will unconditionally benefit our economy.

I am not even speaking about the potentials that are inherent in solution of the ecological problem and in complex, scientifically-based exploitation of the recreational resources of the Black Sea. The compass of this question is extremely broad. Both on this plane and in all other questions, we are hoping for international collaboration on cooperative principles with all the countries of the Black Sea basin.

In a word, both in the short term and in a longer-range perspective, we have more than enough problems, as well as questions. Broad public opinion will be taken into account in dealing with them; all businesslike proposals will be carefully examined and considered for the good of the matter.

In answer to our opponents, I can firmly state that the program for developing a national maritime conception is a precise one methodologically. A course has been set for complexity in the solution of problems, which unconditionally will make a contribution of its own to establishing and strengthening the economic sovereignty of the republic. With the solution of this task, the sea will be ours, and its profits and its blessings will become ours. The main thing now is to work productively and thoughtfully.

Speeches as January Georgian Central Committee Plenum

90US0625A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Report on Speeches at January Georgian Central Committee Plenum: "The Communist Party of Georgia: The Responsibility to the Time and to the People"]

[Text] This plenum of the Georgian CP Central Committee has been long awaited. And for the most part it has justified its expectations, and has been distinguished by its principled nature and acuity of judgements. At it, not only were the problems not side-stepped, but even more were revealed; constructive criticism and self-criticism resounded; bold, unusual thoughts and proposals were expressed.

Such a mood for the plenum, a tone truly businesslike unfolding at it, and concerned conversation was set by a speech which had already been published in the press.

Naturally, it is difficult to reflect in their entirety everyone's speech in the report offered today. We will single out only the chief, fundamental problems and issues, conclusions and proposals that resounded from its tribune.

To Check Every Step Against The Lofty Goal

Today, Georgia lives by the hope of winning real political and economic independence, and no power can stop this process. That is why the Georgian Communist Party must first and foremost express its attitude toward this issue.

"The draft of the Conception of the national development of Georgia published several months ago instilled certain hope in people," Georgian CP gorkom first secretary N.M. Lekishvili said in his speech. "Based upon this conception, along with the strategic line, we should develop a concrete program of tactical actions. The peace treaty of 7 May 1920 should be evaluated and its results realized. One of these stages should be considered the issue of concluding a new union agreement by a certain deadline in which would be formulated the

interrelations with the Union and other sovereign republics. Another immediate task is the renewal of the anthem and flag of the Georgian republic.

"There frequently ring out the questions, 'Where are we going? Are we going correctly? Have we not gotten off the track?' And this is not groundless. If we look the truth in the eye, we must recognize that the party today is experiencing a serious shortage of the people's trust. The party has become encompassed in a definite political crisis. Let these words not frighten, such is the general situation in the party, and when the talk gets around to the fact that in this or that region the party organization works well or is not handling things, that the center has been restructured, or that there are now lower echelons, and it simply seems not to be serious to me. I will say nothing new if I add that the political situation in all the echelons of the party is almost identical.

"Time does not wait. As the life and the experience of recent times has shown, the situation is changing almost every day. The CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo must take into consideration the fact that the main thing is to foresee objective reality, and to recognize a fait accompli—the lost political struggle.

"However, not all our designs, and not only our designs, are linked to the fate of the Georgian Communist Party, its place and role in the life of our people. It must become the political vanguard of society, and make the transition to solid national positions. This can be done only by a renewed Communist Party, enriched by new ideas and concepts, a new attitude and practical activity. Therefore, it is extremely important to formulate the status of the Georgian Communist Party in a timely manner."

Ispolkom chairman of the Kutaisi city soviet of people's deputies T.G. Shashiashvili and other speakers spoke about the fact that Georgia itself must determine the nature of its political life. It was emphasized that such a categorical tone must not irritate, either in Georgia, or beyond its borders. The rise in the national movement which is being observed today is an objective conformity to the natural law of social development. If not reckoned with, all this reality may become more exacerbated even without such an extremely tense situation.

However, it is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that in the development of the national movement, we should not make unprincipled concessions. And today, that is exactly how the matter stands; the authority of the party is at times undermined, and the forces opposing it are intensifying. Just a few months ago we discussed and adopted the CPSU Central Committee platform on national relations, and the other day, during a speech to the aktiv of Lithuania, the Central Committee general secretary had to recognize that new proposals are being prepared; that we will have quite a different federation, although we do not know what kind, as we have not yet lived under the conditions of such a new federation.

Let us say directly: After all, it was possible to make an accurate diagnosis in time and bring a model of such a federation up for general discussion. Then we would have managed to avoid the tension which rises in our path every minute, doing damage to the economy, which is existing in a state of crisis even without that.

Who is going to speak against such a union in which each republic will be granted complete political and economic freedom? After all, that is exactly what the people demand!

In evaluating the state of affairs today, Georgian CP Central Committee second secretary **A.Yu. Pavshentsev** noted that it is necessary to reckon with the realities of the unprecedented growth of social activity, and the rise in national self-awareness, which has been particularly manifest this past year.

We all deeply recognize, he said, that this year was a great tragedy for Georgia, the ominous repercussions of which rolled across the entire country, and at the same time, correcting the foundations of policy and the law, morality and the conscience of our entire society, the national and civil dignity of the Georgian people. And is it only the Georgian people in blood—everyone who perceives the long-suffering land that has not lost a bit of its hospitality as a result to be his homeland, who shares fully in its joy and sorrow, and is truly involved in its fate experiences the pain from the wound that will not heal.

The sad echo of the April events has grown, intertwining itself with many other well-known complications in the life of the republic, which have practically not spared a single one of its regions. Under these conditions, the only true path has been selected in the work of the Georgian CP Central Committee—the path of patient, constructive dialogue, an unceasing search for that platform upon which the consolidation of the public and the mutual understanding among its various formations is possible.

At the current, no less, and sometimes more, complicated stage, it is not enough to fortify the yet weak sprouts of what we have achieved. We cannot labor under a delusion: Our positions are fairly hurt. This manifests itself primarily in interethnic relations, which have intensified substantially in a number of the country's regions, and have recently reached extremes in neighboring republics. The impression is being formed that this suits someone's hand, to inflame national discord, and undertake efforts to drag Georgia into the conflict situation. It is the cause, to say the least, of bewilderment that it is frequently the central press and other mass information media which provoke such a situation when, without even thinking about the geography as they should, they lump everything into the same basket under the rubric, "The Situation in the Transcaucasus."

The complex sociopolitical situation which has been created in the republic today finds its origins not in the ill-fated 9th of April, but in an earlier period, when the

problems which had accumulated owing to democratization suddenly surfaced. Then came the bloody April, and the ethnic conflicts in Kvemo Kartli and Abkhazia, then in South Osetia, caused by rallies and other actions leading to a strong exacerbation of the situation.

During such a time, the main task is the stabilization of the political situation. How can this be achieved? It is impossible to resolve such a problem through old examples, clichéd approaches, and methods of force. The current Central Committee leadership has started on the path of a search for and introduction of principally new forms and methods of party work which respond to the demands of the moment. The generalization, confirmation, and deepening of these forms and methods are necessary for the consolidation of social forces with the goal of realizing national interests.

It was stated at the plenum that all of this must be taken into full consideration in the determination of approaches and principles for the resolution of urgent problems. They were speaking first and foremost of the elections to the Supreme and local soviets of people's deputies. It is likely that each voter must convince himself that the Communist Party has at the center of its attention the interests of the people; it is going into the elections with a realistic, constructive program, and a piercing concern for the republic's welfare. Along with this, it is necessary to create normal conditions for the free manifestation of the people's will.

The next most important task is the preparation for the 28th Congress of the Georgian CP. Here it is fitting to listen attentively to the broad masses on a comprehensive basis on the matter of principled and program issues concerning the party's place and role in society, and the democratization of intra-party life, and other aspects of party building.

On The Path of National Development

Subjects of particular discussion at the plenum were the issues connected with the realization of the Conception, the national development of Georgia, one of the most important components of which is the achievement of the republic's economic independence. It was noted that despite the energetic measures undertaken by the Government for the stabilization of the situation and the recovery of the financial condition, for the time being, it has not managed to handle practically a single one of the main indices of socioeconomic development.

Speakers expressed their deep conviction in the reality of achieving Georgia's economic independence as a most important condition of the republic's extrication from the crisis. It was emphasized that the main thing now is to force the new economic mechanism to pick up speed, to activate explanatory work in labor collectives, to convince them that the current reform is "serious and long-term," and not the usual campaign.

Georgian CP Central Committee secretary **B.S. Dzhihiya** underscored in his speech that work with cadres in the

provinces acquires particular meaning here, first and foremost in the rayon echelons. Naturally, this work should be raised to a qualitatively new level in the labor collectives as well. It is necessary to eliminate leaders who have lost the moral right to make exacting demands of others, before things get to the point of conflict. After all, there have been cases in which managers in public farms in Gurdzhaanskiy, Zugdidskiy, Mtskhetskiy, Chkhorotskuskii, Tsalandzhikhskii, and Tsiteltskaroyskiy rayons were forced to give up their positions under such circumstances. This process is developing, and has reached the level of party committees. The conclusions should be drawn, and the appropriate measures taken. At the present time, there is also taking place a process of refinement and delimitation of party and soviet functions, and those of other echelons of the political system. What are the role and place of the party in the political system, its structure? This remains to be determined, after broad discussion, by a future congress. But one thing must be said now: The party is not a legislative organ. Its authority cannot be fortified by articles in the Constitution. Having granted all power to the soviets, the party must finally free itself from functions alien to it, although it does not have the right to eliminate socioeconomic problems, but to find a political approach to them, and thus resolve the problems that have accrued in the economy, relying upon public opinion; the party must work out a strategic direction, constantly concerning itself with their implementation, since the economy and policy are intertwined to such an extent that breaking one off from the other could have extremely grave consequences.

"While supporting the ideas, advice, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in the report and in individual speeches, at the same time, I consider it necessary to expound my position on what, in my view, are several of the principal problems," said N.A. Chitanava, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

"First. Today, we must collectively recognize the bitter reality—a civil war is taking place in the spiritual sphere of the republic.

"Unfortunately, it has become a palpable reality. The political course determined by the plenum must accelerate change for the better in the situation.

"Second. The epicenters of the situation's complications on the map of the republic's sociopolitical life are changing rapidly. Consequently, in accordance with this, the content and scope of our political tasks should be changed with this, the psychological load, quality, and level of the organization of their resolution. This must be accompanied by a change in the principles, trends, style, forms, and methods of work of party and soviet organs.

"Third. There has been accumulated in the republic recently a certain amount of experience in overcoming the most complex situations; however, we have a multitude of urgent political, social, and economic problems. Simply a correct analysis of the situation which has

arisen, an objective evaluation of the phenomena is insufficient for their resolution; action is necessary, action well-thought out from all sides, constructive, aimed at actual results.

"It is well known that there exist no consequences without causes. And the cause of political tension in the country is complex. The perestroika processes taking place have highlighted a great deal in a completely new way, laying bare the shortcomings in our life. To some extent, this was conducive to turning on the left-leaning criteria for evaluation of the past, the intensification of the tendency toward our groundless rejection of what has been achieved by the country, the people. We have been so attracted by the pathos of unmasking, instead of deep analysis, that we, unfortunately, also put down that which is positive in our history.

"Why are the people, the party organizations, the cadres now in a state of confusion, in no condition to understand what it is that is happening? Where are we going? What do we want? This has been a bad influence on people's general mood, and has led to an intensification of psychological stress, sown the seeds of mistrust. The party center has also permitted a slow-down in the implementation of effective measures. And as a result, we are in a state of political weightlessness.

"Today, under the complicated conditions of perestroika, when we have decided to change the existing reality, we must choose a true position; define that version and model of the future which will correspond to the republic's actual reality, the traditions of the people, the level of its culture. We would be making a serious mistake if, in determining the path to the future, we started to borrow ideas and recommendations from various political theories and teachings—we say, perhaps this will suit tomorrow's Georgia. The main thing has to be determined—are they appropriate to our reality? It is precisely this sort of comprehensive study and analysis of the actual reality that we need today. And it is precisely this which we are lacking, seriously hindering our movement forward. All the more so because not one of the movements, associations, or even the scientists themselves has a scientifically based program for tomorrow's Georgia. Under such conditions, the republic's political leadership has done a great deed—it has put forward for the people's discussion the draft of a conception of national development, and today, it faces confirmation, with consideration for the results of this discussion.

"Of course, work in this direction will continue in the future since every stage of development has features inherent only in it, and it is impossible to guess everything in advance. The main thing is that the methodological bases for determining the model of the future be constructed upon a solid, genuinely national and scientific foundation.

"Many centuries of rich experience of statehood have been accumulated by our people, which we somehow do

not bring to our attention in governing. Such, for example, are the foundations of state administration, of the economic structure of the epoch of David the Builder or Tsaritsa Tamar (we have been satisfied with their mere description), or Tsar David's conception of religious tolerance. But have we penetrated deeply into the essence of his policy of the unification of Georgia? What was laid in the foundation of the reforms of David the Builder? What conditioned the successful functioning of the state model of that time, its structures, and how can their later destruction be explained? Every people has such nuances of natural qualities, which must be taken into consideration at the complicated crossroads of development.

"The complicated process of perestroika began in the country, and of course, in the republic, without the corresponding preparation and comprehensive determination of the main strategic trends. Just as in other regions, the party organization in Georgia as well proved obviously unprepared for the sharp turn.

"The Georgian CP Central Committee has not been able to overcome the general inertia in the processes of perestroika, and in this complicated situation, it has proven not to have a precisely formulated and carefully aimed political program, or effective forms and methods of activity. That is why at the conflict with the first obstacles, a great portion of the party organizations proved ideologically, politically, and organizationally disarmed. This bitter reality should be acknowledged..

"Now, when the details of the 9 April tragedy have been made concrete and precise, we can with all grounds give a political evaluation of this unhealed wound of the people, of each of us.

"The April tragedy, it is possible, was the consequence of the fact that the party organization, the Central Committee, had not deeply analyzed the free-form processes of perestroika, had not found their place in them. They were not capable of heading the process of consolidation of healthy forces against the complicated backdrop of perestroika.

"It is now clear to everyone that many entered the party for career motivations, and even managed to occupy influential positions in it. We must unmask this dangerous category of people in a timely manner. Recognizing their political physiognomy is no difficulty. They have already shown themselves clearly, especially of late, at the crossings of political events. It should also be said that the 'position' of many leading workers and the yardstick of their evaluation during the course of the development of events has changed and is still changing. We probably all recall the tone, content, and address of the speeches of many of our comrades at plenums, sessions, and other meetings before the 9 April tragedy and after it. Many did not withstand the trial by truth. We must rid ourselves of the people who are two-faced, immoral, and hypocritical on all levels of political life.

"A big game based on national feelings, a dishonest game, is continuing in Georgia today, in its political and public life. There has already been defined a group of comrades who constantly, with great exaggeration and aplomb put down Soviet power. They do this in order to curry favor with the patriots. Unfortunately, our chameleons have multiplied. More than anyone else, the most 'qualified' will bear the party and the Government, those who received everything from this power, by their services, or more often, without same; by legal means, or more often, by illegal ones.

"Now, some are trying to cover the tracks of their dubious activity by such a method. That is why today, you often cannot even understand who has what position, or whether someone even has a political position at all, other than his own egotistical aspirations. It remains to be explained and understood, who of our body is on whose side; to what party he belongs, or if he adheres to a "party-fraction," if he is mobile through some sort of groups, or through family interests. Such is the bitter reality of which we have become convinced in the difficult days of January.

"Many complicated problems have accumulated in our economy. The situation in this vitally important sphere is now alarming. I concisely declare to the plenum that the Government, its chairman, cannot take upon themselves the responsibility for the stabilization of the republic's economic situation if the labor collectives and the entire people do not support the implementation of the measures for the economy's recovery. And unfortunately, this is not to be seen today; the crisis is deepening. The waste and pilferage of the national property are of a massive nature; at leading sectors of the national economy, many managers are showing insolvency; planning and financial discipline in an entire range of branches of the national economy have been shattered. Unless extraordinary measures are taken, great difficulties with supplying the population with foodstuffs will arise.

"The transformation of the organizational structure of state administration of the economy must be accelerated—there is no need for such a multitude of ministries and departments. It seems expedient to transfer the functions of an entire range of ministries and institutions to the local soviets. This will be conducive to the strengthening of people power.

"Incidents of gross violations of law and order, legality, and public order have become more frequent in the republic; the number of criminal violations is growing. The responsibility lies first and foremost upon the Government, and it bears full responsibility for such a state of affairs. The issue of making concrete the interrelations of the Council of Ministers and the administrative organs requires clarification. Now more than ever we need to wage a decisive struggle against corruption, bribery, and pilferage of public property, which have put down such deep roots in the republic.

"This fight should be declared with particular urgency in the administrative organs themselves. It is here that the most reliable and experienced cadres (fortunately, we still have such cadres) should be sent to work. It is no accident that this issue arises. As bitter experience shows, in recent years, individual services of the administrative organs have not been functioning according to their designation. They have not been fighting the disorders and lawlessness with a full front.

"The people must believe in the purity and firmness of policy of power. Otherwise there will not be any faith. And a people without faith will not support any sort of policy.

"A few words on the role of the intelligentsia in the life of our republic. Certain people feel that that intelligentsia is holding itself off to the side of the most complex processes taking place. There is also the opposite opinion, exclusive of the latter, that the intelligentsia is actively participating in the urgent processes of modern times. However, there also exists a third point of view: The intelligentsia is seriously analyzing the zig-zag processes and is not drawing any hasty conclusions.

"What is my position? Despite the fact that there undoubtedly exists a 'rational kernel' in the first two opinions, I still firmly believe that the intelligentsia is reflecting deeply, seriously, thoughtfully, and not hurriedly, and along with a comprehensive analysis, it is also seeking and will propose to the Government and the people an acceptable model of political and economic structures. In light of this, I must note with satisfaction that a process of effective utilization of the great potential of economic and engineering thought has begun.

"At all levels, at almost every meeting, especially in dialogue with leaders of public movements, the question is simply raised, why do we not permit the existence of various parties, that is, the issue of a multiparty system is being raised. I want to inform the plenum participants of what I have repeatedly said at such meetings and various types of gatherings: During recent months, it is precisely within the framework characteristic of a multiparty system that meetings, discussions, and pointed dialogues are taking place between the republic leadership, and various social movements and parties not officially registered, but having charters, programs, platforms, a press organ, and possessing real strength to influence the processes of social development.

"Therefore I categorically refute the opinion of individual comrades who consider the non-standard decisions of the authorities in extraordinary situations to be a deviation from party principles, for there exists no objective basis for this. I have stated many times and I state now: We fully support the consolidation of healthy forces. The national movement, which is growing stronger on the basis of the dialectical cause and effect relation, is gathering strength and deepening, and should be defended from high moral nationalist positions. We must deeply master the art of

opposition and combination of our own policy with the new movements and trends which emerge on the waves of perestroika, in order to improve our strategy and tactics during the course of events. We will thus promote the creation of a solid political foundation of the future Georgia. And it is such an approach, a non-standard position and resolution, if you will, which saved Georgia and the Georgian people from catastrophe in those difficult days of January."

Brigadier of the Zemo-Alvanskiy sovkhov, Akhmetkiy Rayon **N.A. Petriashvili**, first secretary of the Lanchkhutskiy Rayon Georgian CP **E.A. Beridze**, first secretary of the Khuloyskiy Rayon Georgian CP **B.D. Shainidze**, editor in chief of the magazine KOMMUNIST GRUZII **V.V. Keshelava** and others spoke at the plenum of the paths and means for the realization of the Conception of the national development of Georgia, the resolution of topical economic and social problems, and the improvement of democracy within the party.

On the Principles of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation

The plenum rightly demanded the immediate review of the usual dogma and cliches, the renunciation of the weight of the errors of the past. It was emphasized that it is necessary to actively seek new ideological values, assimilate humanistic and democratic ideals and interests, placing them decisively higher than the falsely understood class and narrow-group and prognostication interests. There was an objective conversation as to whether the status of the Georgian Communist Party must be brought into accordance with the real political, economic, and cultural sovereignty of Georgia.

We are living and working in a most complicated political situation. The pain of the tragedy in Tbilisi, the ethnic conflict in Abkhazia, Kvemo Kartli and Shida Kartli lay on the people's hearts as a heavy burden. Therefore, our main task today, it was said at the plenum, is above all the creation of a normal situation in the republic by means of a consolidation of all the nations and nationalities inhabiting it. We need national unity and international brotherhood in the best sense of the word.

"Today in Abkhazia overall, the situation from the outside is more or less calm, and we are doing everything in order that it become stabilized," **V.F. Khishba**, first secretary of the Georgian CP Abkhaz Obkom said in his speech. "However, certain facts of the overgrowth of recent confrontation and mistrust of one another are disturbing. We must not permit the development of this process. The time has come to begin an honest, frank dialogue and mutual understanding. The problems of the economy, the ecology, language, demography, and others—these are our common problems, and the entire population of the autonomous republic must participate in their resolution. Endless unrealistic demands, appeals, strikes, and mutual accusations in the press and on

television do not create material or spiritual blessings, do not raise the economy. If each in his place does the minimum of which he is capable (not to mention the maximum), that is, if every patriotic and civil duty is fulfilled honestly and conscientiously, bearing in mind not only our rights, but our responsibilities to society, then that will already be quite sufficient for a sharp turn toward the better."

Many spoke at the plenum of the importance of creating the bases for national solidarity and concord, a solid foundation for the stability of interethnic relations and cooperation. Various paths for achieving this were proposed; unusual opinions were expressed. And this is natural. As if having awoken from a lethargic sleep, we are throwing off our fetters of settled stereotypes, freeing ourselves of a great deal which only yesterday seemed immovable and taken for granted.

Today's most tangible results in the movement toward democracy are glasnost and freedom in expression of opinions. And this is quite understandable under the normal development of events and the conditions of a law-governed state, yet it does not always seem acceptable when the skills for living under a genuine democracy are lacking.

It is against just such a backdrop that **A.A. Kachmazov**, ispolkom chairman of the South Osetia Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies evaluated the events of the end of last year to beginning of this year, recognizing that the soviet and party organs did not manage to take events in hand at the critical moment. None of the public organizations could take this role upon themselves. And as a result, further development of the conflict was prevented only at the expense of great efforts.

The complications which arose do not have deep roots or real soil. However, the unforeseen occurred: Two peoples, always proud of their traditional amicability, always understanding each other's half-spoken thoughts came into conflict, and blood was shed. The republic mass information media also played a negative role in the complication of the mutual relations. The impression is created that some of them are subject to the influence of certain circles to whose advantage it is to supercharge the situation of suspicion, mistrust, and enmity between the Osetian and Georgian peoples, that is, to create an interethnic problem where there had been none.

How to go on living? How to restore a normal moral-psychological atmosphere in our society? The questions were raised. It was not easy to find answers to these questions. One thing is clear; everyone will have to work long and hard, systematically and goal-directed, convincing each other in deeds, not in words, of their sincere aspiration toward the good and justice in order to restore the previous trust among people.

A great deal remains to be thought through and done. It is difficult to guess all the forms and aspects of the work in advance, yet one thing is beyond doubt—there must not remain a trace of the former complacency and

inactivity. Now is the time to think and act, to act in a weighed manner, thoughtfully, actively, wise in the ways of the people, and with foundation. Administration has exhausted itself; it is now the turn of truthful thought, and honest, fair deeds.

The errors permitted in the cadre and nationality policy over the course of years lend themselves to correction with difficulty. This is being exploited by creators of certain moods, who represent the situation that supposedly the interethnic conflicts which have recently taken place in the republic were caused by the actions of the Georgian population, which does not correspond to reality. As Georgian SSR Procurator **V.A. Razmadze** announced at the plenum, the investigation into the causes of these conflicts continues, but one thing is obvious—it was of an organized nature in all cases. And despite certain difficulties, all measures are being taken in order that not one single guilty party be left undetermined and unpunished, regardless of his national affiliation, social position, or post held.

Many declare that we are building a law-governed state, however, it is probably early to talk about that for now. Policy is often put above the law here. But after all, policy must flow from the demands of the law, and only the law may determine it.

One of the real possibilities for a way out of the situation which has been created today is the steadfast execution of the Conception of the national development of Georgia. This document confirmed its viability in action over the short interval of time which has lapsed since its publication. It really formulates the theoretical basis of the republic's national development. Practical steps are now necessary for its execution.

This was discussed at the plenum by speakers **V.S. Zorina**, an embroiderer from the Tbilisi "Komsomolka" textile plant; **T.Sh. Mosiashvili**, first secretary of the Georgian CP Akhaltsikhskiy raykom; **A.I. Kavadze**, first secretary of the Georgian CP Gori gorkom; **F.M. Makharadze**, director of the Tbilisi branch of the Central V.I. Lenin Museum, and others. It was noted in particular that in the sociopolitical situation which has come into existence, the republic leadership has capably worked out and defended a correct position. Only conviction, dialogue, and personal contacts with the people helped stabilize the situation. Such an ability to take responsibility, to advocate positions of principle in word and deed must distinguish genuine party workers, and, of course, Central Committee members.

Today, a great deal remains to be done and renewed, and renewal is what is most needed by the party. But haste should not be made here, emotionally, blindly following others' examples.

In speaking of the Conception of the national development of Georgia, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Vice President **A.M. Apakidze** noted that Georgian scientists were among the first to approve it. Temporary

working groups were created, uniting specialists of various branches, which are developing a concrete program for implementing individual trends of the conception. The Georgian Academy of Sciences has long worked on these issues in conjunction with Tbilisi State University and other higher educational institutions of the republic's Ministry of Public Education system.

Naturally, the implementation of the conception of the national development is linked to the republic's sovereignty and the determination of the status of the Georgian CP, which must be expressed in its real independence. The Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences, for example, has firmly resolved to achieve complete autonomy. Nor has it requested the center to grant such autonomy, but resolved the issue itself. This year, at a meeting of the Academy's presidium, a publication plan was confirmed, and the appropriate organs were notified that from now on, they will not receive these plans for confirmation. With the support of the Georgian CP Central Committee, the republic Council of Ministers, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, the institutions of the Academy and Georgian scientists have established close mutual relations with foreign scientific centers. Today, without an intermediary or any sort of appeal to the center, the Georgian Academy of Sciences sends scientists abroad on business trips. Even though this is associated with great difficulties due to the lack of foreign currency, the republic Government, Ministry of Finance, and Gosplan are rendering all possible assistance to the Academy. Practical steps are now being taken in order that the Academy itself accumulate foreign currency. The issue has long since become urgent of granting scientific degrees and titles on a final basis in the republic, in the appropriate state certification councils. Other innovations are also envisaged which are within the competence of precisely such an independent Academy.

A substantive conversation was held on the mutual relations among the union and republic organs. It was emphasized that a genuinely democratic, pluralistic state such as we are attempting to construct does not need organs that are appendages of the administrative-bureaucratic machine.

"When we speak of independence," **P.P. Chkheidze**, Georgian Council of Trade Unions chairman noted in his speech, "This in and of itself excludes any guardianship on the part of the center. Everything must be built upon the principles of partnership and mutual assistance. There have already been cases where the secretariat of the AUCCTU has tried to resolve certain issues without our consent; we, of course, did not carry them out. And in the future, we will not permit resolutions unacceptable to the republic to be adopted. The ethics of our mutual relations are simple and understandable—independent development, and service to a common cause.

"I do not want to separate the 400,000-strong Georgian Communist Party from the Georgian people, the population of Georgia. We love our country no less than anyone else, and we cannot take all the errors of the Communist Party upon ourselves. The main thing is to recognize errors, to

develop a general opinion, to adopt the wishes close to the heart of the people, to raise the issue of the rejection of the leading role of the Communist Party, fixed in the 6th article of the Constitution, and on the existence of other parties along with it. We must attempt to earn society's support by means of greater efforts, and conducting a correct national policy. It is impermissible for any sort of political or public organization to have an unlimited hegemony everywhere and in all things, independent of its activity, just as it is impermissible for one nation to lead another.

"In a Central television broadcast, the announcer recently said, 'Is it right that the Russian should always be the older brother for all the soviet peoples, if he wants to be an equal among equals.' It is good that they have already realized this; perhaps he does not want to play the role of the older brother, responsible for everyone and everything.

"The distorted ideology of the national question harmed the chain of true, fine, and humane friendship that has united us with other peoples, and has led to forgetting of all that is good, and mutually beneficial relations."

Today, as the extremely complicated processes of radical changes are taking place in our society, literature and art are called upon to play an important role. **G.D. Lordkipanidze**, chairman of the board of the Union of Theater Figures, said that it is the fortune of the Georgian people that in this period of crisis, that have reached not for weapons, but for enrichment of their spiritual world. "Events of enormous significance have taken place, eliciting a feeling of lawful pride in the heart of each of us. One of these events is the opening of a Georgian theater of the Dmaniskiy land. Prominent masters of the stage participated in its opening performance; the immortal verses of Ilya Chavchavadze resounded. A desire was expressed to open a similar theater in Kazbegi. And the other day, we became witnesses to one more exciting event: A play aimed specifically at the toilers of the "Azot" production association had its premiere at the Rustavi theater. This association became the theater's sponsor, and contributes to it R100,000 annually, allowing the Rustavi theater to abolish its subscription system. Now the theater will have a larger audience. And one other thing: We have started a subsidy for the theater in Saingilo—we give it R120,000. We also pay board for 450 students of the theater institute. It is also important that we pay the difference between the salary and pension for all members of the Union of Theater Figures. I speak of this because we have shown greater concern for our native country, its people. The people need a great deal; it is in a difficult situation, it needs support, and everyone must do his part conscientiously."

Under the Sign of the Consolidation of Healthy Forces

With all definitiveness, the plenum announced that the command-administrative system, autocratic work style, and forced methods are incompatible with perestroika, democratization, and glasnost. Political pluralism is alien to uniformity, dictation, and being bound to anyone's personal views. The experience of recent times has

shown that under the circumstances of a constructive political dialogue, cooperation with all of society's healthy forces, various sociopolitical associations, and movements is possible. A definite experience in such constructive cooperation has already been accrued by the republic Communist Party. The transition from forced methods and a monologue to constructive dialogue is one of the most significant achievements of the republic party organization and its Central Committee. Now the task is one of substantially deepening and developing these processes both in form and in content; they have highlighted in a new way the image of our society, and moved to the forefront the healthy forces which had previously been in the shadows. The policy of constructive dialogue must become a most important ideological instrument of the best cognition of all society, of disparate viewpoints of the public on various problems.

As Georgian SSR Minister of Public Education **G.N. Yenukidze** said, the time has come for the party to finally recognize itself as the servant of the nation, and, based upon this, to seek paths toward renewal.

Pluralism of opinion is the single opportunity for establishing truth and correct development of public life. We are wasting much time in arguments about whether or not there will be a multiparty system, while at the same time, the number of various parties increases daily; we argue about whether or not the 6th article of the Constitution will exist, while at the same time, the party must really become the vanguard and strengthen its authority through political work, without trying to defend its so-called "rights" through administration.

In focusing attention upon the system of public education, the speaker emphasized that this sphere is directly linked to both political, and cultural and economic problems, and most importantly, with moral problems, among which the basic one is the school, the foundation of education and life itself.

Healthy ideology is the guarantee of correct civic indoctrination of the teenager. The maximalism inherent in youth causes the opposite reaction among certain people; however irritating such a position, we are obligated to support our future generation, it was emphasized at the plenum.

Youth is participating all the more actively in public life. As we know, many new youth organizations have emerged in Georgia. Their existence undoubtedly serves as an effective means of more complete expression of the interests of the young generation. Yet there exists another reality along with this. Many thousands of young men and women today only nominally belong to the Komsomol organizations.

"We are far from considering them to be Komsomol members," admitted **S.U. Gogiberidze**, Georgian Komsomol Central Committee secretary. "The position of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee is such: Each Komsomol member, everyone in its rank-and-file

today must determine the fate of the organization. Based upon this, we consider it advisable to convene as soon as possible an extraordinary congress of the Georgian Komsomol."

The thought was persistently expressed at the plenum on the necessity in the near future of legalizing new youth public organizations, registering them, and the main thing, defining their status. If each political force precisely determines its attitude to the issues of the political structure of the future Georgia, the nature of its economy and international relations, and gives society a well-reasoned guarantee of Georgia's future development, then the people will have the opportunity to evaluate them correctly and make a choice. "Enough of learning from mistakes; the time has come to learn in universities" rang out from the plenum; all the more so because we expect many universities.

Only a qualitatively transformed and renewed party is capable of handling the cause of perestroika, democratization, and the qualitative renewal of our society. Therefore, it was emphasized at the plenum, we need to master the basics of new political thinking, to develop a broad outlook, deep professionalism and competence, the ability to live and function in a pluralistic society.

Naturally, this process is not simple and painless. Only argument, fact, and concrete matters may act as our allies here. The authority of the Constitution is not the only thing to be strengthened, its Article 6. We must look the truth in the eye: Society is evaluating the activity of the party not according to the role and functions which it defined through its program, charter, and other documents, but according to how capable it is of carrying out that role, those functions, and ensuring the free democratic, humanistic development of society, and civilized life.

That is why today the task of radical renewal of the republic Communist Party, of each echelon, is so urgent. We cannot lag behind the dynamic processes and democratic development of society. Rayon and city committees, and party organizations are obligated to actively manage unusual situations and non-standard sociopolitical processes, to approach the new political realities with the new political criteria generated by democratization and glasnost.

The plenum basically approved the Conception of the national development of Georgia. This is indubitably an event of particular significance in the history of the Georgian Communist Party, of the entire people. The republic Communist Party has actively faced the resolution of national problems; it is energetically taking the initiative into its hands. The main thing now is for the party organization in the provinces to be penetrated by the ideas and the goals of the conception, that it bring them to each communist, to each manager, to each person. Rayon and city party organizations, and labor collectives must develop a concrete plan of work in this direction. All alternative proposals, all constructive

ideas and positions should be given way, and mutually acceptable compromises should be found even surrounding the most polarized opinions.

The regional programs developed in such a manner, which will become a component of the all-republic conception, will allow for a maximal utilization of social energy, a comprehensive actualization of the initiative and creativity of the workers, and their active involvement in the constructive activity of the representatives of all nations and nationalities residing in the Georgian land.

The expansion of the political, economic, and cultural sovereignty of each republic is an objective process conforming to natural law. And that is why mutual relations between the center and the union republics, and the central and republic organs must be of solely a partnership, mutually useful, mutually advantageous nature. Posing the question thus should not be seen as a manifestation of separatism and nationalism. The 400,000-strong Georgian Communist Party must not be opposed and will not be in opposition to the Georgian people, the workers of Georgia.

The republic Communist Party now stands before great and serious trials. The 28th Georgian CP Congress remains to be faced in a world-view manner, organizationally and comprehensively prepared; it convocation in April was unanimously supported by the plenum participants. Very little time remains until the congress. It is necessary to begin the pre-congress discussion even now, to consult with communists and the people about what sort of Communist Party we need, what its status must be, and how we see the republic's tomorrow, and how we want to build the new, free, democratic Georgia.

Georgian Komsomol to Debate Future Status

90US0626A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
11 Feb 90 p 1

[Gruzinform report: "Georgian Komsomol Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] A special Georgian Komsomol congress will be held on 20-21 March 1990 to work out, in particular, the status of the new union. This decision was made by a Georgian Komsomol Central Committee plenum that was held at the youth center. The plenum participants discussed the platform, as well as the program and charter drafts that were recently published in the press.

Opening the plenum, Sesili Gogiberidze, first secretary of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee, remarked that the congress delegates would have to determine what kind of organization the future union of Georgian free youth would be—a public-political organization or only a public organization. In addition, she expressed her opinion concerning the desirability of raising the age requirement for young men and women entering the union—to 16 or 18 years. That means that the school system will be relieved of the currently existing structures of political and ideological organizations. Speaking about the future interrelationships

with the Georgian Communist Party, S. Gogiberidze proposed retaining a common political platform with it, but remaining organizationally independent from it, up to and including the right to express real opposition in various questions. Also, in the name of the fundamental interests of Georgia, she called for cooperation, but on parity principles, with other sociopolitical youth organizations and movements in the republic.

After subjecting to criticism the first version of the program and charter, most of the speakers voted in favor of the second version. The Georgian Youth Union, they emphasized, must not be guided in its actions only blindly imitating the program version for the Lithuanian union. On the contrary, with the assistance of sociologists it is necessary to ascertain the opinion of a broad number of union members, to achieve a mutually acceptable synthesis and balancing of the interests, and to go to the congress with a single program.

Mikhail Kantariya, first secretary of the Komsomol's Zugdidskiy Raykom, spoke about the inadmissibility of setting up an opposition between young students and the Komsomol. Those who supported him mentioned, at the same time, the need for a more precise definition of the future interrelationships with children's organizations. At the present time, for example, only one-fifth of the schools in Tbilisi have retained their Young Pioneer organizations with the traditional symbols and attributes. Simultaneously, there are functioning a large number of children's special-interest associations that have engaged in a study of the history of Georgia and of ecological problems. But who is supposed to give them the appropriate status—Council of Ministers, Ministry of Public Education, or the republic's Children's Fund?

Nino Kapanadze and Aleko Alavidze, administrators, respectively, of Komsomol organizations in Leninskiy Rayon and Rayon imeni 26 Kommissarov, called upon the plenum participants to look the truth straight in the eyes. At the present time the Komsomol, they said, actually does not conform to its original charter or program, which were enacted several decades ago. It is necessary right now to prepare to create a qualitatively new youth organization, all the actions of which will be built on a nationwide platform.

The statements made by Misha Chkuaseli and Mikhi Chenkeli, students at Tbilisi University imeni Ivane Dzhavakhishvili, proved to be even more radical. In their opinion, at the forthcoming congress of the Georgian Komsomol, it is necessary to announce its self-liquidation. After ceasing its existence, it would appear to those speakers, that organization must undergo a major transformation and must make way for the new union of Georgian free youth.

The plenum formed an editorial group to prepare the drafts of the new programs and charter with a consideration of the proposals that had been expressed and of the forthcoming study of the opinions of a broad group of union members.

The decision was also made to publish in AKHAL-GAZRDA KOMUNISTI a response to the letter written by a number of sociopolitical youth associations that was recently published in that newspaper.

An evaluation will also be given for the actions that were employed to stop the 18 February 1989 youth rally near Georgian Technical University.

Vazha Gurgenidze, Georgian CP Central Committee secretary, spoke at the plenum.

Participants in the work of the plenum included Nugzar Sadzhaya, chief of the Party-Organizational and Cadre-Work Department, Georgian CP Central Committee; and Vladimir Kirsanov, responsible worker at All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.

Masaliyev Delivers Kirghiz Buro Report on Nationalities Policy

90US0546A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 90 pp 2-3

[Report of the Central Committee Buro at the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee 14th Plenum: "Tasks for the Republic Party Organizations in Fulfilling the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum 'On Party National Policy under Present Conditions.'"]

[Text] Report of Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary A.M. Masaliyev

Comrades, when it initiated the revolutionary perestroika of society the party set painful socioeconomic tasks, the development of democracy and glasnost, and improvements in the activity of the CPSU itself and of the state organs as the priorities. And during the course of accomplishment of this work many of the problems that have built up have moved into the sphere of interethnic relations. They are making themselves felt today in every republic. In some place the tension has grown into open conflicts, and this has caused alarm about the fate of the country.

In this connection the CPSU Central Committee has for a long time been studying the problem, and after careful preparatory work, in September of last year at its plenum it considered the status of national relations and worked out a new strategy for its actions. This strategy has been set forth in the CPSU Central Committee platform on national policy under present conditions. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his report, the platform is an innovative program that takes the reality into account and meets present requirements. Herein lie its scientific nature and viability.

Proceeding from the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the provisions contained in the party platform, we must today define the specific tasks for the party organizations in terms of implementation of those decisions in the republic.

What are the most acute problems?

In the economic field they include the disproportions in the location of production forces, the preservation of extreme centralization and the sector principle in management, which ignores local conditions and the interests of the region, the one-sided, mainly raw material based, development of the national economy, and the republic's lagging behind the all-union average in providing the republic's inhabitants with foodstuffs and sociocultural objects.

In the field of social relations they include the distortions in the national structure of the working class and the significant differences between urban dwellers and the rural dwellers made up mainly of the indigenous population. There is also the tardiness in resolving employment issues, particularly for rural youth, and the internationalization of the labor collectives.

In the spiritual sphere they included first and foremost language problems. Adoption of the Kirghiz SSR Law on the State Language is only a first step toward resolving them. Questions relating to the development and preservation of the distinctive character of national cultures, investigation and study of the history of the Kirghiz people and filling in the "blank spots," and returning to the masses the creative legacy of figures from the past have become acute.

In the ideological sphere they include purging the social sciences of dogmatism and stereotypes, restructuring international indoctrination, changing the methods and content of work in shaping the internationalist awareness, and studying, predicting, and managing national processes.

This, then, is the broad sweep of the main issues that require collective examination and work on practical measures to resolve them.

It goes without saying that the contradictions and difficulties that are present cannot hide the achievements of the republic during the years of Soviet power, or nullify the real results of the party's Leninist national policy. Suffice it to recall our point of departure when we started. Like some other republics, Kirghizia was an outlying national district, and not only in the geographical sense. Now it has a multisector industry, a major agroindustrial complex, developed science and culture, and skilled personnel. The land of Kirghizia has become the common home of representatives of 80 nations and nationalities of the USSR. Most of the labor collectives are multinational. Differences of language, traditions, and customs do not interfere with the friendly relations that have been established.

It is therefore impossible to agree with those who are trying to distort and disparage what has been achieved, and to engender distrust in the viability of the Soviet federation and CPSU national policy. In their indoctrination work the party organizations must make active use of the internationalist legacy of the Great October

Socialist Revolution, and proceed from the concrete facts of the history of the region and the labor collectives.

The working class, which numbers more than a million souls in its ranks, has a special role to play in strengthening international relations. Representatives of all the nations and nationalities living in the republic are internationally tempered in its milieu. We believe deeply that the working class will firmly support party national policy and not allow extremists to stir up the pure spring of the friendship of the peoples.

The composition of the peasantry is becoming increasingly international. It represents a significant proportion of the population and is doing much to rally people of different nationalities and purge the common soil of the poisonous shoots of interethnic enmity.

We have at our disposal a great detachment of the people's intelligentsia. Its actions, words, and deeds largely determine the moral atmosphere in society. The task for our intelligentsia is in all it does to defend the ideals of friendship and humanism and strengthen trust and unity of the multinational family of the Soviet peoples.

At the beginning of 1989 some 4,258,000 were living in the republic. They include 2,228,000 Kirghiz, or 52.3 percent of the population, 917,000 Russians, or 21.5 percent, and 1,113,000 representatives of other nations and nationalities, or 26.2 percent.

The republic party organization unites communists of 73 nationalities, and it tries to pursue a cadre policy giving due consideration to the structure of the population. The nomenklatura of the party committees at all levels includes the representatives of 34 nationalities and ethnic groups [narodnosti], when comparatively recently the figure was only 23. The number of persons of Uzbek, Ukrainian, Kazakh, German, Dungan, Jewish and other nationalities. During the course of the present election campaign representatives of 26 nations and nationalities have become people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR.

Overall, the composition of the population corresponds to the corps of leaders in ministries and departments, and enterprises and organizations in industry, transport, and communications. They include 50.6 Kirghiz, 24.5 percent Russians, 7.3 percent Uzbeks, 3.9 percent Ukrainians, and 13.7 percent for representatives of other nationalities. In recent years the number of kolkhoz chairman and sovkhos directors of nonindigenous nationality have slightly increased.

At the same time questions relating to the selection and placement of cadres cannot be reduced to the mere mechanical distribution of posts and duties according to national affiliation. This would be a vulgarization of the idea of internationalism. Today, the business and human qualities of leaders are more important for the workers. For example, the collective at the Alamedinskiy Fur Association, which is made up of Russians, Kirghiz,

Germans, and Ukrainians, has chosen on a competitive basis a director who is an Azeri. This is not an isolated example.

It is very important when leaders recognize the complexity and delicate nature of the national question and by personal example promote friendly relations in a collective. Comrade N.I. Meshkov, director of the "Kyzyl-Dzhar" sovkhos in Dzholskiy rayon, and Comrade A.G. Khomenko, chairman of the "Kommunizm" kolkhoz in Aravanskiy rayon, for example, have a good knowledge of the language, traditions, and customs of the representatives of all the nationalities working at their farms, and have a tactful attitude toward their needs, which has earned them the respect and trust of the workers. We have many such leaders in our multinational collectives.

However, they do not all have adequate political standards. There are instances where some leaders permit ill-considered actions that offend people's national sensibilities, or on the basis of partial facts can groundlessly accuse an entire people.

Party organizations must increase the personal responsibility of communist leaders for the status of interethnic relations and for finding practical solutions to the most painful questions, and for responding promptly to shortcomings. It is essential to introduce into practice accountability reports for leading cadres to communists and the labor collectives about their personal involvement in international indoctrination. In certification and new promotion consideration must be given to the ability of the leader to indoctrinate people in a spirit of friendship, and to his internationalist qualities.

Let me deal with the problem of employment. It affects many national groups in the republic. But more so the indigenous inhabitants, and also representatives of the Uzbek, Dungan and other nationalities, who are insufficiently involved in the main sectors of the national economy. For example, according to the republic Gosplan, at 1 June 1987 employment of Kirghiz in industry was only 25 percent, in transport and communications 35 percent, in capital construction 26 percent, in trade and public catering 34 percent, and in the housing and municipal economy and personal services only about 30 percent.

Meanwhile, in the industrial sectors about half of the workers are representatives of the Russian-speaking population. But in agriculture it is a different picture: more than 70 percent of workers are Kirghiz.

Of course, there are objective reasons for this. But none of these disproportions are helping to strengthen daily links and regular dealings among people within the framework of the labor collectives. This is exerting an adverse effect on the formation of internationalist awareness among the workers and the standards in interethnic relations.

On the other hand, there are very considerable social differences between city and countryside. Despite the

fact that over the past 4 years more than R2.3 billion have been allocated for the agroindustrial complex and that the construction of housing, polyclinics, hospitals, children's preschool establishments, and cultural and everyday projects is proceeding at a preferential rate, the needs of rural dwellers are by no means being fully satisfied.

Moreover, excess manpower has been formed in the countryside. And the fact that social problems have not been solved and that there are painful difficulties in finding employment for people are reflected in people's awareness and cause offense and dissatisfaction.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the republic government and the soviet and economic organizations are taking steps to recruit the able-bodied population for social production. Private subsidiary production facilities and crafts are being set up at kolkhozes and sovkhozes and major populated points, and branches and shops and sections of industrial enterprises are being opened.

But the scale and rate of the worker being done are inadequate. Taking into account the population growth during the 13th Five-Year Plan, it is necessary to organize at least an additional 80,000 new work places, first and foremost in the countryside. Local soviets and planning organs must show initiative and submit specific proposals to the appropriate ministries and departments and major enterprises. This work must be led by the State Agroindustrial Committee and the oblast and rayon ispolkoms, and the opportunities available for kolkhozes and sovkhozes must be brought into play. It is essential to act without waiting for instructions. It is intolerable when thousands of young men and women are unable to exercise their constitutional right to work. It would be expedient for the republic Council of Ministers to resolve this acute problem more actively.

The organs of public education also (Comrade M. Bazarkulov) must do more to enroll young people from the countryside more in vocational and technical schools teaching industrial disciplines, and conduct career counseling work more actively to this end. It is hardly normal when less than 20 percent of the people studying machinebuilding occupations in Frunze's schools are of indigenous nationality.

This situation is explained by the fact that many leaders at enterprises of all-union subordination do not care to burden themselves with the concern of training work cadres from among young people locally but try rather to recruit trained workers from other regions. But this creates additional difficulties of a social nature and slows down the process of forming the national detachment of the working class.

The stratum of industrial workers of Kirghiz nationality is particularly low at machinebuilding enterprises in Frunze city. They make up 9 to 13 percent of the

total at control-and-measuring plants and instrument-building plants, in "Tyazhelektromash," and in the associations of the "Stankostroitelnyy zavod" imeni V.I. Lenin, and in the production of computer equipment. When they are starting up new capacities the management and party organizations at these enterprises must give due consideration to the national composition of the collectives. There is food for thought here for the Frunze gorkom and the rayon party committees in Frunze city (comrades USSR. K. Chinaliyev, A.M. Muraliyev, G.S. Kuznetsov, and A.S. Moiseyev).

References made by some leaders to the poor rate of establishment for local workers allegedly because they have no desire or proclivity for work in industry are unfounded. If this is so, then why at enterprises of the Issyk-Kul Association of Electrotechnical Plants do Kirghiz workers make up 36 percent of the total, while in the Sulyuktinskiy mine administration the figure is 42 percent, and in the Kirghiz Worsted Cloth Combine 61 percent? Everything depends on how young workers are handled, particularly yesterday's rural dwellers, and on an attentive attitude toward their needs and requirements, and on creating basic living conditions.

It has been established by a analysis of the reasons for attempts to seize land for housing construction last year, hundreds of representatives of the indigenous population working at industrial enterprises and at organizations in Frunze city not only had no apartments or hostels, but were not even registered, and because of this were unable to find places for their children in schools and kindergartens, and were unable to visit treatment centers or participate in the elections of people's deputies. Many leaders knew about this but remained silent, including leaders of Kirghiz nationality, fearing that they would be accused on nationalism.

I think that people will take my meaning correctly when I say that it is a question not of offense or mutual claims. This fact has, to put it mildly, cast light on the lack of understanding by particular leaders of what real internationalism is—it is not words or appeals but an attentive, tactful, and honest attitude toward people's concerns. "...Only an enormous amount of attention to the interests of the various nations," V.I. Lenin wrote, "creates the trust, particularly among workers and peasants who speak different languages, without which peaceful relations between peoples and the successful development of everything that is considered of value in modern civilization is absolutely impossible." (Complete Collected Works Volume 45, p 240).

In this connection it is not out of place to remind communist leaders that the task of forming the national working class can be traced back to the best traditions of proletarian internationalism and to much that they impose. It is necessary to change attitudes and approaches to the problem and to participate with more interest in the development of the social sphere, and to build hostels and housing and child's preschool establishments.

Enterprises of all-union subordination owe our workers a great deal. Taking advantage of local manpower and natural resources they are producing 36 percent of all Kirghizia's industrial output. But in 1988 they paid the republic budget less than 4 percent of the sum that they deducted to their own ministries. The soviets of people's deputies, the trade union committees and the primary party organizations, consistently pursuing the line of internationalization of the labor collectives, must become involved in questions relating to strengthening national manpower resources.

We believe that the Gosplan (comrades S. Begaliyev and M.M. Aybalayev) should review the existing practice of training workers and engineering and technical staffs, and link it to the demographic situation and the prospects for the development of production forces. Increasing the numbers of work cadres is the foundation on which, to use the words of Marx, "the strength of our nation and its ability to develop are founded," and it is essential to regard it as an economic task, a social task, and a task of great political significance.

Comrades, we are well aware that the national question is very complicated. We must constantly to solve it, without emotion, displaying restraint and wisdom, and not generating unjustified tensions in interethnic relations.

In this connection special attention should be paid to the in-depth study and develop of languages within the country. Over the decades the problem has been driven deep, and insufficient attention has been paid to it. Slogans have been proclaimed that falsely interpret the concept of internationalism, and the languages of many nationalities, including the Kirghiz, are now in a precrisis state and the sphere of their use has been significantly curtailed.

Work has been initiated in the republic to eliminate these deformations. The Law on the Official Language of the Kirghiz SSR has been passed. With the participation of the Central Committee ideological commission the Council of Ministers has drawn up a draft State Comprehensive Program for its stage-by-stage introduction. Those attending the plenum have copies of the document. I would like to note that we have dragging out the work to comply with the law. During our meetings in the labor collectives and training establishments peoples of various nationalities were asking us when the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, Supreme Soviet Presidium, party committees, and local soviet organs will be moving from words to deeds and when they will embark on the practical implementation of this important document.

The complaint is being directed primarily at the Ministry of Public Education, which must take steps to increase training for Kirghiz language teachers and interpreters, and organize a network of course everywhere, and in the shortest possible time produce visual aids and new textbooks and methodological literature.

The State Publishing Committee (Comrade B. Ryspayev) faces a great deal of work with respect to publishing the necessary quantities of training, methodological and other literature. We know that there are objective difficulties connected with shortages of paper and the weakness of the printing base. But there are also unutilized capacities. First and foremost it is necessary to improve the organization of publishing affairs and deal with them more purposefully.

Essentially up to now no ministry or department has compiled a list of positions for workers who whom, along with Russian, it is essential to possess a certain amount of knowledge of the Kirghiz language. The soviet organs, the trade union committees, labor collective councils, and the leaders of enterprises and organizations should have a more serious attitude toward opening courses to teach people, and toward selecting teachers and providing them with textbooks and dictionaries and essential technical facilities.

We expect from the Gosplan and Gossnab practical actions to set up an appropriate material-technical base for the functioning of the official language in all spheres of life. The Academy of Sciences must activate its work, first and foremost in the field of research on Kirghiz philology. The scholars still face many questions but are doing little work to implement the law.

At the same time it is essential to make greater efforts and in fact improve the teaching of Russian as the vehicle for interethnic dealings generally recognized in the country. For the Kirghiz and other peoples of the USSR living in the republic it has become an integral element of their spiritual lives.

It is important to improve the teaching of Russian in rural schools, where most children of the indigenous nationality study. Our language policy should be subordinated to the main goal, namely, forming national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism.

Compliance with the Law on the Official Language of the Kirghiz SSR requires from all ministries and departments and enterprises and organizations, and from each worker a high sense of responsibility and a proper weighing of matters. Here it is not possible to permit procrastination or running ahead of ourselves. But instances of this are being encountered. In this matter some people are lacking in tact and benevolence. There have been attempts to strain interpersonal relations on the basis of language. At some enterprises in Frunze city letters have been circulated and incitement is carried out by exaggerated rumors about alleged discrimination against the Russian-speaking population.

Party organizations are obliged to unmask such provocative fabrications and explain the democratic essence of the law. In indoctrination work it is essential to turn more often to the life and activity of the best representatives of the Russian intelligentsia who by their deeds have left a good trace on Kirghiz land and in the memory of the people.

Many of us remember well Academician Konstantin Ivanovich Skryabin. The older generation notes with warmth and gratitude his attentive and solicitous attitude toward training cadres from the national intelligentsia, and his knowledge of the language, customs, and traditions of the people. The republic also remembers Mikhail Nikolayevich Lushchikhin with the same warmth and respect.

The devoted labor of those notable figures in Russian science and culture who include Academician D.I. Shcherbakov, the Turkic scholar K.K. Yudakhin, the composers P.F. Shubin, V.A. Vlasov and V.G. Fere, and the artists S.A. Chuykov and V.V. Obraztsov, who did much for the development of Soviet Kirghizstan, are also now proof of real, not mere demonstrative internationalism. The traditions of friendship and brotherhood that they laid down must be cherished and developed and instilled in the rising generation.

Let me remind you, comrades, that more than 100,000 Germans now live in the republic, along with about 37,000 Dungan and as many Uighurs, about 21,000 Turks, 18,000 Koreans, and 14,000 Kurds. Together with the representatives of other nations and nationalities they are working in the various spheres of the national economy, making their contribution to the socioeconomic and cultural development of Kirghizstan, and being promoted to leading work in party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organs. In recent years the representation of the Germans, Dungan, Kurds, Turks and others has been increased in the party Central Committee and the party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms.

For them, and for the representatives of other nations, conditions are being created to satisfy specific needs and develop their languages and cultures. German is taught as the native language in 11 schools, Dungan in 10, Kurdish in 5, Turkish in 4, and Uighur in 3. Courses have been started for the adult population expressing a desire to master their own national language more thoroughly. Starting last year, at the Kirghiz State University training was initiated for specialists in the Dungan and German tongues. Work on this plane continues.

Together with the Ministry of Public Education, a great deal can be done here by the representatives of these peoples themselves and their national intelligentsia. For example, in providing support for schools in the literature of the mother tongue, selecting teachers from among their own people, and training capable young people in the VUZ's. To this end it is necessary to make use of all the opportunities available. During this academic year, for example, 40 percent of Germans, 35 percent Dungan, almost 27 percent Turks, and about 15 percent Uighurs submitting applications were enrolled in Kirghizia's VUZ's. Incidentally, the percentage figure for Kirghiz was 26.4 percent.

In accordance with the CPSU platform a start has been made recently on setting up national cultural centers and

societies in the republic. The German "Contacts" club is also in operation, Korean, Uighur and Turkish cultural associations are being set up, and work is being done to organize a Dungan cultural center.

I would like to caution against allowing them to become closed societies or isolated associations of fellow-countrymen. Through propaganda of national spiritual values and progressive popular traditions these centers and associations are designed to promote mutual understanding and bring people closer together. The party committees and soviet organs must help them to define the directions of their activities. The Ministry of Culture and the creative unions must establish close contacts with these formations and actively help them in organizing cultural and educational measures and holding festivals and folklore holidays. Dozens of Uzbek, German, Dungan, Turkish, Uighur, Kurdish, Tatar and other national ensembles are now active. They constitute our wealth and they should be accessible to all people living in the republic.

There is no doubt that the activity of the national cultural centers and associations that are being set up requires legal regulation and that their legal status and powers be defined. This matter falls within the competence of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and it should not postpone consideration of it.

The question of organizing special edited versions of multinational broadcasts on radio and television is one that should now be resolved. Broadcasts in German, Dungan, and Uighur on republic television are now only sporadic, and none are done in other languages. The leadership in the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Comrade U.Sh. Orozova) must concern itself with making this systematic, and should select journalists and take into account the technical feasibility of regular national radio and television broadcasts.

The question of setting up, in accordance with the CPSU platform, national settlements and rural soviets in places where nationalities live in a compact area but do not have their own national-territorial formations, is also a difficult one. I think that it would be expedient for the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers to make a comprehensive study of this and then offer a sound solution to it, giving due consideration to public opinion.

Comrades, according to the figures in the latest census, more than 300,000 Kirghiz are living in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and particular regions of the RSFSR. Acting in concert with the fraternal republics, we must concern ourselves with satisfying the cultural and other needs of our fellow countrymen. Some steps are being taken in this direction.

This year, for example, dozens of graduates from Kirghiz schools in Dzhirgatal'skiy and Murgab'skiy rayons in the Tajik SSR and a number of rayons in the Uzbek SSR have been enrolled specifically in VUZ's in Kirghizia.

Through the republic a start has been made on providing textbooks and literature and sociopolitical literature in the native language to those same places. Theatrical collectives, writers, poets, and party and socialism workers from Kirghizia have visited. These links are being constantly strengthened.

On the other hand everything must be done to satisfy more fully the needs of the Uzbek and Tajik populations living in Kirghizia. More than half a million Uzbeks and almost 34,000 Tajiks live in the republic, mainly in Osh Oblast. They are actively involved in all spheres of socioeconomic and public and political life and they enjoy the same rights as all Kirghiz people. Attention is being paid to developing their languages and culture and national traditions. Uzbek children are being taught in their own language in 201 schools, and Tajiks in 8. An oblast Uzbek theater is operating and an oblast newspaper is published in Uzbek. Notwithstanding, it is essential to show more concern for their cultural and linguistic needs. In particular it is necessary to resolve problems relating to the reception of television broadcasts in Uzbek and Tajik in a number of rayons, and to organize the publication of large-circulation newspapers in Uzbek and Tajik.

The ancient traditions of fraternal relations in Kirghizstan have been established with all regions. Suffice it to say that today more than 3,500 young men and women from Kirghizia are studying in 137 VUZ's in 47 cities in the country. True, there are many problems and difficulties in their education and domestic lives. Hence the high rate of student dropouts. For VUZ's in the RSFSR it is as much as 25 percent. The student associations are not operating at a proper level. Young people often find themselves without moral or material support. And the first educational or domestic difficulties bring them to their knees.

The Ministry of Public Education and Komsomol committees must improve the selection of young people for the central VUZ's and show an interest in their education and their domestic conditions, maintain constant links with students who are fellow-countrymen, and provide them with the necessary assistance. It is important that when they are on trips the leaders of party, soviet, and Komsomol organs find the time to meet with the young people and talk with them and inform them about what is happening in the republic.

The permanent representation of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers in the USSR Council of Ministers (Comrade O.K. Atabayev) must show more business-like initiative and specific concern for training for specialists in the country's VUZ's. A council for students and young people studying in educational establishments in Moscow and the Moscow area has now been set up in the permanent representation. It is essential that it operate to help young people in the training and educational process.

It is also essential to strengthen contacts with the military units in which young Kirghiz men do their service. There is a broad field for activity here by the Komsomol. There is also patronage assistance and trips by agitation-and-propaganda groups. Last year these groups from the Komsomol Central Committee visited Kirghiz servicemen in the Turkestan Military District. But this is not enough.

The internationalist soldiers must be involved more actively in the international and patriotic indoctrination of the rising generation. The young men who passed through the hard school of Afghanistan have experience of life and understand more deeply the meaning and significance of international friendship, and they carry a large indoctrinational charge.

The Komsomol Central Committee, Kirghiz military council and DOSAAF Central Committee must give support and assistance to the republic association of patriotic societies and the "Rodina" clubs, acting as the sponsor for fine initiatives in the development of the military-patriotic movement. The association also needs help from the soviet organs in setting up cost-accounting subdivisions and reinforcing the material and sports base.

The student body in the republic needs the constant attention of the positive, soviet organs, and Komsomol. In the full-time departments of nine of our VUZ's more than 40,000 young men and women are studying, along with about 34,000 in secondary specialized training establishments. These are the future reinforcements for the intellectual forces of Kirghizstan. It is very important that the young specialists be ideologically tempered internationalists through conviction.

We shall continue the established tradition of meeting regularly with the student youth and looking deeply into its problems. Our republic was among the first in the country to seek out opportunities and allocated R6.5 million from the local budget to raise student allowances. Steps are being taken to strengthen the material-technical base of the educational establishments.

Under the conditions of democracy and glasnost there has been a significant increase in the role of the teacher, particularly the social scientists. Candid discussions must be held with young people, and we must be able to answer their questions and show concern for their everyday life and the organization of their leisure while guarding against the influence of demagogues and political adventurists.

Neither must there be any slackening of attention in work with foreign students and people attending courses and studying here. We have recently noticed a certain revival in the cooperation between local young people and foreigners. Friendship soirees, antiwar meetings and sports events are being held more often. The experience of the republic Komsomol organizations has been approved by the Komsomol Central Committee. But

this should not make us complacent. It is essential to complete what has been started.

The Komsomol Central Committee (Comrade T. Tabyldiyev) and the Komsomol committees must constantly study the processes taking place in the youth environment and be aware of the mood, and specifically look into their affairs and respond immediately to negative phenomena.

Comrades, in solving the problems in oblast national policy it is in detail very important to eliminate the so-called "blank spots" of history and to restore the names of figures from the past who have been unjustifiably forgotten or unjustifiably dishonored.

As you know, by a decision of the Central Committee Buro the names of the Kirghiz thinker and akyn [a Kirghiz folk poet—ed] Moldo Lylych and the eminent linguist and writer Kasym Tynystanov, who were repressed during the period of personality cult, have been rehabilitated. The creativity of thinkers and akyn improvisers of the past like Arstanbek Kalygul and Dzhenzhok, the akyn poet Moldo-Niyaz, one of the first Kirghiz enlighteners and scholars Belek Soltonoyev and others is worthy of attention.

It is common knowledge that some of their works contain errors and delusions about world outlook. It is therefore necessary to make a careful selection of everything that represents some esthetic or humanistic value and enriches people's spiritual world.

The concept "blank spots" in history also includes processes and phenomena that have not been researched and have been considered "closed zones," or that have been incorrectly illuminated. Filling in these "blank spots" will help in realization of the comprehensive program to improve research in and the teaching and popularization of Kirghiz history. The draft of this program is to be published in the press for broad debate. The scholars should make a decisive contribution to this.

Here, it must be said that some social scientists are still engaged with simple commentary and their works are speculative, add nothing new, and contain no sound recommendations or solutions. In other words, they lack in-depth analysis of historical processes. The Academy of Sciences Presidium (comrades A. Akayev and T. Koychuyev) must direct and coordinate research work on topical problems relating to interethnic relations, and strive for some practical return.

Questions have recently been raised about the renaming of particular cities, rayons, populated points, and streets. Obviously distortions were permitted here. However, we must approach this responsibly and in a well-considered manner and each specific case must be examined in its history aspect, from internationalist positions, and no haste or subjectivism must be allowed.

Today we must also note that in recent years the days and weeks of the arts and literature of fraternal peoples

have been held less frequently in the republics, including ours. I think that we are all losing here. Suffice it to recall important events in the cultural life of Kirghizia such as the all-union festivals marking the 125th anniversary of the great akyn poet and democrat Toktogul Satylganov that culminated in Moscow, and also the "Nooruz" festival of the theaters of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. They helped in some measure in the mutual enrichment of the cultures of the Soviet peoples and exerted a positive effect in strengthening friendly ties.

Our task is to strengthen and develop cultural contacts with the fraternal republics on a long-term basis, filling them with real internationalism. The Ministry of Culture, the Union of Writers, and all the creative organizations should do a great deal here.

Among the republic leadership there has been an expansion of the practice of benevolent and interested dialogue with the creative intelligentsia, and an atmosphere has been established that excludes administrative diktat and voluntarist approaches. At the same time we expect from writers, painters, artists and composers, and from all the intelligentsia, more vigorous and well-considered actions is sociopolitical life and in strengthening interethnic relations. We must make a well-weighed approach to these complex issues and not be hasty in making evaluations and drawing conclusions about particular process. An ill-chosen word, particularly in the press, can aggravate relations between peoples and result in negative consequences.

You and I sense the great influence on the moral situation that is wielded by the mass media. They are doing a great deal to renew the public awareness and affirm the ideals of friendship and brotherhood among the peoples. There have been many meaningful broadcasts on this theme on television and in the statements made in the republic press. The Central Committee will always support the efforts made by the press in the cause of perestroika and will make more information available to journalists and work with editorial offices in a spirit of comradeship, principledness, and exactingness.

At the same time individual workers in the mass media are losing their sense of objectiveness. You are aware that pieces have appeared in the newspapers that contain tendentious judgments on matters relating to interethnic relations. Lack of scruple and ideological omnivorousness have been offered as a substitute for pluralism of opinion.

Certain statements in the central press are not always a model for local journalists. In some of the material in IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the former newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA incompetent conclusions have been drawn on acute interethnic problems. This has exasperated the public. We would like the leaders of those newspapers and their correspondents to responsibly and sensibly the their coverage of life in the republic, and

show respect for national sensibilities and help to solve the problems that are worrying us.

Proceeding from Lenin's behest that the press is a party matter, we speak out decisively against the desire of particular publications to abandon party principles and distort the truth to the advantage of interests that are alien to the socialist order and the Soviet people.

An absolute majority of communists and workers share this position. The day before yesterday a letter was published in SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA from a veteran of labor from Kalininskiy rayon, Comrade V.Ya. Lanskiy. He also sent a copy to the Central Committee. Some of the author's thoughts are controversial. But the veteran was right when he wrote: "We the readers, and indeed everyone else, want to see a newspaper (both central and republic, oblast and rayon) that is honest, truthful, and objective, not subject to conjunctural considerations and not falling senselessly into a euphoria." We should listen to these just words.

The Central Committee Secretariat and the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms must provide specific assistance for the editorial collectives of the press and television and radio in drawing up plans to cover issues relating to interethnic relations. Measures must be devised to set up public councils in the editorial offices, hold roundtable sessions and conferences, and exchange issues of newspapers with the fraternal republics, television links and so forth.

Under present conditions it is essential to alter in a radical way the approaches to international indoctrination. The declarative style and high-flown phrases no longer work. It is necessary to master nontraditional work methods, and start it inside the family. In this connection the proposal from the republic council of women to organize trips for children from various parts of the country to us here in Kirghizia, and also school-children exchanges, and the creation of multinational family children's homes, is worthy of attention.

Party and soviet workers at all levels, and the ideological aktiv, are obliged to visit the labor collectives and student hostels regularly and to engage in conclusive dialogue with people, and learn how they live and what it is that is concern to them. It is, however, not everyone, particularly economic leaders, in whom the specific approach to indoctrination work is inherent.

Today it is also necessary to take into account the noticeable revival of religion that has resulted from the development of democracy, and the return to common human values. Accordingly, the party committees and organizations must take this into account in atheistic work and make it more flexible, and eschew dogmatic ideas and outdated methods without retreating from materialist positions.

The increase in crime and the weakening in the struggle against drunkenness, drug addiction and parasitism are exerting a baneful effect on the state of interethnic

relations. Last year there was an increase in the number of robberies, muggings, and malicious hooliganism. The professionalism and organization of criminals are increasing. In terms of growth in crime the republic stands sixth in the country. But we sense no disquiet or alarm on the part of the law enforcement agencies.

I would like to remind the communist leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Comrade V.V. Goncharov, and of the Procuracy, Comrade G.I. Ivantsov, that they carry the full responsibility for the state of law and order in the cities and the countryside, and for how these matters are handled. Today it must also be stated that the ad hoc committees set up in the republic and in oblasts, cities and rayons to deal with crime are essentially not working.

The people's control organs can and must make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of state discipline and public order. They must establish control over observance of the principles of social justice in the allocation of housing, food, and industrial goods, and pay special attention to the struggle against mismanagement and waste.

We have no right to close our eyes to the fact that some people would like to cause disorder, disrupt the production rhythm and distract people from perestroika and bring them into conflict on national grounds.

We are sometimes asked why, say, in Kirghizia perestroika is not proceeding as it is in the Baltic and Transcaucasian regions. Perhaps we are lagging in some things, but we have a calmer situation and there are no strikes and meetings. But is this not the essential nature of perestroika and democracy? On behalf of the Central Committee Buro I would like firmly to assert that we do not support the various conflict and nervous situations to which we are being called, will will do everything necessary to create and encourage a businesslike, healthy atmosphere and friendly relations among citizens, and on this basis insure advances in finding solutions to economic and social problems. This is our principled position and we shall not retreat from it.

It is another matter that the course of perestroika is not yet as we would like, and that much remains to be done to enable people to live better. Party and soviet organs and leading cadres are working in this direction. We shall see what changes will take place in socioeconomic development and the sociopolitical life of the republic.

I have already said at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies that emissaries were sent to us from the so-called Moscow People's Front, who then put out, not without help from local journalists, a special publication dealing with Kirghizia, under the title "The Unknown Republic." In this publication the Kirghiz people and the affairs of the republic are presented in a mainly negative context. There is not a single word about the work of the party organizations and our people. There have also been representatives from other informal associations from various regions. They have incited particular people to a

destabilizing situation and to create tension. Our painstaking work and finding solutions to the food and housing problems and other urgent problems on which the well-being of the population depends, is of little interest to these people.

The positive and communists and workers are called upon to cut short these attempts. None of us who make up the Central Committee can today occupy an entrenched position. It is necessary to unmask with party principledness and communist conviction the intrigues of all those who, hiding behind the slogans of perestroika, would like to shake the soviet order and undermine the friendship of the peoples.

The Kirghiz SSR bears the name of the Kirghiz people. If they are master of the region then they carry great responsibility in solving interethnic problems. The Central Committee considers that even in this difficult time the Kirghiz people will display their inherent hospitality to all nations and nationalities living here, and will not react to the isolated provocative tricks and acts of incitement, and will not allow our region to become an arena for interethnic tension and dissension.

The republic's intelligentsia is called upon to be the spiritual bastion of its people. It has a deep knowledge of the history of the nation and it acts as custodian of and enriches its moral values. By adhering to these values, our intelligentsia, we are convinced, will not allow itself to be stupefied by the venom of nationalism but will keep a clear head, open mind, and clear conscience, and will not allow anyone ever to encroach on the friendship and brotherhood of the peoples.

The Kirghiz people linked their destiny to the Russian people more than 120 years ago. Together with them they have traversed a long and difficult historical path. And we believe deeply that, continuing the wonderful traditions of internationalism in which the history of the Russian people is so rich, our Russian comrades will do everything possible to strengthen the cohesion and unity of peoples of different nationalities.

We are also convinced that the representatives of other peoples will display their own better moral qualities and will not allow splits and misunderstandings to arise in interethnic relations. Each of us, no matter who he may be and no matter to what nation he may belong, should cherish and augment the friendship and brotherhood. Herein lies the decisive guarantee of our common successes in renewing socialist society.

An obvious role belongs to people of the older generation—the party veterans and the veterans of war and labor—in strengthening interethnic relations. They have learned through their own personal experience that friendship of the peoples is not some abstract notion but a reality that helped us to win through in the Great Patriotic War and restore our shattered economy. The veterans stand ready to use their experience in the cause of international indoctrination of young people. And we

are grateful to them for this. In turn, the party and soviet organs must increase their concern for them.

The processes taking place in the sphere of interethnic relations require competent management. It was to this end that the corresponding commissions were set up in the party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, the Kirghiz Trade Union Council, and the Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee. Unfortunately their work is poor.

In order to coordinate the activity of the existing formations it is advisable to set up a Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee commission to deal with questions of national policy, and a Central Committee subsection based on the existing section. If this proposal is supported then the composition of the commission can be confirmed at the next Central Committee plenum.

By tradition, on the eve of this Central Committee plenum the newspapers SOVETIK KYRGYZSTAN and SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA and the other mass media offered the tribune to scholars, party and soviet workers, and many Soviet workers and readers, and to economic leaders and cultural figures, who offered many proposals about the further strengthening of interethnic relations.

In particular, doctor of economic sciences Comrade K. Sydykov and candidate of historical sciences Comrade I. Boldzhurova shared their ideas about how to make rational use of manpower and how to regulate population migration and even out the irregularities in the national structure of the working class. Secretary of the Kantskiy party raykom Comrade A.B. Eshimova talked about ways to restructure the international indoctrination of the workers. Deputy general director of the "Kirgizavtomash" Association Comrade P. Yadrichnikov and chief economist Comrade G. Kozlovtssev, and Comrade O. Amankulov, a machine tool operator at the same association, talked about the formation of national work cadres at the enterprise. Linguists comrades B. Oruzbayev, A. Erkebayev, E. Abdyldayev and others raised specific questions relating to practical implementation of the law on the official language.

I think that party and soviet organs should make use of these and other thoughts and proposals in their work.

Interethnic relations are essentially a tangle of interwoven knots of economic, social, ecological, demographic and other problems. The main element is economic. Acting through the party committees and organizations the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee is focusing ministries and departments, economic cadres and the labor collectives on resolving priority socioeconomic tasks.

The first priority here is food. During these past years of the five-year plan it has been thoroughly reviewed at three Central Committee plenums. The Central Committee Buro, the government, and party and soviet organs are constantly monitoring this acute problem.

As a result, during the period 1986-1989, compared with the corresponding 4 years of the 11th Five-Year Plan the sale of meat products to the public through state and cooperative trade rose 24.0 percent; milk and dairy products increased 31 percent, eggs by 300 million, and canned goods by 42,000 tons. An advance has been seen in the per capita consumption of basic food products.

And this year it has been possible to maintain the preferential growth rates in the production of foodstuffs. More than 12,000 tons of meat have been purchased above plan, together with 25,000 tons of milk, 38 million eggs, 12,500 tons of vegetables, and 6,500 tons of potatoes. Milk yield per foraging cow has increased 108 kilograms.

Advances have been made in social tasks. During the past 4 years targets for commissioning of housing, hospitals, polyclinics, general education schools, and children's preschool establishments have been exceeded. The planned growth in national income has been made.

During this period above-plan consumer goods worth R1 billion have been produced, user-fee services have been developed at accelerated rates, and there has been some improvement in the financial position in the economy and the number of enterprises operating at a loss has been reduced.

But these positive changes are not eliminating the economic and social problems that have built up. The standard of living for the population remains below the all-union indicators. The Kirghiz Communist Party and republic government have set a task for themselves and for communists and all workers, namely, not to permit abatement in the stepped-up tempo of work and to insure annual increases in the production of livestock farming products and consumer goods and services, and to build up the rates of construction for housing and sociocultural and everyday projects.

In this connection can it be said that everyone has an understanding attitude? Unfortunately no. This year, for example, Keminskiy and Manasskiy rayons have not met the targets for the sale of cattle and poultry; Keminskiy rayon—again—and Sokulskiy rayon have not met targets for milk. In Osh Oblast 51 farms have lower purchases of cattle and poultry compared with 1988, and 28 have less milk; in Issyk-Kul Oblast the corresponding figures are 40 and 38. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Sokulskiy rayon have not worked as well, and here, 12 farms have reduced the volume of cattle and poultry purchases, and 15 the volume of milk purchases. Procurement of livestock farming produce has declined at a number of farms in Chuyskiy, Kalininskiy, Moskovskiy, and Panfilovskiy rayons.

We are concerned about the course of overwintering for cattle, and milk production. Over the last 3 months sales have declined in 5 out of 9 rayons in the Chuysk Valley and in Kirovskiy and Manasskiy rayons.

This year, 1990, is the final year of the five-year plan. At the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum and the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies there was detailed discussion about this year being a decisive, turning-point year. We must achieve optimum results in people's lives. Otherwise faith in perestroika will be undermined and economic difficulties will increase and the situation in the country will worsen. This must not be permitted.

People are also quite rightly demanding from us a radical review of the approaches to ecological problems. The question of protecting the air in Frunze city, the bodies of water in Issyk-Kul, the relics of the nut-tree stands in Arslanbob, the nature reserve of Sary-Chelek, and other places unique to us, is an acute one. Essentially no one is regulating the massive entry of people there or monitoring their actions, which often do unjustifiable damage to nature. Our descendants will not forgive us for this waste.

The Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers and State Committee for Environmental Protection must devise special nature conservation measures for each region, manage population migration, and prevent the squandering of natural resources. The richness of nature in the republic should serve not only the Kirghiz people but the entire country.

Comrades, the CPSU platform defines specific directions for the radical transformations in the Soviet federation. In particular provision is made for all the republics to switch to regional cost accounting and self-financing. We, comrades, face crucial and complex work. In this connection I think that it is essential to recall the words of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev at the CPSU Central Committee plenum. "As we develop a new economic policy that meets the tasks and goals of perestroika and development of the federation, filling it with new content," he emphasized, "we must do everything in a well-considered manner, with a cool head, not on the basis of emotion, ambition or abstract schemes."

It is precisely thus that we must approach the creation of the new economic mechanism, bearing in mind two circumstances as we do so.

First, the republic's transfer to self-management and self-financing should be accompanied by extension of the rights and responsibilities of the main element of the economy, namely, the enterprises and associations. This is the point of departure for the radical economic reform drawn up by the party and government. Analysis shows that the best results have been achieved precisely by those labor collectives that have switched to cost-accounting relations based on real independence. These include the Frunze ZhBI-2 plant, the Osh Pump Plant, the Tokmak Worsted Spinning Plant and others.

Second, economic independence for the republic should not lead to self-isolation or a breaking of links with other parts of the country, or give rise to parochial tendencies.

"While different nations live in a single state," V.I. Lenin remarked, "they are linked together by millions and millions of threads of an economic, legal, and everyday nature." (Complete Collected Works Volume 24 p 175). To ignore this means to set out on the road of setting boundaries between republics and peoples, along the line of national "quarters," and this does great harm not only to the cause of internationalism but all first and foremost to the nation itself. For no republic can provide itself with everything it needs. And indeed, it is unthinkable to try to do this by disregarding the economically advantageous conditions of cooperation and specialization.

Kirghizia, for example, supplies various parts of the country with more than half of their machine-building and metalworking articles, and about one-third of output from light industry and one-fourth of output produced by the food industry. In turn we receive the most diverse kinds of equipment and materials from virtually all parts of the country.

In this connection we are for independence and self-management but decisively reject the idea of economic isolation. This would act as a brake along the path of progress and would destroy the organic interrepublic links that have been set up over the decades, and it would be retrograde for us.

We should remember that throughout its almost century-long history our party has invariably been guided by the principle of internationalism. And it speaks out firmly now against national narrowness, corporation mindedness and federalism in party building, and its fights for its own ideological and organizational unity.

In recent times, however, voices are sometimes heard calling for the republic communist party to act independently and not to be bound by the one program and one set of CPSU Rules. And the Lithuanian Communist Party has moved from words to deeds, announcing its independence at its 20th Extraordinary Congress.

This is an unprecedented decision. It is aimed at an organizational and political split from the CPSU. As was stated at the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum, this step goes beyond the framework of internal party relation. Essentially a blow has been struck at all of perestroika.

Expressing the will of the more than 150,000 communists in the republic we consider it our duty to state quite definitely that we do not support the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party and are against federalization of the CPSU. It contradicts the essentially internationalist nature of our party, which expresses the interests of all socialist nations. The road of dissension leads to impasse. We appeal to the communists and people of Lithuania not to be angry and to consider seriously the fate of the USSR created at the initiative of Lenin, and the unity of our entire multinational people, and to show a sense of responsibility and courage and

reconsider the decision that has been reached. We believe that ultimately reason will prevail and we shall be together.

Comrades, the communists and party organizations are the cementing force in the resolution of all national problems. It is on their vigorous activity that the state of interethnic relations depends. Communists should live with people's deeds and concerns, and overcome the difficulties along with them. For us there is no other way to strengthen the authority of the party organization and justify the people's trust in us.

As we prepare for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 19th Kirghiz Communist Party Congress, each party organization must analyze its own work in an exacting and critical way and do everything possible to meet the interests of the people. It is very important to conduct in an organized manner the upcoming elections for Kirghiz SSR people's deputies and deputies to the local soviets and to form a reliable corps of deputies at all levels. Our successes will in large measure depend on this.

On behalf of the Central Committee plenum permit me to express the conviction that the communists and workers of Kirghizstan will do everything possible to bring the republic to new frontiers of socioeconomic and national progress.

Latvian Local Election Preliminary Statistics

90UN1009A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 10 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Aleksey Sheynin, SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH observer: "Let's Count Up the Percentages: Preliminary Election Results"]

[Text] I propose to take a look at certain results of the recently held elections to the local soviets. In my opinion, the readers themselves will be able to find some very interesting figures and draw their own conclusions. The data are as of mid-January (obtained in the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet).

	Total	Percent
No. of soviets	594	
No. of electoral districts	14,586	
No. of deputies elected	13,423	92.02
Elected for the first time	9,322	69.44
Women	4,822	35.92
CPSU members and candidate members	5,034	37.5
Komsomol members	668	4.98
NFL members	5,684	42.35
IF members	68	0.51
LSS members	3,072	22.89
Workers	2,659	19.81
Kolkhoz members	4,085	30.43

	Total	Percent
Military-service personnel	146	1.09
Latvians	11,119	82.84
Russians	1,459	10.81
Ukrainians	294	2.19
Belorussians	291	2.17
Jews	14	0.1
Poles	203	1.51
Other nationalities	51	0.38

It is easy to find adherents of the Latvian People's Front and Interfront among the deputies (with 42 percent and 0.5 percent respectively, for an advantage by the Latvian People's Front amounting to a factor of 84. To apportion the entire list with regard to the political spectrum is more complicated. For even among the communists there are adherents of both Fronts, whereas the Farmers' Union has its own point of view on many issues, although they coincide with those of the NFL [Latvian People's Front] quite often, while it is completely unclear what the Komsomol members think.

Let me add that, among the 34 elected chairmen of soviets (out of 39 needed) in the rayons, 2 persons are under 30 years old, 29 are between 30 and 50 years old, and 3 are older than 50. There are 33 Latvians and 1 Russian. There are 32 persons with a higher education. Of these 17 have graduated from the Latvian Agricultural Academy, 7 from the RPI [Riga Polytechnical Institute], 5 from the LGU [Leningrad State University], and 3 from other VUZ's. Two persons have a specialized secondary education. There are 23 Communists (of whom 4 are NFL members and three are SSL [Latvian Farmers' Union] members). There are 5 persons from the Latvian People's Front, 1 Social-Democrat, and 5 non-party persons.

After obtaining the final data, it will be possible to attempt to venture making predictions concerning the upcoming elections to this republic's Supreme Soviet.

And one more thing: I hardly think that statistics can serve as campaign material of use to this or that party on the eve of the runoff elections. Although figures are very significant, they are neutral.

Uzbek Election Commission Finds Campaign Flaws

90US0521B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Jan 90 p 2

[UzTAG report: "In the Central Electoral Commission"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission held its regular meeting on 11 January in Tashkent on elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies. It was led by its chairman, T.Kh. Sabitov.

The commission members were informed on the progress of registering candidates for Uzbek SSR people's deputies. As of 10 January 342 deputy candidates were registered in

173 districts. Among them are citizens of different nationalities, ages and social groups, communists and nonmembers. It was emphasized that little time is left before the registration deadline, and the electoral commissions must organize their work more efficiently.

The Central Electoral Commission examined the progress of preparations for election of Uzbek SSR people's deputies in the electoral districts of Samarkand Oblast. It was noted that the election campaign is proceeding here in accordance with the provisions of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and the new election legislation. The oblast's public is taking an active part in it. Two hundred fifteen candidates for Uzbek SSR people's deputies were nominated in 56 districts by representative organs of public organizations at conferences and assemblies of labor collectives and assemblies of voters by place of residence.

At the same time there are shortcomings in the work of electoral commissions in regard to organizing public information on the results of nominating and registering deputy candidates, in setting up meetings of candidates with voters and in election campaigning. It was recommended that the district electoral commissions and the Samarkand Oblast Executive Committee focus their attention on ensuring high quality implementation of all election measures and voting on election day.

A report was given on the work of the republic's Komsomol organizations with young voters and Uzbek SSR people's deputy candidates. During the election campaign 111 persons below 30 years of age received the right to fight for a deputy seat. The Komsomol committees were asked to intensify work among young voters aimed at explaining the provisions of the Election Law and to ensure their active participation in the election campaign.

The work of Tashkent's precinct electoral commissions concerned with preparations for the elections was discussed at the meeting. It was noted that the rayon executive committees had formed 625 election precincts. Many commissions have initiated aggressive election activities. But in a number of cases various technical problems are being resolved too slowly. Executive committees of the city's local soviets have not always provided effective assistance to precinct commissions in organizing their work. It was recommended to the Tashkent City Executive Committee that it implement exhaustive measures to eliminate the existing shortcomings, and turn special attention to widely explaining the provisions of the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Uzbek SSR, on the voting procedures on election day, and on creating the needed conditions for normal operation of precinct commissions.

The Central Electoral Commission acknowledged a report from the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Publishing Affairs that the enterprises that will publish the ballots and voter lists are ready, and it gave instructions to implement the necessary measures together with interested organs to ensure their timely publication.

The format of the ballot to be used in elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies in cases where different numbers of deputy candidates are to be voted on was established in accordance with the law.

A number of petitions by citizens and labor collectives were examined at the commission meeting. The appropriate decisions were made on them.

Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Deputy Chairman B. I. Bugrov took part in the meeting of the Central Electoral Commission.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Views Election Campaign Faults, Crime Rate Growth

90US0521C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet held its regular meeting on 18 January. The meeting was led by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Deputy Chairman B. I. Bugrov.

The progress of preparations for elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies and deputies of local soviets in Khorezm Oblast was reviewed at the meeting. It was noted that local bodies of state power in the oblast are capitalizing on the preparations for the elections to further develop the initiative and the social and political activity of the masses, and that they are striving to confirm democratic principles in this important effort on the basis of provisions of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and new election legislation.

At the same time the Presidium noted that stereotypes and obsolete approaches to organizing elections have not been fully surmounted in the work of the oblast's local soviets and their executive committees. In their work jointly with district commissions, the executive committees have not made sufficient use of the right to organize assemblies by place of residence of voters in order to nominate deputy candidates, in a number of cases they have approached preparation and conduct of election conferences in formal terms only, and they have not always stuck to their principles in evaluating individual cases in which the voting rights of citizens and labor collectives have been limited. As a result candidates in a large number of the electoral districts will be running unopposed in elections to various positions in the soviets.

The Presidium ordered the soviets of people's deputies of Khorezm Oblast to implement additional measures to organize support to the election campaign, to examine each case of violation of election law strictly and in accordance with their principles, and to see that the organs of popular sovereignty that are voted in would be truly capable of implementing the party's course toward restructuring all spheres of the society's life.

The Presidium discussed the work of the soviets of people's deputies of Tashkent Oblast concerned with managing the activities of law enforcement organs in

safeguarding public order and in fighting serious and dangerous crimes. It was emphasized at the meeting that the oblast's soviets of people's deputies, their executive committees and law enforcement organs have not achieved a fundamental turning point in the fight against crime, especially its serious forms, and they are not carrying out their constitutional responsibilities in regard to upholding the law in their territory fully. As a result the operational situation in the oblast has remained extremely complex for a long period of time, and it is characterized by a dramatic rise in theft, bribery and brutal acts of violence. The situation is especially alarming in the cities of Almalyk, Angren, Narimanov and Chirchik and in Pskentskiy and Chinazkiy rayons, where serious crimes have doubled.

Crime among young people has increased by almost 70 percent. Organized crime is growing, and the fight against criminal recidivism is not being conducted satisfactorily.

Proper order has not been established in the law enforcement organs themselves either. Cases of cover-ups of crimes, of illegal detention and initiation of criminal proceedings against citizens, and of falsification of the materials of criminal cases still occur.

The soviets of people's deputies have not perfected the new system for placing and educating personnel of internal affairs organs. Efforts to encourage deputy formations and laborers to participate in the fight against crime are weak, and the role and significance of comrades' courts, volunteer detachments and other self-help public organs is declining in this effort.

Having recognized the work of the Tashkent Oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies to be inadequate, the Presidium demanded adoption of exhaustive measures to correct the noted shortcomings. The corresponding orders were given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, the Ministry of People's Education and a number of other ministries and departments of the republic.

The results of elections of people's assessors of rayon (city) people's courts of the Uzbek SSR and other problems of the republic's life were examined at the meeting.

Draft Charter of Uzbek Youth Organizations Committee

90US0584C Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 3

[Draft: "Charter of Uzbek SSR Youth Organizations Committee"]

[Text] The Uzbek SSR Youth Organizations Committee [KMO] is a public youth organization that unites on voluntary and democratic principles the republic's youth organizations, associations, and movements, and that operates within the framework of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and in conformation with international agreements recognized by the USSR.

Goals and Tasks of Uzbek SSR KMO

The goals and tasks of Uzbek SSR KMO are:

- the consolidation of the actions of the republic's youth organizations, associations, and movements for the purposes of humanizing the sociopolitical life, preserving peace on earth, achieving social progress, and reinforcing and developing friendship among nations;
- the participation of the youth of Uzbekistan in various international nationwide and republic-level measures that conform to the spirit and goals of Uzbek SSR KMO;
- the promotion of the preservation and development of the cultural heritage of the nations and nationalities inhabiting the republic and the country, as well as the propagandizing of the universally human and natural cultural values of the world's peoples;
- the establishment, development, and reinforcement of ties with young fellow countrymen abroad;
- cooperation on a mutually acceptable basis with national groups, regional committees, and associations of unions of foreign citizens who are working or studying in Uzbek SSR;
- cooperation with youth organizations of the USSR and the union republics, with the preservation of its own independence;
- cooperation with youth organizations, associations, and movements operating in the republic, in resolving social, economic, political, ecological, and other problems of modern life;
- with the assistance of Uzbek SSR KMO, the maintaining of international ties with youth organizations abroad;
- participation in the work of the general meeting of Uzbek SSR KMO;
- the nomination of its representatives for election to the coordinating agencies of Uzbek SSR KMO;
- the election, through its representatives, of the Uzbek SSR KMO chairman and the Uzbek SSR KMO Council;
- the obtaining of information concerning the activities of the KMO;
- the withdrawal from the makeup of Uzbek SSR KMO with the mandatory notification of the KMO Council.

Duties of Uzbek SSR KMO Members

The duties of Uzbek SSR KMO members are:

- to carry out their activities as a KMO member in conformity with its goals and tasks, as established in this Charter;
- to inform Uzbek SSR KMO concerning the measures to be carried out within the framework of the KMO.

Organizational Structure of Uzbek SSR KMO

The highest coordinating agency of Uzbek SSR KMO is the general meeting of the republic's KMO, which convenes once a year. Every KMO member has the right to cast one deciding vote.

1. Uzbek SSR KMO General Assembly

The Uzbek SSR KMO General Assembly:

- accepts the Uzbek SSR KMO Charter and makes amendments to it;
- determines the basic trends in the activities of Uzbek SSR KMO during the immediately forthcoming period, and reviews and approves target programs for working with youth and the KMO budget;
- elects an Uzbek SSR KMO Council and chairman;
- listens to the report of the Uzbek SSR KMO Council and chairman concerning their work during the period between general meetings;
- makes the decision concerning the acceptance of new members and the removal of members from the KMO;
- nominates its candidates for election as people's deputies in conformity with the USSR Election Law.

Note: Decisions that are made at a general meeting and that contradict the opinion of a segment of the KMO members are nonmandatory for that segment of the members. At such time the following constitute an exception: financial-organizational, organizational, and moral support of social, political, scientific-technical, creative, and other youth initiatives that correspond to the KMO goals and tasks;

- the rendering of the necessary assistance in studying youth problems with the purpose of working out the priority trends in the activities of Uzbek SSR KMO;
- the taking of all steps to develop youth forms of the people's diplomacy;
- the protection of the rights and interests of youth by means of legislative and other initiatives;
- the carrying out of economic activity in the USSR and abroad on principles of cost accountability in order to implement the KMO goals and tasks.

Membership in Uzbek SSR KMO

Membership in the KMO is collective.

The following can be KMO members:

- youth organizations having the rights of a juridical person;
- spontaneous youth associations, special-interest clubs, and amateur associations operating in conformity with the Uzbek SSR Constitution;

- youth sections that are part of state, cooperative, public, and religious organizations;
- persons who recognize this charter, perform work to implement the KMO goals and tasks, and pay entrance fees and membership dues.

The extent and procedure for payment of membership dues are established by the KMO Council for every organization that is part of the KMO, on the basis of mutual coordination, proceeding from its size and its financial capabilities.

The acceptance of youth organizations (associations, clubs, or sections) as KMO members is carried out at general meetings, and, during the period between them, at the KMO Councils with subsequent confirmation at a general meeting.

Rights of Uzbek SSR KMO Members

Uzbek SSR KMO member have the right:

- to participate in the formation and implementation of the KMO activities program; questions pertaining to the charter. Failure to agree to a general meeting's decision must be reported in the course of the meeting or after its conclusion.

2. Uzbek SSR KMO Council

The KMO Council is elected for a two-year term by direct secret vote.

The number of Council members is determined by the KMO general meeting.

The KMO Council:

- operates on public principles;
- approves the structure and composition of the KMO executive agencies, and also monitors its activities;
- elects the Council chairman;
- makes the decision concerning the convoking of a KMO general meeting;
- listens to a report, at least once a quarter, from the KMO Chairman concerning his activities;
- monitors the implementation of the decisions of the KMO general meeting;
- has the right to express a vote of lack of confidence in the KMO Chairman in the event that that has been voted on by no less than two-thirds of the listed makeup of the Council (at such time, a special KMO general meeting is convoked);
- creates public and expert commissions for the various trends in KMO activities.

Uzbek SSR KMO Chairman

The election of the chairman is held at a KMO general meeting by direct secret vote.

A condition of the registration of a candidate for the position of KMO chairman is the vouching for him by no fewer than five KMO members.

A candidate is considered to be elected if he has won more than 50 percent of all the KMO members. In the event that no single candidate wins the necessary number of votes, a runoff election is held, in which the participants are the two candidates who received the largest number of votes in the previous round.

The KMO Chairman is elected for a two-year term and cannot occupy that position for more than two consecutive terms.

Powers of the Uzbek SSR KMO Chairman

The powers of the Uzbek SSR KMO Chairman are:

- the formation and guidance of the work performed by the KMO executive agencies;
- the dispersal of the financial means in conformity with the KMO activities program and budget;
- representation of the KMO in interrelations with other Soviet and foreign organizations;
- the carrying out of current KMO organizational activities.

Legal Status of the Uzbek SSR KMO

The Uzbek SSR KMO, as a public organization, is a juridical person. It has blank forms, a press, and accounts at bank institutions. The location of the Uzbek SSR KMO is the city of Tashkent.

Uzbek SSR KMO Funds

1. The sources from which the Uzbek SSR KMO funds are formed are:

- monetary fees and dues paid by the members;
- proceeds from concerts, plays, and other measures carried out by KMO, and also from all types of its own economic activity;
- voluntary fees paid by various state and public organizations, institutions, cooperatives, and individual citizens.

2. These Uzbek SSR KMO funds are expended for:

- carrying out bilateral exchanges with foreign partner organizations; for carrying out international measures in the republic and abroad, festivals, friendship weeks, and labor and recreation camps; for maintaining the Uzbek SSR KMO apparatus; for carrying out publishing and propaganda activities; and for other purposes stipulated by the KMO activities program and by this Charter.

Note: In the course of the work of the initiative group and the discussion of the drafts of the Uzbek SSR KMO Statute at the buro of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee, a recommendation was made to

reorganize Uzbek SSR into an association or federation of organization, which reorganization would be more consistent with its goals and tasks at the present time.

Military Academy Teacher Sees Positive Role for Informal Groups

90US0607A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 7, 12-18 Feb 90 pp 8-9

[Interview with Lt Col S.N. Yushenkov by Georgiy Dolgov: "Children of the Totalitarian Underground"]

[Text] Just several years, ago any independent movement was unflinching declared dangerous and criminal. Today, a great number of the most varied forms of civic associations have appeared. We are beginning gradually to become accustomed to them and they are playing an ever larger role in our social and political life. Nevertheless, debate has not halted with regard to such independent civic initiatives. And attitudes toward them are not unanimous within various social strata and groups.

So, who are they, these members of informal groups? This is the topic of our discussion with candidate of philosophical sciences, Lt. Colonel S.N. Yushenkov, a political scientist and instructor at the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin.

[Dolgov] Sergey Nikolayevich, let us first define our terms: Who do we call informalists? What sort of independent associations do we include within this movement?

[Yushenkov] Generally, today, we consider as informal groups those which are nowhere registered in accordance with the law of 1932. But this is a very vague definition. Indeed, strictly speaking, the CPSU is also not registered anywhere, although it too is a social organization. They say that this is not necessary in its case, making reference to Article 6 of the Constitution. But, in the first place, it was not so very long ago that this article appeared. And, secondly, the informal groups have precisely the same right to cite the Constitution, which also speaks of "other social organizations."

However, there are also other characteristics: [An informal group represents] an independent initiative by a group of people that is not imposed upon them from above, an association of people who think alike in terms of interests. Besides this, an informal group is distinct from official structures and sometimes opposes them, but it never duplicates them.

[Dolgov] Are there many such associations in our country?

[Yushenkov] About 60,000. It is difficult to say exactly. The process of development of civic initiatives is a very dynamic one. Some groups are being born and at the same time others are ceasing to exist.

[Dolgov] Is it possible somehow to classify the basic directions of the informal movement within the country?

[Yushenkov] Of course. If we take as a starting point an analysis of the principles on which they have been established, of the ideals and goals to which they aspire, of the sociopolitical direction of their activities, then it is

possible tentatively to distinguish several groups. For example, the "fundamentalists" [pochvenniki], those who have joined together based exclusively on the idea of national rebirth. In particular, "Pamyat" [Memory], in all its variants, "Otechestvo" [Fatherland], "Molodaya Rus" [Young Russia], and the "Russian Cultural Center." With certain provisos, the Russian People's Front can also be added to these. Listed among them are also almost all the people's fronts operating within the union and autonomous republics and other associations such as "Rukh" in the Ukraine and the Shota Rustaveli Society in Georgia... The programs of these groups are based on nationalist ideas.

The next group are the "westernists," those who are oriented toward western models of development. It seems to me that the clearest expression of this trend is seen in the "Democratic Union." Also associated with it are such groups as "Democracy and Humanism," "Perestroika-88," and the overwhelming majority of new parties.

One can distinguish one more category, which can arbitrarily be designated as the "socialists." These, as a rule, are those associations which are based on defending socialist values. Among them are the "Democratic Perestroika" club, the club of "Socialist Innovators", the "Social Initiatives" club, and many others. At one time, a powerful tendency toward merger, toward consolidation, could be detected among these associations. Simultaneously, a process of demarcation was also going on. Incidentally, such opposing processes are generally characteristic of the informal movement. They are quite real. Perceptible shifts can be achieved in the solution of social problems only through joint efforts. And the Federation of Socialist Social Clubs and the All-Union Social and Political Club have already been established and are functioning. The Moscow People's Front also unites various clubs. It is, in general, sharply distinguished from the other people's fronts. And not only in terms of geography, but first of all by its goals, its tasks.

[Dolgov] There is also one more large category of independent organizations. Within it, probably, we should list those that have dedicated themselves to a concern for restoring charity within our society and for protecting the social and legal rights of its citizens.

[Yushenkov] The majority of these have already been registered. Juridically, such clubs and societies as "Charity" [Miloserdiye], "Socialist Trade Unions," and "Shield" [Shchit] are not informal groups although, in their practical activities, they still retain many of the forms and methods of the first stages of their existence. So far, they have managed to preserve a low level of bureaucratization within their structures, to maintain broad and firm ties with the popular masses, and to make active use of independent elements.

And finally, one other category—the ecological one. A very powerful movement. An active process of politicization is now taking place within it. This is natural,

inasmuch as it has already become clear to all that ecological problems cannot be solved without the solution of political problems. Consequently, it is necessary to establish the kind of political conditions that, if they do not help, at least will not hinder the participants in the movement from carrying out their activities.

In this same category I would also include the committees for self-government [samoupravleniye] because a majority of these have been established on an ecological basis. I know from my own experience, because I am a member of such a committee. It grew from an initiative group which prevented destruction of the only public garden on ulitsa Vorovskaya, with its well-known elm tree. They still have not registered us. The procurator, unlike the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, considers that everything that is not authorized is prohibited. But the committee is at work. We are trying to ensure social protection for pensioners and are organizing, for example, a sale of inexpensive and well-made goods. We are conducting free legal consultation for residents of the micro-rayon. We are looking into the housing situation and are trying to organize cooperatives which would be able to provide funds to assist the needy. Indeed, the state is not in a position to do this. We intend to establish a coordination council of all the self-government committees in Kievskiy Rayon and to seek joint solutions to even more serious problems.

[Dolgov] This will be an alternative to the Rayon soviet executive committee?

[Yushenkov] Well, and so what? There is no reason to be afraid of this word—alternative. There is nothing dangerous about it. Lenin in his time said that soviet power is a higher form of the organization of authority only because it permits the working masses, if they are not satisfied with their party, to elect other deputies of their own, thereby transferring authority from the hands of one party into the hands of another without the slightest revolution. In my opinion, the time has already come to return to alternative structures, whose significance Lenin understood in this way. That the bureaucracy is very unhappy about them is a different matter. They are hindering it from realizing its own narrow, selfish interests and are destroying its monopoly on power.

[Dolgov] Is the appearance of the informal structures in our society a product of a desire to achieve our unrealized desire for alternatives? Do they in fact conceal a threat to the existence of the party and administrative apparatus?

[Yushenkov] They have not just appeared. Informal organizations have always existed in Russia. The "westernists" and "slavophiles," for example, were notorious. Even in the cruel times of Stalin they existed. It is sufficient to recall Ryutina, the group in which Aleksandr Zinovyev took part. There were also socialists, and ecologists, and there was a dissident movement. Up until the present time, all of them were simply under the surface, in the underground of our totalitarian

system. Perestroika opened for them the way to the light. In general, as long as society exists, informal organizations will also necessarily exist within it. We sometimes do not even suspect that we belong to them. Take fans of the Russian baths, or of the ballet. How many of them are there? And you will notice that conversations that are held there are not only about the quality of the twig switches or of the steam. They talk mostly about politics. Opinions ripen and points of view are formed in such company. And something else. Every person has many interests. And he has a right to their satisfaction.

[Dolgov] You have in mind both everyday ones, and social ones, and political ones?

[Yushenkov] Of course. Out of habit, we continue to talk about two classes in society—the workers and the peasants, and about some kind of stratum that we don't understand. But real practice testifies to something different. Recently published sociological studies convincingly show the presence of several other large groups within society. And all of them have been distinguished on the basis of Leninist methodology for defining classes. And once you have classes, this means you have interests.

[Dolgov] Such a possibility is appearing today in connection with the new concept of the role of the soviets.

[Yushenkov] One wishes to hope so. But it is difficult to say how this will take place in practice. In this sense also, there is no kind of experience. We do not know what authority of the soviets means. All our lives we have been dealing only with a dictatorial apparatus. What is more, its establishment was not an historical surprise. On the eve of the October revolution, G. V. Plekhanov wrote that if the Bolsheviks came to power then, after five years, they would establish a dictatorship of their own party. And in fact, after precisely five years, in 1923, it was written in the decisions of the 12th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolshevik)] Congress that the dictatorship of the proletariat under contemporary conditions could not be exercised other than through the dictatorship of its leading detachment, that is, of the Communist Party. The dictatorship of the proletariat was replaced by the dictatorship of the party.

[Dolgov] But an informal association can not set political goals for itself; it must occupy itself with purely prosaic matters. It must fight, let us say, for the production of modern equipment for ice-fishing fans.

[Yushenkov] Politics takes many shapes. And there is such a concept as political consciousness. Remember the period of the so called kitchen democracy, when we all sat around our own homes and discussed all sorts of political events during the period of stagnation. It has now somehow become accepted to talk half-contemptuously about this time. But, indeed, it was precisely these kitchens which also prepared public opinion for perestroika. Within the circle of those close to him, a person, as it were, talks through his own opinion, learns to formulate it. This is a political school,

and moreover a very serious one. Recall that just a few years ago we were afraid pronounce the word "multi-party." And now we are freely discussing this problem. It has emerged full-blown before us because the informal movement—this is the way to a future democratic structure for our political system.

[Dolgov] The main condition for the establishment of any informal association—is this the possibility of associating with one's like- thinkers?

[Yushenkov] And the desire to change something for the better. They say that, among the informalists, there are many people who somehow want to realize their own ambitions and aspirations. Well, and what of it? We are not talking about a person who, because he has a voice and an ear, wants to become a singer in the Bolshoy Theater.

In precisely the same way, certain people may have a need for political activity. This means that it is necessary to create conditions for its realization as well. When an American schoolboy writes in a composition that he dreams of becoming President of the United States, this is accepted as being normal. If one of ours writes that he wants to become General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, this in the best of cases provokes a sarcastic smile. As if, even the General Secretary did not want to become this, they forcibly made him do so. Informalists are frequently accused of straining for power. But pay attention—the ones doing the accusing are usually those who are already in power and who do not want to part with it.

In other words, there is a narrow, clannish interest of their own here. Precisely this, to a large degree, determines the negative attitude toward the informalists today. This is sad because it deprives society of a large group of already trained professional politicians, first of all parliamentarians. They are not permitted to nominate their own candidates for deputy; it is necessary for them to operate "indirectly," via the labor collectives of enterprises. A route that is neither short nor simple. Along it, we lose a great many people who could enliven our political life and be of great benefit to perestroika. It is specifically within the informal structures that the future political leaders on all levels are being born today.

[Dolgov] One frequently hears today about the establishment of new parties, not associations. To what extent are they really parties?

[Yushenkov] To very different degrees. For example, the anarchist-syndicalists do not pretend to this role, inasmuch as they generally advocate a system without parties. Members of the "Democratic Union" (DS) call themselves a party and are striving to become the party of the Union of Constitutional Democrats, although I think that, for the time being, this does not entirely accord with reality.

[Dolgov] Have the constitutional democrats established themselves according to the model and image of their forefathers, the Kadets?

[Yushenkov] In general, yes, although in terms of its charter their party is distinguished from the one that is well-known to us from history. As you will recall, there were many professors and scholars among the old Kadets. There are considerably fewer of them in the present union, although doctors and candidates of science are joining it. This is a liberal democratic party.

[Dolgov] And are there SR's?

[Yushenkov] Yes. This is a prototype peasant party. I think that such will appear in the very near future. The recently established association of peasant farms probably will join together with the party of town and rural farms that is in the process of being established. They will all together comprise a peasant party or they may take various paths. For the time-being, it is difficult to say. Most likely, a commonality of interests will force them to unite their efforts.

It necessary to state that, already today, there are powerful groupings which do not call themselves parties but which, in essence, exercise all the functions of parties. Among them, first of all, are the people's fronts. They, incidentally, are also nominating their own candidates. Such as Sergey Stankevich—the leader of the Moscow People's Front and a very prominent figure today in our parliament.

Or take "Democratic Perestroika." This is not a party; this is a club. People gather together at the Central Mathematical Economics Institute and discuss very important problems. For example, on the eve of the 19th All- Union Party Conference, they developed their own program and sent it to the delegates. And, what is very important, some of their proposals went into the resolution of the conference.

[Dolgov] Do you consider that the birth of the informal movement today is a good thing for our society, that it is a reaction to its totalitarian past and a step toward the future? What then is to happen with regard to those negative phenomena that exist within the movement, the manifestation of which have turned out to be so tragic?

[Yushenkov] You know, I am deeply convinced that all kinds of informal structures should exist freely and independently within society. From a society of people who fancy canary-bird singing to the anarchist-syndicalists. But with one rigid condition. There should not be a single association that propagandizes ethnic or racial discord and violence. Society must protect itself from manifestations of extremism. I also find absolutely unacceptable, for example, the commission by certain groups of illegal acts and the desire to destabilize the situation for purposes of achieving certain kinds of narrow, usually purely selfish goals.

It is not at all difficult to identify such groups within the movement as a whole. It is sufficient to study the principles on which they are established and the strategy and tactics of their activities. And then the goals and tasks of such groupings will be revealed, without any

democratic and patriotic decoration. In principle, I am able to accept, for example, the platform of a certain part of "Pamyat" with regard to a regeneration of the nation. But when they tell me that the great and powerful Russian people was enslaved by a small group of Jews, this is deeply insulting to me, as a Russian. I am unable to accept a blind and lively hatred for everything that is "not one's own." Please, do what you can for your own people, but do not deter the rest from doing the same thing. We cannot place ourselves in opposition to other nations. Winston Churchill once expressed himself very well on this score. They asked him why there was no anti-Semitism in England. And he answered: "Because we, the English, do not consider ourselves more stupid than the Jews."

But here is what is strange. Almost all informal groups, to one degree or another but necessarily, have been subjected to pressure or repression on the part of the authorities. And only the nationalistic associations have never experienced such unpleasantness. Just as scandalous, they have all but ignored the well-known "Democratic Union." To be sure, most all its members have been picked up by the militia and have been prosecuted. For administrative violations. And indeed, the "DS", with all the ambiguity of attitudes toward it, has never called either for violence or for any kind of discord. But not once have I had occasion to hear that they have in any way offended anyone from "Pamyat," even from its extremist wing. The same thing has happened with the people's fronts in the Transcaucasus. It is as if they have developed under hothouse conditions. We can now see for ourselves what this has led to.

[Dolgov] Do you suppose that the nationalists have a future?

[Yushenkov] I don't think this is a very bright one. Society in the final account recognizes a real danger that threatens it. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, there are neo-Nazis. And they are taking part in political life, are nominating their own deputies to parliament. But they also have there a whole series of laws, rather severe ones, which make it possible to protect the country and its people from tragic excesses. With us, such laws exist only on paper. I think that the time is approaching when we will be forced to apply them in practice.

[Dolgov] The informal movement itself, in your opinion, will it grow and expand?

[Yushenkov] Yes, if only the social and political situation will allow this, if an overturn of democratic victories does not begin. I have already talked about slamming the door. I would not like to think that the walls of our very unstable building could begin to sway or even collapse from several blows, but this possibility cannot be entirely excluded. But even if the darkest conservative forces should be victorious, we nevertheless would no longer become unanimous and obedient. Enriched by experience, the informal movement would again go underground and organizationally

established even there, in the gloomy closeness of a new stagnation, would put out the shoots of a new perestroika. Herein lies, incidentally, the promise that the processes going on today are irreversible. There is no need to fear the informalists.

Armenian Officials Blast TASS, Central TV Statements on Caucasus Crisis

TASS Statements Scored

90US0507A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
24 Jan 90 p 2

[ARMENPRESS report: "Whose Purpose Does False Information Serve?"]

[Text] The regular meeting of the Operations Staff at the Republic Council on the Extraordinary Situation began with a statement by Gen-Maj M.S. Surkov, chief of the Political Department of the Yerevan Garrison and People's Deputy of the USSR. The general's statement completely refuted the TASS report in the 21 January central television broadcast of the program "Seven Days." It sharply condemned this information and called it false. At the same time, the general declared that while the additional contingent of army units was in Armenia, there were no attacks upon them, anywhere; and no one tried to block their movement to their temporary encampment; and certainly no one took any weapons or ammunition from them. General Surkov also stated that during the Karabakh conflict, not a single military serviceman stationed in Armenia suffered.

The statements in the TASS report, that "Extremist elements continue to threaten the military servicemen and demand that they leave Armenia," are far-fetched, and were made solely for the purpose of stirring up national sentiments against the Armenians; the moreso, since meetings were held in Stavropol and Krasnodarskiy Kray protesting the call-up of reservists. If he wished, an honest journalist could have taken advantage of the fact that previously stolen weapons had been handed over to the Regional Internal Affairs Department in the city of Yerevan and in certain other regions. At the same time, the persons who surrendered these weapons were motivated by the fact that, after the introduction of the additional contingent of Army units onto Armenian territory, their need for self-defense disappeared. In so doing, they were expressing their attitude toward the Soviet Army.

Also far-fetched is the statement that, "The appeal by certain leaders of the Armenian National Movement [ANM] not to give up the weapons would lead to a situation in which a significant portion of the weapons would fall into the hands of criminal elements and would be used against the people of the republic." ANM leaders made no such appeal. On the contrary. If someone did surrender his weapon, this was a result of the agitation work conducted by representatives of party and Soviet organs together with ANM.

The details cited by TASS on a number of assaults on institutions for the purpose of seizing weapons suffer from inaccuracy. If an assault on the Abovyanskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department had indeed taken place, it was not on 20-21 January but about 10 days ago, and Vardeniskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department personnel did not seize 126 pistols, a mortar, a combat vehicle and other arms. TASS once again confused the facts on how many weapons were voluntarily surrendered at several rayon militia departments in the republic.

Over the past two years we have become accustomed to the fact that a number of central mass information organs distort the facts, re-shuffle them, and "confuse" the geography. From TASS information we learn that Armenian fighters on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on territory called "Wolf's Gate," shot up an Azerbaijanian village, where 12 civilians were killed, and that "Contrary to the truth, this barbaric act was ascribed to military servicemen—to those very persons who risked their lives to stop the firing."

Speaking of TASS, incidentally: at the present time there is no office for TASS correspondents in Yerevan; there isn't even a special correspondent there to represent this world-famous, prestigious firm. Then one might ask, just who was it that wrote this material?

* * *

Are the cited facts reliable, that the initiators of the bloody incident on the Armenian-Azerbaijan border were really Armenians? Hardly. Here is what ARMENPRESS Special Correspondent M. Makaryan—an eye witness to the events—has to say about this.

On the morning of 18 January, shots from a spot near the village of Sadarak on the territory of Nakhichevan ASSR aroused the peaceful citizens of Yeraskh. The shooting rapidly became more intensive and more threatening. Two workers were severely wounded at their workplaces. The shooting continued until late at night, and renewed with even greater intensity the following morning.

The TASS report on this bloody clash on the border of the two republics clearly confused the guilty and innocent parties. Moreover, it confused the borders of the two republics and the populated places. TASS declares to the entire world: "On the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, on the territory known as the Wolf's Gate, Armenian terrorists shot up an Azerbaijanian village. Twelve civilians were killed." In point of fact, the Wolf's Gate is eight kilometers this side of the village of Sadarak, in Ilichevskiy Rayon, Nakhichevan ASSR. That means that in order to have shot up the village the Armenian irregulars would have had to penetrate at least 12 kilometers into an autonomous republic; whereas Armenians did not cross this border by so much as a centimeter.

Unfortunately TASS is not the only one guilty of confusing the facts, the borders and the geography. In the 21

January issue of IZVESTIYA it is stated in black and white that, "Exchange of fire on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan continues. From the Azerbaijanian side, an attack was made on the Armenian village of Sadarak. Five homes were destroyed, six people were killed and 23 wounded." One can see how well-informed, how accurate, how reliable they are...

It would also be interesting to find out what sources of information IZVESTIYA made use of in asserting that Armenians in armored personnel carriers had blockaded the villages of Sadarak, Yukhary and Yaydli (probably Yukhary Yaydzhli), and Govu?.. The obvious disinformation in these important reports would appear to be calculated to incite passions, would it not?

Appeal to USSR Procurator

90US0507B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
24 Jan 90 p 3

[ARMENPRESS report: "In the Armenian USSR Procuracy"]

[Text] Having examined the question of the central mass information media distorting certain facts concerning the events taking place in the Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR, the collegium of the Armenian SSR Procuracy appealed to Comrade A. Ya. Sukharev, USSR Procurator-General, on the following:

On 21 January 1990, during broadcast of the program "Seven Days, Central Telegraph Main Information Chief Editor E.M. Salagayev, citing a TASS report, declared that in Armenia "Extremist elements have not ceased to threaten military servicemen, demanding that they get out of Armenia." This assertion not only does not correspond with reality, it also was the cause of profound and justifiable indignation among the soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army and Interior Ministry troops stationed in the Armenian SSR and their commanders, as well as the Armenian people as a whole, who believe that such reports are provocative and that they in fact pursue the goal of driving a wedge between the people and the Army.

The IZVESTIYA article of 22 January 1990, "USSR MVD Press Center Reports," was also full of distortions and provocations. Specifically, it contains the false information, that "Active operations by Armenian fighters continue in Nakhichevan. They have blockaded the villages of Sadarak, Yukhary, Yaydli and Govu. The village of Sadarak has been completely surrounded by armed Armenian fighters in armored personnel carriers."

The Armenian village of Artsvashen, surrounded by Azerbaijani villages, was declared by the author of the article to be an Azerbaijani village, and the following information was reported: "In Krasnoselskiy Rayon, for 24 hours a detachment of fighters (up to 50 men), armed with automatic weapons, blockaded with three armored

personnel carriers the village of Artsvashen, in which Azerbaijanians dwell. An unmarked helicopter was flying around the village”...

At the present time the untrue articles published by the central mass information organs are one of the basic reasons for the destabilization of the situation in the republic.

The Armenian SSR Procurator appealed to the USSR Procurator General to intercede in order to check the aforementioned facts, find the guilty parties and bring them to justice, in order to preclude further reports of this nature.

An ARMENPRES correspondent asked Armenian SSR Procurator V. Nazaryan to explain why the republic procuracy had resorted to such extreme and extraordinary measures.

“Over the past two years we have become accustomed to falsification of information,” said he. “If such distorted reporting had occurred prior to the extremely tense situation which has come to pass in the republic, there might have been an increase in the number of political meetings or demonstrations; whereas, in the present situation such disinformation is fraught with grave consequences, and might lead to bloodshed. But this time we are dealing with deliberate falsification, which contains elements of a criminal act. Moreover, the recent TASS report aired on the 21 January central television program ‘Seven Days,’ is a clumsy attempt to drive a wedge between the populace of our Republic and Soviet Armenia. Naturally, such an attitude might lead to a reciprocal reaction as well; that is, to arouse anti-Armenian sentiments in the Army, which is not at all desirable at the present moment; the moreso since our fellow countrymen have always been well-disposed toward the Soviet Army.

“In consideration of the severe consequences of the TASS report, our procuracy has asked the USSR Procurator General to intercede in verifying the facts cited, on exposing the guilty parties, and bringing them to justice, for the purpose of precluding such reports.”

Armenian-Kurdish Tension Allegations Refuted

90US0507C Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
24 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Titale Afo, editor of the Kurdish newspaper RYA TAZA: “To Whose Advantage is This?”]

[Text] It would seem that someone wants very badly to set the Armenians and Kurds at odds with one another, with the aid of scandalous lies and unfair juggling of the facts. This thought could not help occurring to us, the Kurds of Armenia, who heard a report the other day on the “Vremya” program, about “threats directed against the Kurds,” and unkind attitudes toward them on the part of Armenians. This is not the first provocation, and

not the first attempt to introduce tension in Armenian-Kurdish relations. I can recall that while the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR was in session, a telegram from one Babayev from Baku was read to the entire country, which, I am convinced was for the very same purpose—to aggravate Armenian-Kurdish relations.

The author (or authors; it does not make much difference) of the report was undoubtedly informed on the difficult situation that has come to pass in our republic—Soviet Armenia: in a republic in which today literally everyone—Armenians, Russians, Kurds, Ukrainians and representatives of many other Soviet nations, and people of good will from the entire planet, are striving to contribute their best efforts in order that the wounds would heal quickly; in order to raise from the ruins or build anew the cities and villages destroyed by the earthquake, and to return people to their lives and to their native hearths. And at this difficult time for the entire population, someone is starting false reports, the purpose of which is to confuse us and to throw us, Kurds and Armenians, off-balance. As if it’s not enough that the blockade of Armenia and NKAO is still going on; as if there were no threats and all sorts of provocations from the Popular Front of Azerbaijan.

Armenia’s fate is our fate also! And our sharply emotional reaction to the reports derives largely from a sense of its scandalous inconsistency with the truth of history and reality. The world knows that Soviet Armenia was the first and for a long time the only region in the Union which earnestly took up, on a state level, the concerns and the fate of the Kurds. The most favorable conditions were established for them here. At the same time, the larger policy did not differentiate between Yezid Kurds and Kurds professing Islam. They were allowed to teach their children in their native language, have their own newspaper, and listen to daily radio broadcasts. The Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences’ Department of Kurdish Studies, and the Kurdish writers’ section at the Armenian Writers’ Society have been publishing books every year, as well as academic and scientific literature and works of fiction; they have a native theater, song and dance ensemble, and so on—and this is not a complete list of the sphere of the intellectual life of the Kurds of Armenia, that is subsidized by the state. Armenia has become the only forge for our national cadres in the country. Among them are doctors and candidates of sciences, professors and docents; mathematicians and physicists, historians and chemists, engineers and art critics, journalists, and leaders and responsible officials of party, Soviet, economic and law-enforcement organs. We can be justly proud of our outstanding industrial workers, farm workers, and representatives of the intelligentsia.

In Armenia no one has ever caused any interference, whether to Yezid Kurds or Muslim Kurds, in the conduct of sacred and religious rites, or in freedom of religion. And no one has ever placed emphasis upon the religious preference of this or that group of the Kurdish population.

Even in the tense conditions of inter-ethnic relations, no one has ever spoken an unkind word to the Kurds. On the contrary; everything is being done to ensure that their national feelings are not hurt in any way.

Thus: why repeat again and again the words of the provocateur Babayev, on the unfriendly attitude of the Armenian people towards the Kurds on the program "Vremya," or from such a republic as Azerbaijan? Would it not be better to give serious thought to the matter?

And once again the question comes up, to whose advantage is this? To the Armenian people, who have been decimated by an earthquake, who are fighting for a just resolution of the problems of the NKAO? Or to the Kurdish people, who beyond the borders of our country have shed their blood, and who are carrying on a bitter struggle not only for acknowledgment of their national rights, but also for their physical survival? Or, perhaps, to the Soviet state as a whole, which has decisively and irreversibly set out on the path of fundamental transformation, which requires above all political stability?

Then to whom? The answer is self-evident—those who wish the Armenian and Kurdish people ill; those who are striving to drive a wedge between the two peoples, who are connected by many centuries of history and friendship. Those who are striving by legal and illegal means to cast a pall over the struggle of the Armenian people for correcting the historical injustice in the question of Karabakh. And finally, those adherents of "pan-isms" in our country and abroad, who see serious danger in the unity of Armenian and Kurdish progressive forces, and are therefore trying in a primitive way to play the Kurdish card. But they shall not succeed! Our nation is a trusting nation; but at the same time it can distinguish good from evil. And no matter how much the "protectors" declare themselves and no matter how loudly they cry out; it will take the true and proven path—the path of truth and truth alone. Truth about the friend which has supported us for decades, who has helped us to stand up on our feet, and recover our strength.

Is it not surprising that suddenly people who have recently become protectors of the Kurds are the same people who would not even allow themselves to utter the word "Kurd" in their own homes, while suppressing their every attempt at national awakening and development of their native language, culture, national customs and traditions. Facts are stubborn things. In 1926 three times as many Kurds dwelt in Azerbaijan as in Armenia. According to data from the Census of 1979, the number of Kurds in Armenia has increased nearly fourfold, and Azerbaijan has declared there are no Kurds living in Azerbaijan.

In a conversation with a correspondent of the Leningrad newspaper SMENA (14 Oct. 89), V. Kuliyeu, a member of the Azerbaijan National Front, explains this as follows:

[Reporter] In the past the "corridor" between the Armenians and Nagorny Karabakh was settled by Kurds. But during the Stalin regime they were subjected to genocide and disappeared.

[Kuliyeu] No, there is a Kurdish population here. Especially in Lachinskiy Rayon. But the Kurds have been completely assimilated...

[Reporter] They have been assimilated in the mass of the Azerbaijani population?

[Kuliyeu] That's right. Because we have a common faith... In our republic they are not officially called Kurds...

Well, you can see how simple it all is. One can, it seems, first of all quietly assimilate another nation, and then take an "international" position and pose as its protectors. Is this not the height of cynicism?

Kurds know the value of words and deeds, and they know what true concern is. An article by the late theatrical producer, People's Artist of the USSR Rachi Kaplanyan, "I Love; Therefore I Cannot Be Silent," printed in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA on 23 August 1988, contains the following lines: "...thinking about the transfer of the hall constructed under the 'cascade' of the Armenian Society of Theater Actors [STD] for a young people's theater. In this case, another no-less-important question is resolved at no expense. The fact of the matter is that the Kurdish population of the republic has appealed to the Armenian STD to help them open a Kurdish theater in Yerevan. The Kurds at the same time properly referred to the fact that there is a Kurdish newspaper and a section on Kurdish literature in the Armenian Writers' Society. Solution of the problem is being held up because of the need for a building. If we can locate a young people's theater under the arches of a 'cascade,' then its hall can be turned over to the Kurdish theater, the opening of which would be an event of enormous political significance, once again testifying to the traditional internationalism of the Armenian people."

Along with a Kurdish regional popular theater, Kaplanyan had in mind establishing a new one, right in the capital, and this time a state theater. At the same time no one asked him any questions, and no one tried to dissuade him... Construction of the "cascade" is not yet completed, and there is no doubt that when it is turned over, a place will be offered to the Kurdish theater.

You see, only a true friend could say what USSR People's Deputy Genrikh Igityan said: "...In my opinion, not a single nation, even the smallest one, should feel frustrated... For example, in Armenia the Kurds should feel very good, just as they would feel in their own motherland. We are obliged to render them assistance on all questions..." (the magazine SOVETAKAN ARVEST, No 8, 1989).

On 28 February Catholicos of All Armenia Vazgen I, in his letter addressed to the readers of our newspaper, wrote: "I am pleased...to send my greetings and blessings to the fraternal (emphasis ours—T.A.) Kurdish people, who live and work side by side with their Armenian

brothers and sisters. May God bless the brotherhood of the Armenian and Kurdish nations..."

Let the journalists from the program "Vremya" not interfere with this brotherhood; and let them not follow in the footsteps of the Babayevs. Let us live and work in peace.

We have nothing against the Azerbaijani people. We have all been living on this fragile planet, side by side, for many centuries, for many millennia. Today true courage, nationwide courage, does not lie in throwing stones at one another or operating in an atmosphere of hatred; but in displaying calm, sober thought and objective analysis, and understanding once and for all that the times have passed when one can dismember a nation and force it to submit forever to such a ridiculous absurdity, according to which the aspirations of a son to return to the bosom of his motherland is considered extremism. We have only one road—the road of neighborliness and mutual understanding. I am convinced that sooner or later the mistakes committed under Stalinism will be corrected, justice will be restored, and that this road will be open and safe.

Supreme Soviet Deputy Witnessed Baku Events, Evaluates Role of Army

90US0594A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 24 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Olzhas Suleymenov, USSR people's deputy, by Yu. Kirinitsyanov: "To Understand One Another: The Call of Humanity"]

[Text] *I met with him at the hospital, where he was recovering from a severe case of influenza. Yet, even there, in a hospital room, Olzhas Omarovich's telephone kept ringing and cables lay on his table. One of them read: We express to you our huge gratitude for being with us at a tragic time for our people, seeing and sharing our tragedy and sustaining us with your care and sympathy. Thank you for your weighty, honest words helping our peoples reach reconciliation.*

Signed: Zakir Abbasov, Azerbaijan SSR, the town of Karadably.

[Kirinitsyanov] Olzhas Omarovich, how did it happen that you were in Baku?

[Suleymenov] I had been in Moscow. The Supreme Soviet Committee on the Issues of Legislation, Legality and Law and Order was about to meet. We wanted to discuss important draft laws to be passed at the session. These included the Law on State of Emergency.

On the morning of January 20 I found out from the papers that state of emergency had been declared in Baku. I thought that I had to go to the site to understand everything independently, and to see as-yet unlegalized state of emergency in action.

In all seasons, Baku used to be a bright, sunny city. But now it was different. There were soldiers with assault rifles on the airfield. The passengers, suddenly quiet,

unloaded the plane themselves. Then they crossed the field, single file. The airport building was crowded, but there were no voices or din associated with the multitude of people. Departing passengers had grim faces, tired from suffering. Soldiers guarded all exits and entrances. The square in front was empty. There were no taxis or buses. Armored personnel carriers stood at intersections.

There were soldiers in the city; what else needs to be said? Can the military be blamed? It was carrying out orders. But, apparently, a word of accusation is in order for those who, while preparing the action, did not explain to those who were to carry it out the difference between enemy and opponent.

[Kirinitsyanov] You used the word action. Things had become so bad that a surgical intervention was apparently necessary.

[Suleymenov] Surgery can be different: there is laser and lancet surgery and there is surgery with an ax. I am sure that our army is skillful enough professionally to have avoided casualties on both sides. We are talking about the value of human life. Why could ethnic conflicts not be settled without bloodshed? The inertia of viewing the human being as dispensable is strong and manifested itself in this case, too. Post-Tbilisi criticism had an effect on the army. It tried to avoid taking part in internal conflicts. It was, so to speak, taken out of play. Its stance as an outside observer prodded unhealthy forces of society into action, this much must be admitted. In Fergana, soldiers in crowd control formations patiently endured spitting and insults and did not even fire in the air. In Kishenev, women lay in the path of tanks going on parade and the tanks backed down. In Nakhichevan, people were tearing down border fences and there was not a single shot. And the people became convinced that the army would not fight unarmed people. This was the reasoning of those leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front who blockaded approaches to Baku and led civilians to Tbilisskiy Avenue along which combat vehicles were moving into the city. But the tanks did not stop this time. It was a painful way to overcome the Tbilisi syndrome. The state thereby declared its willingness to protect its structure by all available means. And I can not say that this action caused general consternation in the country. The majority probably approved of decisive measures.

The Baku crisis and the quiet endorsement of it are dangerous signs. If the public, the Supreme Soviet, party bodies and the army do not conduct an appropriate open investigation into the events, we could truly state that we are leading the country to the edge. And the iron fist. Or total anarchy, which will also result in a major blood-bath.

[Kirinitsyanov] Why was the state of emergency not declared in Baku on January 13, when Armenian pogroms began?

[Suleymenov] I do not have the answer yet. It is also unknown why Internal Ministry troops, who were then

in Baku as part of the republic MVD, did not stop the pogroms and did not protect apartments where Armenians lived. This is, in general, a tragic and confusing question.

Probably as far back as in 1988, the USSR Supreme Soviet should have passed a law on refugees, to make every republic at least compensate refugees for lost homes and property, depending on the agreement. Not to mention that everyone who advocates ethnic hatred must answer before the law, regardless of social standing. Decisive actions by the state at the outset of this process would have made today's extreme measures unnecessary.

For two years we have watched as our ark was tossed around and picks instead of oars appeared in the hands of some passengers, which they used to make holes in the bottom. It does not matter where they made the new hole, in the stern or the bow, since we are in the same vessel. My field is history, and I have observed a certain rule: in our state, (the former Russian Empire) interethnic conflicts accompany every revolution. They occur whenever the power of the metropolis weakens. In Baku, for instance, the slaughter of Armenians by Azeris occurred in 1905 and in 1918. And now it has happened during perestroika, which has been called revolutionary. The following alternatives are suggested: either there will be strong central power (which we have experienced in full) or else nations which can not live quietly together after the common yoke weakens must go back to their ethnic habitats and turn a new page in their relationship within their own independent states.

The present circumstances suggest the latter alternative. I think that this was the goal of the organizers of the current conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Having cavalierly decided the fate of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, can they now foresee the consequences of their policy? They are, incidentally, easily predictable.

To mark the path for the people, poets often lighted the beacon of liberty. But not in the cellar full of gun powder. The Baltic people, for instance, use an electric flashlight. This cool form of democracy may not be as romantic, but its experience is doubtless more valuable to the country as a whole.

The rates of achieving democracy in so complex a country must be different, based on type of cultural traditions and a multitude of other local factors. The many centuries of interethnic coexistence in the Caucasus showed that the impatience of individuals who sway the masses is simply dangerous in that precipice-filled land. Mountains are not for sprinting. Precipitous restructuring of social order is comparable only to an avalanche and that, no matter how you look at it, is a fall. This is a rule that can be traced through the history of change on the plains of Central Asia and in Kazakhstan,

too. It is important to maintain balance both when one person is seeking his way, and when a multitude is wandering.

[Kirinitsyanov] Now, when we jointly seek a just formula for the union of peoples, such inter-republic conflicts can slow down our search.

[Suleymenov] In the years prior to April 1985, we had learned very well the rules of simple integration: both addition and multiplication seemed to give the same answer. Consequently, authorities spared themselves the effort and limited themselves to easiest actions. Today, we begin to understand that a federation is not just a sum of nations but a product. The level of our relationship is raised and we begin to discover each other. In the past few years, Soviet nationalities have learned about themselves and others immeasurably more than in the previous seven decades.

Interdependence of nations in a natural federation which emerged within the confines of the czar's empire and then was inherited by Stalin's is a very subtle interdependence of various organs of the same body, where the liver, the lungs and the heart differ from each other in function, shape and size but disease in one impacts the whole. This limited image exemplifies for me the future of our federation.

[Kirinitsyanov] The conflict reached the dangerous mark when people succumbed to the so-called voice of blood. Could it not have been foreseen?

[Suleymenov] In this case, any reasonable politician could have been a seer. We must all think what could have been done in that extraordinary situation. I never liked the word extraordinary. I am allergic to this adjective. For 70 years everything has been extraordinary here, whereas people wanted to live a normal life. We are tired of fighting both external and internal enemies.

[Kirinitsyanov] Your "Book of Clay" (it is hard to define its genre: it is half-legend, half-science fiction), about many centuries of enmity between peoples, contains lines about an unnamed poet: "The poet is drunk on blood! And after the battle, unruly words straggle from the ranks."

I want to say that unruly words of some poets or, say, journalists continue to cause much harm. They sometimes contain the seed of international conflict, too. Do you think that your peace-making mission was a success?

[Suleymenov] There, in the same book, I have the following lines: "The rulers burned cities unaware that the historian recorded their deeds." I hardly can pretend to be a peace-maker; I am, more likely, a historian.

The tragedy we are living through is a reproach to politician and writers alike. We know: woe to those in whom burns the fire of hatred. Our errors cost us too much. An engineer, for instance, can redo a bad design. But a mistake by a writer or a historian may be the source of tragedy for the people. There are 500,000

refugees, thousands of dead and many cripples. There are mass heart attacks and mental illness. I do not know what the impact on the future generations will be. Is it not too dear a price for historical discoveries?

[Kirinitsiyanov] Could Armenians and Azerbaijanis, after everything that has occurred, remain good neighbors in our common home?

[Suleymenov] The nations of the region are doomed to live together. No one will carry them to different ends of the world. No one will free them from one another. This is a given. The idea of the common home in the Caucasus is, in my opinion, a good start for a serious dialogue. In an age when categorical policy prevailed, the word "compromise" was discredited. Now, we have become convinced that we can not survive in the world with an either-or philosophy. The new way of thinking admits a mutually tolerant philosophy of both. It is applicable everywhere, in the relationship with nature, in the economy and in interethnic relations. Not mutual recriminations, but rather a determined search to solve many ingrained problems. This path is starting to emerge already. I know that Georgians, Osetinians and Abkhazians are willing to take part in this work. People are tired of confrontation.

[Kirinitsiyanov] You probably had many meetings in Baku. Which ones do you remember best?

[Suleymenov] The whole week was an endless procession of meetings. It was a shaken people, but one that endured its tragedy with courage and dignity. I had much to understand and to explain to the people. The truly popular poet Bakhtiyar Bagabzade, Turkic scholar Aydyn, physician Nuretdin, historian Suleyman, writer Anar, party employee Evelina and pianist Farkhad are my friends. I saw how they worked. USSR people's deputies Tofik Ismailov, Beli Mamedov and Arif Melikov lived as though at the front. The party Central Committee building was almost empty: all employees were in the street or visiting various rayons of the republic. Ye.Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and A.Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, slept three hours a night.

The tables were heaped high with the 14,000 party cards picked off the ground. The new secretary A.Mutalibov inherited a difficult situation. Rumors were rampant. Some were true, but there was much myth, inventions.

I remember we went to the printers. They met in one of the shops before the curfew. I said: "Comrades, I understand that you are protesting. But your silence plunges the people deep into the morass of hopelessness. We do not know the whole truth, and neither do you; like me, you live by rumor. But every day we must dispel these rumors and tell the people the truth. You complain about Moscow journalists, do you not? They are human and make mistakes, too. You must respond to them. The most passive form of protest is to shut your own mouths,

eyes and ears. Let us use words to fight for justice. What would happen if the bakery stopped working tomorrow? The newspaper is like bread."

"Fine," said one worker. "We will print the newspaper. But not KOMMUNIST. We have left the party by that name." This was probably the most difficult part of the discussion. Believe me, it was no word play. It was one of the most sincere and important meetings for me. "Here stands my friend Aydyn. I have known him for a long time, I know his convictions. He is a communist, but not a party member. There have always been fewer communists than party cards. Print the paper for communists. They were not the ones who shot your brothers and kids."

This is the general meaning of the conversation. I spoke longer. We argued, too. I do not know whether I managed to convince them in the end, but they took my word for it. I was once again amazed to see how much sincerely means to the people. This knowledge makes me forever responsible for the fate of each one of them. The workers with whom I spoke at the shop were not the ones who robbed apartments and murdered. They wanted to live with dignity and quietly do their job. They immediately resumed work. In the morning, all central and republic papers came out, including KOMMUNIST.

[Kirinitsiyanov] Did January 1990 in Baku resemble December 1986 in Alma-Ata?

[Suleymenov] Alma-Ata in December 1986 was probably the first instance when the system was tested for democracy. Out of habit, the system reacted just as it would have 30 years ago: "to punish in order to teach a lesson." I think that if it had happened in 1988, there would have been no casualties. Later, we held rallies of 10,000 and even 50,000 people, when we protested nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk. There was no problem and we were able to control such crowds.

But in Baku the situation was different. As I have said, the lack of trust for the authorities, both local and central, was apparent. Two forces emerged in the People's Front. One wing was liberal, made up mainly of the intelligentsia, and the other radical. Initially, the movement was monolithic and democratic. But when actions of the liberals began to resemble, it seemed, the indecisive behavior of the government, the emotions of the radicals won out.

[Kirinitsiyanov] What were your feelings as you left Baku?

[Suleymenov] Contradictory. I would say I had tears of compassion and anger. And hope. Armenians and Azerbaijanis face a very hard choice. What to do, how to live now? I do not think that journalists, scholars and writers have said their last word yet. I want to believe that it means more than tank divisions. Let the voice of knowledge and the call of humanity be heard, not the voice of blood. We need a live, human dialogue, not two separate monologues that have been heard thus far.

After visiting Baku, touching that tragedy with my heart and seeing centuries-old ties torn and illusions shattered, I became convinced nonetheless that the natural kindness and openness to friendship have not been killed in the people in these two years. This is probably the most vulnerable yet enduring quality of the people, which allows it to survive all trials. I hope and believe that in these troubled times the Azerbaijanis, the Armenians and all of us will see this most important thing and feel and appreciate it in one another.

On Relations Between Baku Residents, Soldiers

90UM0303A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank S. Turchenko, special correspondent: "Toward Mutual Trust: Baku Residents and Soldiers Have Begun a Difficult Path"]

[Text] "The citizens of Baku have always treated the military with love and respect. Even when the year before last a curfew was imposed, the military were literally met with flowers," was what I was told by Ya. Rustamov, the leader of the People's Front at the Baku Machine Building Plant imeni Lieutenant Shmidt; but then his tone suddenly changed abruptly: "However, the residents of Baku will never forgive them for 19-20 January. And no dialogue of any kind is possible between the population and the military!"

At that same moment the two officers who had come with me to the plant were surrounded in the hallway by workers, among whom there were many representatives of the People's Front, and they were already engaged in an interesting dialogue with them. Whatever Rustamov and other leaders of the People's Front might say, life is taking its own course.

Much has already been published in the central press about the events of 19-20 January 1990 in Baku. It is completely understandable that what has been written is not complete, and that the essence of the tragedy was reflected one-sidedly in some respects (the conditions under which the reporters had to work are unknown). But the main thing is obvious: A state of emergency was established by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but the troops were met by organized resistance, they were shot at, and they did some shooting themselves. The blood, pain and grief on both sides opened a deep chasm between the population and the military. Like it or not, it does exist. Why did all of this happen? Who is to blame? Specially created commissions of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee are called upon to answer these questions. But right now I would like to talk about something else. About the fact that we need to go on living, and like it or not, side by side with the military and the local population. And not just live, but restore order, and organize the economy. Of course, it would be difficult to expect that the relatives of the Azerbaijani who died in the crossfire and the friends and comrades-in-arms of the soldier who was ripped

apart by a homemade grenade would take sincere steps toward each other immediately. But we must take such steps, even with our teeth clenched, since they would be in the common interest, and primarily in the interest of the Azerbaijani people. And no matter what the leaders of the extremist wing of the Azerbaijan People's Front might say, no matter how they might try to widen the split between the army and the population, positive processes toward mutual trust are already under way.

For several days I was able to observe the work of the commandant's office in the portion of Rayon imeni 26 Baku Commissars, encompassing the central part of the city itself. I was astounded most of all by the line of Baku residents waiting to see the commandant, Colonel I. Rubtsov. Igor Nikolayevich refers to himself in jest as a "native of Baku," even though his permanent place of service is in the Moscow area. The fact is that he became the section commandant in this very same rayon the year before last, and that he has a fabulous knowledge of all of the city services and of the customs and character of the Azerbaijani people. He is also known by many citizens of Baku. What is it that they seek from "their" commandant?

An elderly, intelligent-looking Azerbaijani woman came to request protection from a neighbor, also an Azerbaijani by the way. Capitalizing on the turmoil he was frightening her, and attempting to throw her out of her room in the communal apartment. The commandant immediately sent an officer of the militia to arrest the man.

The next woman visitors were a Russian and an Azerbaijani. Their friend—an Armenian woman—had left Baku back before the pogroms of 13 January, leaving the apartment and her belongings in their care. Someone illegally occupied the apartment. What were they to do? The commandant helped the women draw up a petition. He promised to resolve the matter together with the rayon internal affairs department.

An elderly Azerbaijani man entered. He spoke Russian with difficulty. It took Igor Nikolayevich a long time to clarify the essence of the problem. As it turns out, the apartment occupied by this person, who had worked 40 years for his enterprise, had been in disrepair for a long time. No one wanted to even listen to him, but perhaps the military could help....

"In the beginning there were just a few isolated visitors," Rubtsov said. "Now I have to receive them practically the entire time that the curfew is not in force. One hundred to 120 persons a day. We resolve all of the problems jointly with rayon and city authorities. Though solving most of them requires a long time. There is too much chaos in the city's administrative and economic mechanisms. Sometimes I would very much like representatives of the NFA [Azerbaijan People's Front], former Azerbaijani executives, and even the ones presently in power to sit here with me during my office hours,

so that they could hear and be horrified by what they have done to the citizens of Baku!"

One evening after leaving the commandant's office I decided to talk with some people in a family atmosphere, so to speak. I selected a little house at random and rang the bell of the first apartment. The door was opened by a graying 60-year-old Azerbaijani who stared at me apprehensively. I introduced myself, telling him that I was a reporter, after which he hospitably invited me into his home. It was also occupied by his sister, his daughter, his daughter-in-law and a tiny grandson. A table was set immediately with traditional Azerbaijani hospitality, and it was only then that the interview began flowing, though unfortunately with much sadness. I also came to wish that someone from among the extremist leaders of the NFA were sitting beside me, listening. Here is what was told to me by these people, whom I cannot identify for reasons that will become clear in a moment.

The tragedy of this family, which is very typical of Baku by the way, is that it has turned out to be a mixed family: The husband is Azerbaijani, the wife is Armenian, and the children are naturally half-breeds. When the pogroms began, the wife was miraculously able to disappear and leave. But soon after, someone rang the bell of the apartment in which they lived. Three persons with NFA armbands on their sleeves entered impudently and said: If they did not vacate the apartment in 24 hours, they would be slaughtered. What were they to do? They gathered their belongings together and found refuge among different friends. And so they lived, one night here, one night in another place. Until they found this vacant room and occupied it without authorization. They live in fear: On one hand of being visited once again by extremists who would chase them out or do them harm, and on the other hand of the militia, which would also ask them to leave. It was a dead-end situation. But something had to be done.... I would go to the commandant tomorrow, I told the head of the household, I will tell him everything, and whatever he decides, will be.

Note that the man never even thought of going to the party raykom or the rayispolkom, or even to the committee of the People's Front, which trumpets for all to hear that only it expresses the dreams of the people, and that the military are supposedly the antipopular element in Baku.... The people are going to the military for assistance. And although it is not within their competency to resolve most of the matters that have accumulated, all of this is evidence that the common people are beginning to trust them, despite everything else.

I would like to make one qualification at this point. In telling the story about this family, it is in no way my intention to belittle the role of raykoms and rayispolkoms to any degree whatsoever. They are presently doing an extremely large amount of work. But the loss of faith in them in the recent past is now producing its fruits. These days, workers of the raykoms and rayispolkoms and of the party city committee and the Baku

City Soviet are going to the enterprises and the military units in an effort to consolidate all of the healthy forces in order to surmount the crisis. And this is also a highly important process, one which is proceeding both from the top and from the bottom. I for example was able to attend a meeting Baku City Executive Committee deputy chairman K. Shcherbakov called with staff officers stationed in Baku. It was a painful meeting, and it lasted for several hours in succession. There were mutual reproaches and complaints. But the main thing is that steps were taken toward mutual understanding, and places of convergence were noted. Such meetings are being held in many military units with Azerbaijani executives of different levels. And the soldiers are traveling to the enterprises and institutions, where they talk with the people, and also seek the ways to come together.

I recently visited a military unit under the command of Officer Ye. Morozov. This unit accommodated itself in Narimanovskiy Rayon, in an indoor light athletic complex. They told me in the political department that personal conditions were difficult. But local government authorities and the population were already actively helping the soldiers. In the evening for example, the personnel were invited to see some videos. One Azerbaijani living in an adjacent house brought over his own video tape player for the soldiers. The telephone rang during our conversation. Bus Pool No 2 asked soldiers to come over. The day before, it turned out, extremists had begun frightening the drivers, and they were afraid to go out on their routes. Captains S. Lyubarskiy and G. Pak and Senior Lieutenant I. Ashirov—a native of Baku incidentally—left immediately. They talked with the drivers for an entire hour. They agreed to have a serviceman escort each bus to protect it from extremists.

In that same unit I was shown numerous notes brought to the headquarters by the population. They report anonymously (a fear of the extremists still exists) where armed men were hiding and where they had their ammunition stockpiles concealed. It was on the basis of one such note, for example, that the unit's soldiers seized a cache of 1.5 million small-caliber cartridges.

Such that processes oriented on restoring mutual trust between the army and the population are under way. But it would be wrong to believe that they are going on easily and simply. What obstacles are there?

First there are the rumors being spread by the extremists about "atrocities" by servicemen. The fact is that, as I myself noted, the common Azerbaijanis are very trusting in rumors and have less faith in the official press. I spent a long time talking with people on the streets of Baku. Here is an example of a typical discussion with young Azerbaijanis. Abbas had recently been an officer. He left the army on his own volition, and now he is making women's earrings in a cooperative. Azer works with him. Neither was out in the streets on the night of 19-20 January, but they are deeply convinced that soldiers fired on unarmed people. I asked Abbas: "You are a former officer, and you know quite well that no one

would ever incite soldiers to fire on civilians." "I know," he replied, "but they told me...."

I heard this "they told me" dozens of times as an irrefutable argument, but I never encountered a single witness to "atrocities" by the soldiers. Though of course, many servicemen themselves confirmed that they did fire, but only in response to brutal fire that was bringing down fellow soldiers.

The fight against rumors is presently one of the most important tasks. This was the topic of discussion at a recent press conference in the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. USSR People's Deputy A. Melikhov, a composer, said that he checked some of them out as part of a special commission, and they were not confirmed. He is deeply certain that each of them must be carefully checked out and immediately commented on in the press and by radio. Otherwise a dangerous inconsistency develops: We reporters often maintain a silence about the events of 19-20 January, fearing to pour salt onto the people's wounds yet another time. On the other hand the extremist forces of the NFA are worrying these wounds more and more, feeding false information to the people and evoking antimilitary sentiments. The full truth about the tragic events must be told as soon as possible. Only then will these wounds begin to heal.

The process of seeking the paths toward mutual trust are also blocked by unceasing attacks by extremists upon sentry posts and servicemen, which forces them to use their weapons.

The state of emergency does of course make restoring good relations between the army and the population difficult. But the population is beginning to understand more and more that this is a forced measure, one directed at protecting the interests of the common people. Because the extremists still have a very large quantity of weapons. They have gone underground, and they are simply waiting for the state of emergency to be called off in order to once again embark upon their black deeds. For the situation to normalize completely, they need to be disarmed. Who would be able to accomplish this? The people know that this is what the military are actively doing.

Problems Encountered by Troops in Baku

90UM0303B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by special correspondent A. Krayniy: "Tanks and Truth. Baku: The View From Within Armor"]

[Text] "Things are frightening at night. My heart thumped in response to every sound outside the door, every footstep and sigh. I couldn't sleep. I would roll up in the chair and count the minutes—if only dawn would come sooner, if only it would be day sooner. And Mitka, snoring away, was oblivious to it all.

"It's as if someone is slowly choking you with his hands, and you don't have the strength to pry him away, to scream, and anyway, who is going to hear? We were alone on the stairway landing. While the pogroms against the Armenians were going on, we shook with fear, and my husband bit his lip: 'Where are the troops?' Then the troops came into the city, and once again we shook with fear.

"During the day he managed to break through to the outside for a few minutes. He was pale, and I felt sorry for him—he was unable to find a place for himself in all of this either. And then we were driven away not by him but by his soldiers. One assault rifleman was assigned to us, Mitka and I lay down on the bed of the vehicle, and we drove away. To the military airfield. It would seem that everything should now be behind me, that there is no longer any danger, but inside I feel like my chest is in an icy grip; even here in Moscow, at my mother's, I can't relax...."

(From the story of an officer's wife who asked not to be identified).

The shots broke out suddenly like rain. Tension had already been hanging over the city for a week now, but the troops did not appear on the streets of Baku until 0030 hours on the twentieth of January. The militia patrols—reinforced to six men—were there more to create an appearance than to keep order. They stood at the intersections, while just 200 meters away people whose only fault was that they were born Armenian were being plundered and killed. A regiment of internal troops that had managed to break through was guarding the buildings of the Central Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and they would not venture out into the streets. The Baku garrison was blockaded in its barracks, and units that were arriving in the city were bottled up at the airfields. The regiments had run out of food, and the soldiers had already spent several days on dry rations. Attacks on armories had begun both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia, highway and railroad traffic had come to a standstill, and commands to put an end to the lawlessness never came in.

Knowing little at that time, I tried to gain an understanding of what was going on: Why was this happening? The explanations I heard—"There wasn't enough time, it was technically impossible"—were not persuasive to me: What if war were to break out tomorrow? Would we have time then? I don't know, I don't know. All I know is that the roads to Baku were still open on the twelfth and thirteenth of January, and wherever they were blockaded, it was on a makeshift basis.

An opportunity was lost, and that which could have been done literally with little bloodshed, was finally accomplished with considerable bloodshed. Very considerable, if you remember that Soviet troops were entering a Soviet city. They entered in order to restore order, justice and law. What sort were they, these occupation troops? What in Baku could be occupied by Senior

Warrant Officer O. Akhundov, an Azerbaijani who died in the hospital from "a bullet lodged in the rib cage and a bullet through the abdomen"? Or Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Opalev, the military hospital's deputy commander for political affairs, who concealed Armenians in the hospital together with his chief until the arrival of the troops? In a hospital which was practically defenseless, and in which the only weapon was a scalpel. Or Sergeant Volodya Kuskov from Leningrad, who was strangled with a piece of wire (an Afghan technique by the way), though luckily surviving, being a strong lad?

Gunfire. Single reports were followed by bursts of automatic fire, which crackled with a dry sound, like tearing paper. Flocks of fiery-blue tracer rounds criss-crossed the night sky. The engines of tanks and APCs roared in the distance.

Zhenya Solovyev, the 23-year-old commander of a motorized rifle company, was late for the start of the battle. He was still standing on the threshold of the weapon storage room, on the threshold between light and darkness, personally issuing ammunition, when shots rang out quite close, near the checkpoint of the Salyanskiye Barracks.

The day before, Solovyev, another two company commanders and the battalion commander drove out for reconnaissance. They traveled in an ambulance, unarmed and without soldiers, seeking a road free of obstructions which could be used at the needed moment to reinforce the guard on the district's armories. Given the present situation, the existing protection might not be enough, the armories could be overwhelmed, and then....

They were unable to find a clear road—everything was clogged with heavy trucks, buses and bulldozers. And so they returned.

The battalion deputy commander for political affairs was the first man Solovyev came across as he rushed out onto the night-shrouded drill field.

"They're firing on the barracks from behind the fence!" he cried, gasping for breath.

Solovyev leapt toward the checkpoint, where he saw someone shooting from beneath the wheels of an Ikarus blocking the road.

Before he could grasp what was going on, he felt a blow in his chest, like someone hitting him with a fist. The 23-year-old company commander was not privy then to what it is that a man experiences when he is fired upon—it simply never came into his mind to put on a flack jacket. A bullet whistled by, burying itself into the fence, and Solovyev's bewilderment was replaced by calm, cold rage. He could no longer hear the chatter of the surrounding gunfire, or the cries of the wounded. His sights were fully on the person lying by the wheels of the Ikarus. All of the mistakes of the politicians, all of the unsolved economic problems reduced to a situation

where during a warm Baku night, two armed men were lying on the ground 20 meters apart, with but one desire dominating their being: to kill the other.

Solovyev suddenly felt a burning in his leg, and he returned several rounds at the wheels of the Ikarus. He saw the other bring his arms together, as if he was going to dive into water, and fall.

It was all over, it seemed. Zhenya felt his head spinning. Reservists leapt out from the checkpoint and dragged him back into the building. After that, under the cover of four assault riflemen—a sniper was holed up on a rooftop, firing on the drill field—Lieutenant Yevgeniy Solovyev managed to make his way on foot to the medical station, and then to the hospital, to the operating table.

It was there that the night came to an end for him. But for others, it went on.

At approximately this time, 20 kilometers from the Salyanskiye Barracks, Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Koposov was walking with a megaphone at the head of a column, telling the people to disperse, and to not block the way of the troops. Someone from the crowd threw a Molotov cocktail at him, which struck his helmet, setting his clothing afire and burning his hands and face. Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service Anatoliy Kurepin began rendering assistance to Koposov. One could see that he was unarmed, and that he carried a pouch bearing a red cross on his side, but the crowd stoned him anyway.

And at 0140 hours, a soldier died in his arms from gunshot wounds in the vicinity of the Baladzhar'skiy Downgrade....

Gunshots bring on gunshots, evil brings on evil, and hatred can only bring on hatred. One must be a professional in order to keep a cool head in such a situation. And that was what they were.

The parachute regiment attacked (Lord, what we have come to!) on Baku from the direction of Kyurdamir. The regiment traveled 180 kilometers, expending 263 cartridges. Meeting an obstruction on the way, the parachute company was in a hurry, and with a "Hurrah!", without firing a single shot, it dismantled the obstruction, detaining 70 persons "to get answers to some questions." The rest simply fled. If only all had advanced in this manner.... There were, unfortunately, other examples as well. An "extreme situation" in which the command permitted the troops to open fire, each had to understand to the measure of his military professionalism, and ultimately to the measure of his fear. Reservists in the Salyanskiye Barracks worked on the sniper holed up on the roof of the residential building with automatic fire. They did not hit the sniper: It was later on, in daylight, that he was brought down by a single shot from a warrant officer who had served in Afghanistan, but in the meantime the soldiers shot up a sizable

number of windows (this was, after all, a residential building! and at night!). Were they really to blame for this?

The morning promised a sunny day. The nighttime gunfire seemed to have been a dream, and the view from the hotel room was almost idyllic—the sea, a white steamship, the quay.

But then I turned the corner and my gaze fell upon an APC and a swarthy lad beside it in a flack jacket. My first sensation was relief: The last days prior to the entry of the troops were a time of constant tension—the turmoil continually lapped over the edge, threatening to become unchecked. It may be that I was developing a kind of "Afghan syndrome," and I have tried again and again to explain, with a stubbornness worthy of the best imitation, what really happened in that black January in Azerbaijan, but I must repeat stubbornly that this was a civil war, and that each day of delay in making the decisions that had to be made cost the lives of obedient and not-so-obedient taxpayers who maintained the government, people who should have felt assured under all circumstances that the state would protect them. But it did not. Refugees were strung out along the roads, casualties cried out in agony, and the unseeing eyes of the dead stared into the high winter sky in astonishment. Their blood evoked more blood, and so on, and so on, and so on....

The army was not late—it was the politicians who were late. And when the decision was finally made, young people in field dress began carrying it out. It was bitter and painful for them to do so, but they had to literally place their lives on the line between the two union republics.

The name of the lad beside the APC was Volodya. We got to talking, and I learned that we were compatriots from the Moscow region, that he was going home in spring, and that he had also served in Fergana, in Sukhumi, and here in Baku as well, for the second time. Smiling, he turned his back: "Do you see there? A lucky hit," showing me the scorched tatters of his flak jacket, burnt by a Molotov cocktail. "A little higher and I'd of been a goner."

It has been a year and a half that he has been roaming the country together with his subunit, a year and a half of sleeping wherever he put down his head, a year and a half of carrying an assault rifle around on his shoulder, just as habitually as he used to carry his sports bag some time ago (in what life was that?). Is he to blame, are his comrades, sleeping behind armor on this sunny morning, to blame for this? And what fault is there in the airborne troops from Kostroma and Pskov, from Ryazan and Vitebsk? They created a screen between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. I saw tanks pulling apart the ruins of Leninakan in that terrible December. There were not enough cranes and dump trucks in the city and there was no light, water, bread or preserved blood in the city. The army—it arrived in just 6 hours!—baked the first bread

in field bakeries, military doctors operated on casualties right within the ruins of the hospital, on the ground, and later when it became dark, they worked in the light of vehicle headlights. All military transport aviation, down to the last IL-76, was committed to carrying cargo to the earthquake site, and the pilots remained in the sky for days on end: I saw their faces, gray with fatigue, as well as the faces of the military air traffic controllers at Leninakan Airport. Were any words of gratefulness said to them? Begrudgingly....

At that time I sensed in Leninakan that the country was left with but one state institution capable of acting with mobility and efficiency. There were of course examples of another sort in Baku as well, there were the countless inspectors with their quickly mounting paperwork—in quantities impossible to measure!, and there were the VIPs with big stars on their shoulderboards, but there were also the soldiers, the sergeants and the officers. Men of duty, carrying upon their shoulders the burdens and deprivations of service, as it says in the regulations. Let me add: of close to wartime service.

But the assault rifle is not the only weapon in the hands of the soldier in these tragic days. There were the angry lines at the bread shops, the closed fueling stations and newspaper stands, and the continually interrupted communications. The army also had to deal with all of this. It had it bad itself—I saw one APC towing another—there was not enough fuel. In several days the army was able to bring gasoline into the city, military signalmen took their seats at the switchboards, the newspaper resumed publication, and gradually the lines at the bread shops disappeared.

The army went into action when both time and reason were exhausted. When angered heads and savagely beating hearts could respond to only one argument, to only one truth—force.

This is a truth which tanks know.

But the world visible from behind the safety glass of an armored vehicle is too narrow and too black-and-white. Tanks can halt bloodshed. But the hope that they could create a new, just reality is illusory. Gunfire can compel us to think, but assault rifles will not solve the heap of economic, political and international problems.

Two months prior to commitment of the troops he, the Azerbaijani man, sent his Armenian wife and children to a distant village, to relatives. A week prior to commitment of the troops he, an Azerbaijani, could leave the republic, while she, an Armenian, and her children could not—posts manned by people with tricolor armbands carefully checking all vehicles and the passports of passengers stood on the roads. On the day prior to the commitment of the troops he spent the night sitting on the porch of his country house with a hunting rifle in his hands, having distributed his cartridges in two piles—16 with which to fight off the attackers and four for his family. After the twentieth of January he rode to the

nearest military unit, where he was given a vehicle, and he then drove his family to a military airfield.

New Estonian SSR Minister To Coordinate Non-Estonian Affairs

90UN0902A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with Eduard Cherevashko, by L. Kallis: "Introducing: A Minister Without Portfolio"; date and place not given]

[Text] **The Law on the Estonian SSR Government provides for 18 ministries but allows a cabinet consisting of 21 ministers. If one does not count the prime minister, two members of the government will be without ministries. The concept of "minister without portfolio", which we know only from literature, has entered our life. We want to acquaint you today with such a minister without portfolio—Eduard Cherevashko.**

[Kallis] The name of your position—Estonian SSR minister—does not contain any information on what you will do. Only the fact that you will not have a staff in the form of a ministry at your disposal is evident from it. What will your functions consist of?

[Cherevashko] My duties include coordinating state policy regarding the republic's non-Estonian population in all of its aspects. It is coordination because it is difficult to imagine that one individual in the government could handle the entire enormous circle of problems in this area. I see as my task the insuring that all state agencies and administrations, including local soviets, ministries, state services, and, of course, the government as a whole consider the interests of this part of the population.

On the other hand, my status as a minister provides citizens, organizations and societies of national groups an opportunity to reach other members of the government, up to and including the prime minister, with their specific interests. In total, this forms a mechanism which will permit the opinion of the non-Estonian population to be taken into consideration when solving all very important questions at the government level.

[Kallis] Does the introduction of this position mean that the Estonian SSR government is attaching a great deal of importance to objectively balancing the separate interests of the Estonian and the non-Estonian part of the population? If yes, how capable, in your opinion, is the presently existing government of removing those tensions that have arisen in interethnic relations?

[Cherevashko] It was originally assumed that an individual with the rank of a government advisor would handle questions concerning interethnic relations. The fact that these functions have been raised to the level of a minister speaks for itself. Undoubtedly, the Estonian SSR government realizes the importance of normal interethnic relations for Estonia's future; for success in

implementing the changes planned in the economy, culture, and education; and for the construction of a democratic law-governed state. This is not the first time that I have been part of the republic's government. I have six years of experience in working in the former Council of Ministers. My break in service was only two years. The changes, which have occurred, are very significant, however. First of all, the democracy in its work, which is immeasurably than before, attracts me. Democracy is the freedom of opinions and the consideration of different positions. The answer to the question is concealed here. The second distinctive feature of the present Estonian SSR government is the absence of tunnel vision and the desire to rely not only on one's own experience but also on world experience, especially that of our closest neighbors both to the east and to the west.

[Kallis] Does the Estonian SSR government already have a clear program regarding the non-Estonian population and are the specific interests of the different nationality groups clear to it?

[Cherevashko] No! Such a program still does not exist. It is necessary to create it. Thanks to the efforts of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet's Commission for Interethnic Relations, we have a law concerning the nationality rights of citizens. It provides a good legislative basis for developing such a program. Based on material prepared by the Ministries of Culture and Education with the participation of national cultural societies, the Estonian CP Central Committee Buro adopted a decision that approved a number of useful and necessary recommendations for humanizing education in the Russian language and allocating space for the needs of the association of Estonian national and cultural societies and a number of others. All of this will help when developing the concept whose essence, it seems to me, can be expressed in the words "social protection for the non-Estonian population." The problems of job placement, the realization of all a citizen's political rights and human rights, and assistance in developing national cultures and maintaining the ties of very different nationality groups with their historical motherland, etc., are included here. Drafts of so-called "Russian programs" with different purposes and meaning are already beginning to appear now. Everything that is of value in them must also be accumulated in the government's program.

Besides a long-range concept, I see the need for short-term programs which would include specific measures, especially measures to fulfill the promises the government has already made. In particular, this includes the construction of a relay station so that Narva can reliably receive Estonia television broadcasts—or, for example, the solving of the problem of subtitled the most interesting television shows broadcast in the Estonian language. If we could solve the much more complicated problem of a voting system in the Supreme Soviet and at a level, which the USSR parliament does not have, then this problem can and must be solved.

I am counting very much on the very active participation of the non-Estonian population itself by word and deed in the development of these concepts and programs. We need not only supporters but also comrades-in-arms.

[Kallis] Are you confident that solutions, which are built on a compromise of different interests, are now possible?

[Cherevashko] It is necessary to proceed from reality, and reality is such that it is impossible to achieve a compromise now on certain political questions. The divergence of interests is too great. The whole question is where attention should be focused—on the divergences or on the similarities. It seems to me that there exist more than enough common economic and social interests. Their solution by joint efforts will permit the barrier of distrust to be overcome and the fears and lack of confidence in tomorrow to be removed from both parts of the population. This is now the main thing.

[Kallis] The help of society is fine. However, how will you manage in such a vast area without a staff?

[Cherevashko] I can use the staff of the state offices—government advisors and consultants—and enlist the help of the most diverse specialists. A small group consisting of three—at a maximum, four—individuals will immediately support this work sector that has been assigned to me. A great deal will depend on local work. I am placing great hopes on the deputies to the local soviets. An agreement was achieved during a recent seminar of chairmen of these soviets that local models for working with the various nationality groups in the population will be developed, especially where the non-Estonian population lives compactly. I am counting very much on the mass information media's support. As I have already said, I see voluntary associations of citizens and enthusiasts among my closest associates.

[Kallis] A report has been published that you are a candidate for deputy to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. In the event you are elected, you will have to resign as minister. Are you ready for this?

[Cherevashko] I do not now see any need to participate in the election struggle. The decision to be a candidate matured during the fall of last year. I wanted to participate in the activity of the parliamentary commission that would work on the problems of the non-Estonian population. I shared these plans with my colleagues in my former work within the professional technical educational system. I received support from them. To some degree, the unexpected suggestion to work on those problems within the Estonian SSR government has changed my plans but the pedagogical collectives of the vocational training schools, to which I turned at one time, decided to express their attitude toward my candidacy publicly. For me, this is not only an expression of trust but also a duty to support in the government in the future all reasonable measures to improve the professional training of youth. Using this occasion, I want to thank my former colleagues from the bottom of my heart.

Gumbaridze Meets People's Front, Media

90US0495B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed report from the press center of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party: "Meeting in the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party"]

[Text] On 11 January a meeting took place in the Georgian CP Central Committee at which G. Gumbaridze and N. Chitanava met with representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, leaders of the People's Front, All-Georgian Rustaveli Society, and other social organizations and associations.

This was a complex but candid discussion, taking place with the same heated fervor which characterizes the complicated socio-political situation in the republic.

Meeting participants acknowledged their responsibility for every word said, the price of which is today unusually high. However, this did not prevent many of them from presenting, in extremely pointed fashion, issues concerning the provision of order and stability in those regions of the republic where tension continues to exist, primarily in Shida Kartli.

The somewhat improved situation noted there cannot serve as a pretext for complacency. State authority and law, the same for all, must be functional regardless of whether one particular person likes it or not. The oblast population must have firm guarantees that all channels capable of promoting tension and confrontation are closed off.

At the same time, meeting participants agreed with the concept that it is necessary to assist organs of state authority and law enforcement agencies in implementing a planned, realistic program of stabilization.

Extremely sharp discussion took place regarding published materials in certain of the central mass media which distorted the true picture of events in Georgia, regarding the need for a greater degree of glasnost in the trial proceedings of people known to be instigators of ethnic strife and participants in illegal activities during ethnic crises in various regions of the republic.

Meeting participants raised the important issue of developing and perfecting the structures which must provide direct links between administrative organs, and social organizations and movements, with the scientific, technological, and creative intelligentsia. A permanently functioning mechanism must be established which would, on the one hand, be able to exert more effective influence on decisions being made by the political leadership and, on the other, would help accumulate and unify the diverse, sometimes diametrically opposed views, judgments, and aspirations of various groups of society.

There was discussion in this regard concerning the establishment of a social forum, in addition to what already exists, which would undertake greater responsibility for expressing all the nuances of public opinion in a spirit of genuine pluralism, for creating conditions to provide each individual the opportunity to openly and democratically argue his point of view.

Our goal—a free, sovereign, democratic, and economically independent Georgia—can be achieved through various means. Choosing this means is today becoming the focal point for public argumentation, reflection, and discussion. Meeting participants emphasized that the voice of the Georgian intelligentsia must ring out with full clarity amidst this boiling of passions and emotions.

G. Gumbaridze and N. Chitanava met this same day with directors of the mass media. A frank exchange of opinion took place on many of the issues and problems currently troubling the republic community, primarily concerning the situation in Shida Kartli and Tbilisi. The important role of the press, radio, and television in today's socio-political life was noted, as was the necessity for objectivity, for balanced approaches and appraisals of events taking place.

Attention was devoted to the ruffling nature of the processes of perestroika, both across the country as a whole and in our republic in particular. The rates at which renewal is effected in the party and in society do not always coincide, nor does their content. This can cause serious deformation and will only serve the purposes of those forces which are relying on the use of force, which do not find political and constructive resolution of problems suitable.

While the press is called upon to adequately reflect public opinion, at the same time it must not withdraw from another very important task—the formation of public opinion. This is true both with respect to people's serious concern regarding negative processes in interethnic relations and the no less serious economic and social problems which have become especially exacerbated in recent times. Unfortunately, many of these remain as yet in the shadows. In this regard, meeting participants received detailed information on the state of the economy, supply of electric power, and the operation of industrial enterprises in the republic.

Meeting participants also exchanged views on problems relating to coverage of the coming election campaign and preparation for the 28th Party Congress.

On 12 January G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, and N. Chitanava, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, met with representatives of the working class who are members of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro and Tbilisi Gorkom [city party committee], USSR people's deputies, and deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet.

It was noted at the meeting that today, when we see an exceedingly tense environment not only in the republic and its capital but throughout the Transcaucasus region as well, we require extraordinary effort on the part of leaders of party committees, law enforcement agencies, enterprises, and institutions, cohesion within the working class, the mobilization and firm resolve of each individual, the concrete manifestation of genuine civic and national responsibility, so that the situation can be normalized in the very near future and we can resume our accustomed way of life, so that the socio-economic and ethnic problems of the republic may be resolved with the general agreement and cooperation of all strata of society in a calm environment.

Moldavian Peasant Union Formed

90US0533A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 23 Jan 90 p 3

[ATEM (Moldavian Press Agency) report: "Union of Moldavian Peasants Founded"]

[Text] The Constituent Congress of the Union of Moldavian Peasants was held on 20 January in Kishinev at the Oktombriye Palace. Its session was attended by representatives of the peasantry from most of the republic's rayons, as well as delegates and guests from state-cooperative and scientific-production associations, and from Moldavian VUZ's. The session was opened in a non-traditional manner—with old-fashioned peasant ceremonies and singing songs which glorify Earth as a nourishing mother. The archpriest Petru Buburuz, a USSR people's deputy, extended a welcoming greeting to those persons assembled there.

The report from the organizing committee was delivered by Kh.G. Andreyev, a USSR people's deputy and chief state engineer-inspector of the Strashenskiy RKAP. He dwelt on the vitally urgent problems of the Moldavian village nowadays, and he emphasized that the goal of the peasants' union being founded was to improve the life of rural laborers, to implement democracy and glasnost, and to establish social justice. This union will fight for the active participation of all healthy forces in the republic to solve the acute problems of the economy, the social sphere, and ecology.

After a detailed discussion the drafts of the program and the charter were approved; editorial changes may still be made in them. The program asserts that the SKM [Union of Moldavian Peasants] constitutes a mass socio-economic and political organization; it is one form of civic initiatives among rural inhabitants to protect the rights and interests of peasants as well as the entire rural population.

The republic-level council of the SKM and its ispolkom were elected at the Constituent Congress. Kh.G. Andreyev was elected chairman of the SKM.

The following persons took part in this congress's work: N.A. Kutkovetskiy, secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee; A.N. Sangeli, first deputy secretary of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers; and I.K. Cheban, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Ukrainian CP Secretary Comments on Chernigov Incident

90UN0899A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
12 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian CP Central Committee Secretary Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, date, time, and place not given, by PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent I. Glyanko: "At a Higher Level of the Mountain Pass, or a Political Evaluation of the Chernigov Incident"]

[Text] The "Chernigov Incident" report was published in PRAVDA UKRAINY a couple of days ago. The incident seemed a commonplace one. However, it grew into an unsanctioned political rally. What sort of evaluation does such an incident merit? Our correspondent talks about this with L.M. Kravchuk, secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.

[Correspondent] Leonid Makarovich, to the best of my knowledge, you went to Chernigov in order to look into the causes of the incident that arose. In your opinion, what constitutes these causes? What ways of eliminating the causes do you see?

[Kravchuk] Leaping ahead, let me say: The Chernigov incident, as such, is not out of the ordinary. It is a commonplace event that could have occurred anywhere: a highway transportation incident, as the specialists call it.

It merits the gravest condemnation as an immoral and antisocial event because V.M. Zaika, a leading official of the party oblast executive committee [oblispolkom], was coming back from a field trip in drunken condition. G.M. Zinchenko, the Volga automobile's driver, was also "three sheets to the wind." The joyride ended with an accident and the oblispolkom chief of organization's [zavorg's] being fired from his job and expelled from party membership. The reckless driver was also severely punished.

Naturally, however, the question arises: Why did this incident take on such importance, and why did it grow into conflict of a political nature? Let me say straight off: The reasons had been taking shape and gradually building up, and explosion occurred. It could have occurred with any other incident as well.

Of course, the form and manner of resolving social conflicts should be more civilized, and more carefully considered and well-founded. However, this is wishful thinking, while the incident remains a fact, and the fact's essence is not altered by it.

On the one hand, the incident revealed the political situation's acuteness and the people's dissatisfaction with perestroyka's not giving quick results. On the other hand, it showed once again that there are political groups everywhere that live by the principle "the worse things are, the better," groups that try to take advantage of every incident in order to destabilize the situation, and not to unite the fighters for perestroyka, but, on the contrary, to disunite them, and thereby drive a wedge between the party and the society.

These are realities, and they must be taken into account and placed in the political forecast realm. However, many cadres are not willing to do this. They are still unable to free themselves of complexes, stereotypes, and various kinds of syndromes, and do not know how to take charge of a situation in time and show flexibility, boldness, and generality.

What elementary logic indicates in such cases is: Go to the public square, take over a microphone, and explain, convince, and prove. Do this as quickly as possible, and unite the people on the basis of the proper conclusions. Naturally, boldness and unorthodox approaches are necessary here in addition to knowledge. If you waste time, you lose control.

However, the stereotypes are inclined to actions of another sort: Assemble the most active party members and confer, work out positions, and dispose forces. Meanwhile, the situation worsens, and more and more people become involved in it. The 2 political rallies that took place in Chernigov on 10 January, and at which over 40,000 people were present, confirm this conclusion. Thus it is understandable why people, who are striving to make the problems even worse, often control the microphones.

This is the first point. The second is the people's and our cadre's inadequate cultural level. I have political culture in mind above all. Under these circumstances, crowd laws begin to operate whether we like it or not. As a rule, all the elements wanting to profit at somebody else's expense, play on emotions, or draw attention to themselves by shouting join the crowd. There are many examples of this. There is that party oblast executive committee's Volga automobile that got into the accident. A crowd had barely had time to form at the scene of the accident when only the wheels and body of that automobile remained. Devotees of profit at somebody else's expense had made off with the removable parts.

In such a case, how can one fail to recall M.S. Gorbachev's words about our not knowing how to live under democracy's conditions and enjoy its blessings. However, this is real life, too, and you will not change it with any magic words. There is one way: work, persistent, patient, and calculated for a long time. For this, the party committees must engage in political and educational work as necessary, and conduct it in a new way.

When you put the matter this way, you hear in response: The situation is difficult; the sales counters are empty, so

it is hard to conduct the work, and its effectiveness is extremely low. But, if one takes this position, it is very difficult to explain the events in many European socialist countries, where the shelves looked far preferable to ours. It is necessary to alter the work's form, and to remember that people want to see and hear the truth, not just the democratic words, but democratic actions as well.

The third point is the personnel at all levels. They should understand that the Ukrainian CP Central Committee will never tolerate any deviation from our moral standards. Nevertheless, some personnel are inclined to view democratization and glasnost as a relaxation of discipline and responsibility. At the Ukrainian CP Central Committee's last plenum, it was clearly stated that we must rid ourselves of such workers because they cast a shadow on all personnel by their actions.

I do not share the opinion that all of the party's Chernigov Oblast Committee workers are morally degenerate people, as extremists are trying to establish. That is a lie. The workers are doing quite a bit to carry out perestroika tasks. Of course, there are shortcomings, there are problems, and there are miscalculations, even serious ones. Not everyone can work in the new way, not everyone knows how, not everyone understands it, and not everyone evaluates a situation in time. This is all the truth. However, one must not defame all personnel of the party's oblast organization, in which there is an overwhelming majority of honest, respectable, and conscientious people who are responsible for their actions and behavior, on the basis of a single incident that had a public repercussion.

[Correspondent] I was present at the unsanctioned rally that took place near the party's oblast committee building. On the one hand, it is good that people have started to talk loudly and express their grievances which built up during the stagnation years. On the other hand, extremists, who have taken advantage of the cry from the people's soul, have fabricated a resolution aimed, not at consolidating forces and expediting perestroika processes and institutions, but at dismantling perestroika's framework and breaking down the party and people's unity. Your position in this regard?

[Kravchuk] You have observed correctly: Democratization has given us glasnost and given people the opportunity to express their viewpoints at rallies and in active groups, at meetings and assemblies, and in the press, and to be aware of themselves as individuals having their own viewpoints and their own positions. This, perhaps, is one of perestroika's greatest achievements—to be aware of your own power and your own role, not as some "automaton," but as an individual, a master of the situation, a master of the land. But how is this viewpoint to be expressed? It requires argumentation, analysis, generalization of facts, and, finally, responsibility. Without these, it remains empty words, meaningless sounds. Actually, the bulk of the people at that unsanctioned rally was passively observing what was going on.

Some small group was controlling the proceedings. For the sake of fairness, let me say: There was much truth in the rally organizers' words. However, this unpleasant truth went almost unheard in the general ruckus of negating all of that which exists. Extremes are always fruitless.

Before me is the rally's resolution. Included in it is: Repeal article 6 of the constitution. Why, does this article hinder anyone's working today? What party committee can impose its will on people by dictate? It cannot because, for example, a party executive committee's director or chairman is elected in democratic fashion. What coercive power does a party oblast committee directive have over a labor collective soviet today? This soviet resolves all issues with the enterprise's management and the primary party organization.

These are just two examples attesting that the attempts to prove to people that the party is interfering with and compelling everything without exception today are sheer fabrication, deception, and deliberate distortion. Democracy has put all people in their places. Thus the fact is that the party does not have coercive power. It reserves for itself only the right to be the vanguard: in politics, in strategy, and in the people's education and their uniting to solve perestroika problems. So, what then was the purpose of introducing the point about article 6 of the constitution in the rally's resolution? The sole purpose in this case was: to "knock" the main foundation out from under perestroika, and to provide impetus for continuing the slandering of the party. It must not be forgotten that, at this stage, the party is the only element which still has the situation in hand and is actively carrying out perestroika. The party proclaimed perestroika, and the party is carrying it out, together with the people. There are shortcomings, of course, and there are also problems, difficulties, and miscalculations in the party leadership at all levels. However, the party talks about these openly and honestly. And, however difficult this may be for the party, it is actively reshaping our life, and is uniting and consolidating the society on the perestroika political platform.

But let us return to the rally resolution. What else is contained in it? There are 18 points, and they are all of a general, political-slogan nature: Dismiss the buro, abolish the party rayon committees, rename a street.... There is not a single constructive and positive proposal, and I emphasize this, that would mobilize people for accelerating socioeconomic development and improvement of the people's well-being. Furthermore, from a legal and democratic standpoint, the resolution was not carefully thought out, and it implies authoritarianism and all of the negative things that the people reject: dictation, extremism, etc.

I know that there are tensions in Chernigov over the Ukrainian language and national culture. Why were these critical problems not reflected, and a way for their solution indicated, in the resolution? But all of this

requires knowledge and work, and many people want to make do with just a bombastic statement.

But, you know, there is a preelection platform in the party's city and oblast committees. I will not say that this platform is perfect. Let us analyze and criticize it together, and together offer new versions. However, it is based on realistic expectations—economic, organizational, and personnel.... The people expect a real improvement of their life, not idle talk. It is bad when everything is rejected outright and condemned, and trite labels are put on it.

We ought to tell the people honestly: The matter of our future is being decided today. It is not a matter of whom to replace, of dismissing the buro and calling the party's city committee to account, as is being said in this case. This has now become a fashionable occurrence. Look, it is said, let the party members be dismissed, and everything will be different. One may agree with dismissal of the buro, as well as the party's city and rayon committees. It is a right of communists to meet and decide the fate of their leaders. However, one thing must be understood. The point here is not in replacing one office with another. The anti-perestroika elements pose the question more comprehensively: Replace the social order, reject socialism, and reject public ownership. As we see, the point does not concern replacing one office with another, but replacing the whole system. That is why every voter, when he or she goes to the ballot box, should pose himself or herself the question: I am not voting for a given name, but am I voting for a person who has a socialist or an anti-socialist position. If the voter will remember this, then he or she undoubtedly will make the correct choice.

[Correspondent] The city has been flooded lately with all sorts of tracts, various proclamations, and other handwritten and printed items. In these, the city's citizens are summoned in ultimatum fashion to unsanctioned rallies, election boycotts, and the organizing of strike committees and strikes for abolition of article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Even calls for violent physical retaliation against communists appear in some of them. Your attitude toward this?

[Kravchuk] I have seen tracts with such content here in Chernigov. I spoke about some of them in my address to the city's active party membership. What catches my eye is this: They are almost identical in content to the tracts that I have seen in Kiev and other cities. At my office, the opinion is being formed that a coordinated operation, down to preparation of the tracts, platform planks, and resolutions, is being conducted.

This is the first point. The second is: A tract is, itself, antidemocratic in its content because its authors, while calling for increase of democracy and glasnost in words, actually are maintaining the old positions. A nostalgia for ultimatums surfaces strongly in a tract. A tract is utterly saturated with intolerance toward a different opinion or outlook. There is pluralism for you. If a

person says anything different, he or she is removed from the speaker's platform or taken away from the microphone. It is a paradox, nonsense. People calling for democratization and glasnost are sanctioning the worst times of the stagnation, and even of the period called the personality-cult era, by their actions, their tracts, and their appeals. And those appeals for violent retaliation tell us that these groups of people do not want any sort of democracy and glasnost.

I think that the laws should be used against those who are calling for violent retaliation. You know, we are building a law-governed state. Nobody must be allowed to break that state's laws. Nobody, no organization, and no self-proclaimed lover of truth and justice is authorized to do this. All must live in accordance with the law, and must respect each other and each other's viewpoints. These viewpoints may not be to my liking, and may even contradict my views and convictions, but this does not at all mean that I should assume a hostile attitude toward these views and my opponent. But some people are trying to introduce such customs now. With one hand they call for the building of a law-governed state, democracy, and glasnost, but with the other they write tracts calling for establishment of a force cult and lawbreaking. This is intolerable. Under such circumstances, the law enforcement agencies should do their job.

[Correspondent] And the final matter, Leonid Makarovich: If you had been a participant in just such an unsanctioned rally, what would you, as secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, say to people?

[Kravchuk] I would speak to people thus: Comrades, we are living through an incredibly difficult time. Our perestroika has reached something like a mountain pass. We are all at a higher level of the pass today. Whether we go farther up, or go back down, depends on us, and us alone. I understand this well, as do all who live in our land. That is why I wish to speak to you. There are people who want us to go up, establishing humanism and democracy, and improving our life. There are elements, and this is no illusion, that are here among us, and want us to go back down. Let us say to these elements that our paths are different.

This is the first thing that I would say. Secondly, I would urge people to look at the situation soberly and deliberately, realistically evaluate it, call its pluses, pluses, and its minuses, minuses, say a kind word to their comrades for the pluses, and keep those who do not understand and are committing unlawful, lawbreaking, and antisocial acts away from perestroika, no matter who this may involve—the secretary of a party oblast or city committee, a production brigade leader, a workshop chief, or a director. Let us do this together. Let us meet with you at rallies, as well as on the streets and in meeting halls. But let us carry on a constructive conversation: How can we correct the situation?

Let us carry on this conversation today. Let us compare viewpoints, alternative proposals, platforms, and tasks—

economic and social. Let us talk concretely about these matters and what we must do tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, who must do it, and who is to be held accountable, and, if that person does not do it, let us fire him from the job because he is unable to correct the situation. However, let us also make this demand of the organizations that are in opposition. This applies to the "Rukh" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] as well.

"Rukh," I would say, today this is no longer the past. The "Rukh" was born a year ago. It was a baby then and, toward the baby, there was the different attitude that is customary toward babies. Today, "Rukh," they say you have grown up and become an organization. If you have become an organization, you must answer for your actions and for your work: Put your real activity on the table! Can you not let people find out that your words are one thing, and your deeds another? Let us approach party, trade-union, Komsomol, and public organizations with the same measure, in order not to create a situation in the society in which some people work while others only talk, and frequently, moreover, even interfere with work.

Today, as never before, it is important to be united in our actions and intentions, and to be united in our efforts and desires to solve our problems. We must become kinder and more patient with one another, and be able to hear different viewpoints and react to these viewpoints as a civilized person should. Let us respect, not insult, each other. You know, we are building a new, humanistic society. Let us be Human with a capital H and adhere to our principles and our standards. Let us reject such of these as are unsuitable and institute new ones, but adhere to them, for we cannot appear before the world as some sort of anarchistic mass or some kind of destructive force. We should show ourselves as a society that must set an example of good organization, discipline, and high morality.

Let us fight against injustice. If we see that someone has overstepped the law somewhere, let us arrest him or her. If we see that we have reduced an ecological situation to a critical state, let us take a public stand against this together. Let us take a public stand against pollution in the society, on the land, in the air, and in the water. However, let us not just take a public stand, but let us also bring about purity by actions. Let us create, not destroy. Let us be united in everything, united and organized.

I think this is the most important thing that we lack today. We are all the people, and we should not be divided. We have no cause for quarrels or spats. There is an urgent need, a pressing need, to unite and move forward step-by-step. As for those who are trying to take advantage of our difficulties and our shortcomings, and there are those, and a good many of them, we must show what kinds of goals they are pursuing so that who is who will be clear to everybody. This is especially important before the elections.

Ukrainian Official Discusses Nationalities Commission

90UN0944A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 5,
29 Jan 90-4 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview of Yuriy Yelchenko, secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, by SOYUZ correspondent Nikolay Baklanov under the rubric "The Party and Perestroika": "Without Delay, Without Haste..."]

[Text] At one of the plenums of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee held last fall, the decision was made to establish a Ukrainian CP Central Committee commission for questions of interethnic relations. Ukrainian CP Central Committee secretary Yuriy Yelchenko was named to head it.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Nikiforovich, what dictated the necessity of establishing a Ukrainian CP Central Committee commission for questions of interethnic relations? What have been the first steps in its work?

[Yelchenko] The establishment of party committee commissions, as you know, was conditioned by the political directives of the 19th All-Union Party Conference aimed at reestablishing Leninist principles of collective discussion and approval of party decisions. This important measure must also be viewed as a means for development of collegiality within the party leadership and as a way of broadening participation by the members of elected party organs in its activities. Now, in particular, members and candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Ukrainian CP Central Auditing Commission are being drawn on a regular basis into active participation in the most important areas of the party's domestic and foreign policy.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee commission for questions of interethnic relations was not among the first commissions created in connection with this. It was assumed that the ideological commission would handle these questions, among others. However, the need for its creation soon became evident because of the extreme urgency acquired by nationality problems. As you will recall, note was also taken of this in the decisions of the September (1989) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

We are becoming increasingly convinced how varied nationality problems are. They are complex in character, having not only legal and ideological aspects, but also socioeconomic, cadre, and international ones. To keep these problems constantly within our field of vision, to examine and analyze their essence, to develop, with the broad participation of the party activists, practical recommendations for the party organizations and their committees concerning the content, forms and methods of work to realize the decisions of the party in the field of nationalities policy—these are the basic reasons for the formation and simultaneously the practical tasks of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee commission for interethnic relations.

It is premature to speak about the results of its work. Too little time has passed and it has taken only its first steps. Only one session of the commission has been held, at which organizational questions were examined, a work plan was approved, and the platform drafts and the appeal of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee "To all voters of the Ukrainian SSR" were discussed. Another question discussed was the importance of ensuring representation of the national groups within the future composition of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies.

Already, during this first stage, the interested participation of commission members in its work makes possible the conclusion that it will be capable of successfully achieving the tasks assigned to it. The department of nationality relations recently established within the apparatus of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee will also certainly be of great assistance in the work of the commission.

[Correspondent] Characterize, please, today's situation in the sphere of interethnic relations within the Soviet Union and, in particular, in the Ukraine. Are there any kind of general tendencies which disturb you?

[Yelchenko] I am unable to make general conclusions. Necessary information is lacking for this. The dynamics of changes in these relations are exceptionally high. But I know that, as a whole, unfortunately, the situation remains complicated. Tens of thousands of refugees, the death of hundreds of people in direct confrontations, considerable damage caused to the country's national economy as a result of interruptions in the work of transportation, strikes on nationalist grounds, uncertainty on the part of people about the future—this is far from being a complete list of the difficulties and complications which exacerbation of interethnic relations has brought us. Particularly alarming is the fact that tensions in the interethnic area have arisen in a whole series of regions within the country.

These troubles, luckily, have bypassed the Ukraine. We have run up only against their consequences. It should be said that, for a very long time now, stable interethnic traditions have existed within our republic. I would also like to note that, with all the shortcomings in past periods, the processes of perestroika, although not so energetically in the first stages, have also touched the area of ethnic policy and interethnic relations.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee has taken measures to prevent exacerbation of interethnic relations by means of solving accumulated problems, first of all in the intellectual and cultural sphere. A course has been set toward expanding the area of use of the Ukrainian language and also creating conditions for free development of the Russian language and the languages of the other national groups that live within the territory of the Ukraine. On the whole, a great deal is being done to satisfy their ethnic cultural requirements. A start has been given to the working out of a complex program for

the development of Ukrainian culture and to thorough scientific studies of the history of the Ukraine. Of course, we would all like to see this work go more quickly, but the main thing, which time has shown, is that we are on the right track.

What I have said certainly does not mean that we have no problems. There are many of them. They are characterized by a broad diversity. First of all, it is necessary to check that everything planned has been carried out. Through the party members who work in the soviets and in various departments and the party committees. We cannot do without such influence and, I will frankly state, also without appropriate oversight (of course, without commands and pressure). Indeed, for example, implementation of the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR requires, in itself, enormous and long-term work.

I will not conceal the fact that great efforts will also have to be made in order to neutralize attempts by nationalist and separatist elements to destabilize the situation within the republic. We also have our "hot spots," which require constant and close attention. These are the Crimea and certain of the Ukraine's western oblasts, especially Lvov. There is also a "storm blowing" in Kiev. Both the all-union and the republic mass information media are reporting this.

I want to stress that the CPSU platform on "The Nationalities Policy of the Party in the Modern Conditions" and the decisions of the October (1989) Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum, which were developed on its basis, are a firm political foundation for successful work aimed at harmonizing interethnic relations.

[Correspondent] What, in your view, is the chief threat to perestroika? How do you assess attempts to promote the idea of the preferability of a confederative structure and of splitting up the Soviet Union on the basis of "national quarters"?

[Yelchenko] Not pretending, of course, to absolute truth, I consider on the whole that this is political adventurism which is leading perestroika astray into a morass of hare-brained schemes.

The nationalism that has raised its head and which manifests itself in the ideology, politics, and psychology of certain informal [samodeyatelniy] formations and of their leaders and stooges, represents a serious danger. And it, as you known, is capable of misleading the thinking of a person no matter what the level of his education and life. It is specifically in this that its main danger lies.

As regards the second part of your question, then the question, in my view, is essentially one of a federative or of a confederative structure for our society. I think that in whatever attractive slogans they mask the ideas of confederation, their popularizers have just one goal—the

destruction of our unified state. Incidentally, the experience of history testifies that confederations usually fall apart, or end up being transformed into federations.

I am deeply convinced and believe that only a renewed socialist federation is capable of ensuring the success of perestroyka, of creating the conditions for the free development of each nationality, of revealing broad possibilities for their collaboration on the basis of equal rights for the common good in common goals.

It is understood that measures aimed at improving the federal union, in particular, with respect to delimiting areas of competence between all-union and republic organs, should be legislatively formalized within a new USSR constitution, preparations for work upon which are developing at the present time.

[Correspondent] One gets the impression that certain forces in the republics, including in the Ukraine, are consciously working for an open confrontation with all-union authorities and with the Communist Party, that they are provoking law enforcement forces into serious clashes... Who needs this, and why?

[Yelchenko] The question is a complicated one. But there are such forces, as you say, also in the Ukraine. Evidently, you are not most interested in to whom and for whom this is necessary. The answer here is obvious. It is necessary to those who have nothing in common with the interests of the people. And so, what kind of forces are these, what are their characteristics? This question must be answered directly. These are political extremists, mainly of a nationalist hue.

I will be completely frank. If there was one thing that has seriously alarmed us in connection with the birth of the "Ukrainian National Movement for Perestroyka" (the Ukrainian name "Rukh" has become widespread), then this was the possibility of its penetration by nationalistically-inclined forces, and also by forces that are openly anti-Soviet. To our great misfortune, this fear was justified. The personification of these forces today are the "leading figures" of the so-called UKhS (Ukrainian Helsinki Union). The public is aware this and is demanding that the healthy forces within Rukh publicly declare their disassociation from these "defenders of rights." So far this has not been heard, although within the leadership of Rukh there are also members of the CPSU, and USSR peoples deputies. The party organizations consider it to be their task to consolidate all the progressive forces of the informal movement of working people, to broadly expose the true enemies of perestroyka.

[Correspondent] In your view, are the problems of interethnic relations connected with economic problems?

[Yelchenko] It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that the principle source of tension within interethnic relations, as well, lies precisely in the failure to solve the many social and economic problems in our country.

Therefore, the most important line and an unavoidable condition of harmonization of interethnic relations is the implementation of radical economic reform. Of course, on the basis of economic accountability, as is also envisaged by it.

Today there are more than enough people willing to give out all kinds of prescriptions, to restructure our lives, while pretending to absolute truth. It is my conviction that the economic accountability of enterprises and the economic accountability of the region have their fundamental distinctions and that it would be extremely destructive not to consider or to simplify them. But no matter how much we talk about economic accountability, this will essentially lead nowhere if we do not set about a reform of prices. Specifically, this reform will in turn determine both the quality of economic transformations and the timing of real, perceptible changes in the economy. Precisely therefore, many economists are advocating a simultaneous transition to economic accountability by all territories in our country.

In my view, what we should be talking about is a planned, centralized influence on the development of the economy of the entire country and of each republic. Of course, it is not simple to achieve a correct combination of territorial economic independence and planned, centralized influence on individual regions. Here, the economy is tightly intertwined with politics, while directly touching upon the nationality aspects of the latter. But we are obliged to master this art. I am convinced that those devoted to making a fetish of the republic's economic independence are consciously or unconsciously driving a wedge into our interethnic relations.

The concept of our unified national economic complex requires a precise, a theoretically and politically correct, interpretation. The entire world has been seized by integrational processes, but some are calling on us to split up along national lines. Strength, naturally, lies in unity. But this unity, like everything in social development, must be not be an end in itself; it must be of public interest. In the conditions of our multi-national state, this interest lies in a striving for a common good life on the basis of mutual help and real interethnic brotherhood. But I will note here that this must be without economic parasitism and on the basis of relationships between republics that are regulated by agreements that ensure equality of rights and mutual benefit and interest.

[Correspondent] What must be done in order to improve interethnic relations in the country as a whole, and in the Ukraine in particular?

[Yelchenko] The main thing, in my view, is, on the basis of the CPSU platform on "The Nationalities Policy of the Party in Modern Conditions," to create an effective system of mechanisms, in particular legal and economic mechanisms, mechanism that touch on the intellectual and cultural sphere, and others, ones which will ensure a harmonious combination of ethnic and inter-ethnic interests.

Laws, both all-union and republic ones, should become the basis of such mechanisms. Without delay, but also without excessive haste, it is necessary to determine their character, to approve them, and to set about their practical realization.

Statistics for Recent Fergana Oblast Migration Trends

90US0523B Tashkent KOMSOMOLET
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "We Answer at Once: Fergana: Migration Statistics"]

[Text] I have heard that, since the tragic Fergana events, many families from the oblast's non-indigenous population are abandoning their native places. I am convinced that this is will not have the best effect on strengthening interethnic relations. What is the scale of the migration processes? What is being done to halt them?—N. Sadykov, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, Tashkent

According to the data of the Fergana Oblast Statistical Administration, during the first nine months of the past year, 41,214 persons left the oblast and 25,039 arrived. However, to connect intensification of migration processes solely with the interethnic conflicts that took place in June would not be entirely correct.

Analysis carried out recently by the sector on interethnic relationships that has been created within the Fergana Oblast party committee has showed that, among both the people leaving the oblast and those arriving, about 50 percent are persons of Uzbek nationality. They are leaving for various reasons: for study, for professional, or for personal reasons. As regards the Russian-speaking population that has left the oblast, it accounts for only four percent of the total number of residents of the oblast.

It cannot be denied that the dramatic June events have been reflected in these processes. Every month from May through August, the number leaving regularly doubled. But, beginning in September, there was a noticeable drop—migration declined by 34 percent, and in November, as compared with August, it was reduced two-fold.

It must be noted that, way back as December 1988, workers at the Institute of Philosophy and Law and at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History conducted an interesting sociological study. Even then, 13 percent of the representatives of the nonindigenous population surveyed stated that their plans included moving to another place of residence outside the oblast or the republic. They gave very diverse motives and reasons: unsuitable climate, a desire to return to places of historic residence, an unfavorable ecological situation, poor housing conditions, an intention to improve material well-being, difficulties in advancing in work, lack of knowledge of local customs and language.

Here is what the managing secretary for interethnic relations of the oblast party committee, Sh. M. Abdullayev, had to say in this regard in an interview given to the newspaper FERGANSKAYA PRAVDA:

"The problem of migrational flows is organically connected with the complex demographic situation within the oblast. The demographic crisis cannot be presented solely as the result of a surplus of labor in the region. Migration has its own historical dimension. With all the positive significance of these processes, like any social problems of such a scale, they have also had negative consequences, which up until now have not been subjected to objective analysis... We should be talking not simply about improving interethnic relations, but about restructuring them."

One might add: an immediate and radical restructuring.

Public Prosecutor Holds Collegium Session on Gdlyan Affair

90UN0946A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by S. Kosterin: "A Step Toward the Truth: Notes From the Session of the USSR Procuracy Board"]

[Text] I noticed a shadow not only of anxiety, but also of alarm, on the faces of the people who had gathered in the auditorium of the USSR Procuracy board last Thursday. We know many of the people who occupied a place behind the session table: they had been approved openly, publicly, with a high degree of exactingness by the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Well-known legal experts, they had been given the responsibility of monitoring the rigorous observance of Soviet laws. Behind that phrase, which has a slight ring of bureaucratic style, is our life, security, and freedoms—the totality of everything that enables man to live with his head held high, if he himself does not cross over the line of the law.

The USSR Procuracy board was considering the question of violations of legality by... the USSR Procuracy itself, by its empowered and high representatives. The question to be discussed was formulated in this manner: "Dealing with crude violations of legality that had been committed by T. Kh. Gdlyan and N. V. Ivanov, respectively the senior investigator and investigator for especially important cases, under USSR General Procurator."

The "Gdlyan phenomenon"—that expression was frequently heard at the board session, which lasted almost six hours and which listened to several dozen witnesses and opinions. The persons who spoke were not only board members, but also USSR Procuracy members investigators and invited USSR people's deputies. The only persons who did not speak were T. Kh. Gdlyan and N. V. Ivanov, who are not only people's deputies, but also USSR Procuracy workers and investigators. Informed ahead of time about the day and hour of the board session and about its content, they failed to appear.

The "Gdlyan phenomenon," as we understand it, is closely connected with the biggest case in recent years that was linked with corruption, figure-padding, and bribery. A rather large amount is already known about the "cotton case" in Uzbekistan. One need only recall that, according to the minimal computations, for the 1978-1983 Uzbek SSR harvests alone there had been figure-padding for more than 4.5 million tons of cotton, and the state had suffered damages exceeding 4 billion rubles. Over a four-year period, more than 5000 persons had been convicted, including major republic administrators. One hundred million rubles had been repaid to the state. Gdlyan and Ivanov's investigation group had not had anything to do with these cases. It had begun operating in August 1983.

But the "Gdlyan phenomenon" consists precisely in that the impression was created that all the investigative successes that had been achieved by the labor of a tremendous number of workers in the law-enforcement agencies, as well as the "cotton case" itself that had been handed over to the justice system on the initiative of the CPSU Central Committee, were linked only with the names of Gdlyan and Ivanov. We were repeatedly told that if it had not been for these miracle-working detectives, the bribe-takers and embezzlers of public funds would not have been brought to responsibility.

But during the six-year period of work on the initiative of the investigators in the Gdlyan and Ivanov group, out of the 32 persons who had been convicted, four were acquitted by the court, two cases were returned for additional investigation, and valuables were confiscated, including seizure of the defendants' property, with a total amount of 35 million rubles.

Those are the objective facts. As you can see, the "phenomenon" proves to be inflated. But that is not what the harm consists of.

In recent years, drop by drop, and then in a broad stream, the country's party and state agencies began receiving a flood of complaints linked with violations of legality during the investigation of cases by the Gdlyan and Ivanov group. The most insignificant violation of the defendant's rights is still a crime, and it must not go unnoticed.

General Procurator A. Ya. Sukharev, who presided at the board, gave the floor to V. I. Ilyukhin, chief of the Administration for Overview of the Execution of the Laws Governing State Security, USSR Procuracy. This is what he stated:

"Dozens of people were illegally detained and arrested, and languished for months and years in solitary-confinement cells. By means of blackmail and threats, the persons under investigation were forced to give depositions, or, to put it more accurately, those depositions were frequently falsified.

"It was a well-entrenched practice in the investigative group to make family arrests, frequently of completely innocent persons, persons of advanced years, sick women, and citizens having several minor children as dependents.

"The blatantly arbitrary actions that were expressed in the illegal detention were carried out with respect to retirees Ishim Turkmenov, born 1914, and Dzhanzak Dzburayev, born 1919. Polo Olimova, mother of nine children; Vibizada Daliyeva, mother of 11 children; and Anora Saidova, mother of 12 children, were arrested.

"On 30 April 1985, on accusation of bribery, T. Kh. Gdlyan arrested Turam Khaitov, a former Uzbek SSR MVD worker. The indictment was read to him by N. V. Ivanov. During the investigation, Khaitov's mother died. The investigators prohibited everyone from telling

Khaitov about her death. His relatives were not allowed to take him to the funeral. Khaitov had been brought to criminal responsibility on the basis of a false accusation. He was kept under guard illegally for more than three years. On 15 May 1989 he was justifiably acquitted by the court.

"Numerous instances were established in which persons had been deprived of their civil liberty by being kept under lock and key in official areas. At 0200 hours on 6 July 1984, on instructions issued by T. Kh. Gdlyan, M. Mirzabayev, who was suspected of storing valuables that had been acquired by criminal means, was brought to an interrogation. There was not sufficient foundation for detaining him. However, over a 24-hour period Mirzabayev was kept in the administrative building without any record of his detention having been prepared. He was locked up for the night in a service area on the second floor. In the morning of 7 July, before the investigators arrived, he committed suicide by jumping out of the window onto the asphalt.

"The question that arises naturally is: 'Why did they resort to arbitrary actions?' Many deviations from the law were committed in order to 'break' the person, to 'beat the necessary depositions' out of him. But what cynicism, what monstrous acts of inhumanity they went to in order to do this! Just as in the 1930's, children were forced to denounce their parents, and, conversely, parents 'unmasked' their children. Many citizens stated that at interrogations they had been given the names of responsible republic workers and CPSU Central Committee workers, and had been forced to give depositions about them. And the pressure had been so great that the persons under investigation had frequently been unable to withstand it, and had given false depositions.

"Hundreds of people had been humiliated and vilified. Their legal rights and freedoms had been trampled upon. Thousands of completely innocent citizens began to have doubts about the justice of the legal system and the Soviet authority.

"In June 1985 Gdlyan and Ivanov removed from official responsibility 56 workers at the Bukhara City Trade Office, who had given Kudratov, the trade office director, bribes amounting to more than 2 million rubles. Several of them had handed over as bribes from 70,000 to 200,000 rubles, or even more. In the course of the investigation, evidence was obtained that that money had been obtained as a result of thefts, fraud perpetrated against the customers, and the upgrading of commodities. The inspection document showing a major shortage had not been appended to the file, although it had been sent to Gdlyan by the inspectors. No one has yet been able to find that document. Thus, Gdlyan and Ivanov not only failed to bring flagrant thieves to responsibility, but also concealed their dangerous crimes.

"In beating 'confessions' out of people, they went so far that persons who did not have anything to do with the crimes implicated themselves and turned over their

personal savings to the investigators, borrowed money from their relatives, and collected money from the entire village. Frequently they purchased valuable articles in stores and handed them over under fear of being arrested, as being articles that had been acquired by criminal means. It can be said without exaggeration that this kind of 'confiscation' was prevalent through Uzbekistan. The way in which it occurred is graphically attested to by the example involving D. Bekchanov. A person with Category 2 disability, he was repeatedly told to come to interrogations and was told to hand over 500,000 rubles. He refused, since he was not hiding any money that had been acquired by criminal means. Then, under the threat that he, his wife, and children would be arrested, he agreed to collect and hand over to the investigators 100,000 rubles. Over a 24-hour period he borrowed the money from his relatives and acquaintances. He certified the loan terms at a notary's office. He added his own savings and gave the investigator more than 97,000 rubles. However, that money was officially identified as money that had been criminally acquired...

"Examples such as this are not isolated ones. Moreover, when Gdlyan's millions were all counted up, they proved to be scarcely a third of what had been advertised on the newspaper pages. True, many hundreds of thousands of rubles had been confiscated, but it was not established that they belonged to the persons who had been arrested and brought to responsibility. The investigation has a tremendous amount of work in this regard..."

V. I. Ilyukhin concluded his report by stating, "This is the first time that we have encountered such a system of illegality, such a dangerous backsliding to the times of Beria and Vyshinskiy."

Let us now give the floor to the testimony of other legal experts who made statements.

"The presumption of innocence was crudely trampled upon," A. V. Sboyev, chief of the investigative unit of USSR Procuracy, said. "The persons under investigation had pressure exerted on them by their cellmates, who 'spoke with the investigators' tongue.' Why was all of this necessary? In March 1989, a few days before the election of USSR people's deputies, Gdlyan organized a display of valuables that had been confiscated. Someone called that exhibition 'the pre-election millions.'"

Procurator R. M. Ovcharova, who supported the accusation at one of the trials in Tashkent, said, "Certain of the people who were supposed to give depositions to the court, upon entering the auditorium, fell to the floor and literally crawled to the table behind which the court was sitting. They had preliminarily been 'trained' in that way in the Gdlyan and Ivanov group, and had been intimidated in that way. More than 30 persons involved in this case made statements about threats that had been directed to them (women had been threatened with rape, and men had been threatened with beatings)."

N. A. Klokot, an investigator from the Gdlyan group, testified, "The Gdlyan group had investigators—

so-called 'hatchets.' They beat up the persons under investigation until they wrote confessions, then they took the confessions to the 'piano players,' who typed them up."

"The actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov," Yu. A. Khitrin, member of the USSR Procuracy board, said, "attest to the fact that their misdemeanors should be brought not only to official responsibility, but also criminal. By international conventions that have also been signed by the Soviet Union, their actions with respect to persons under investigation are described by the word 'torture,' since they are the causing of moral suffering. The evidence that we now have make it possible to raise the question of expelling Gdlyan and Ivanov from the USSR Procuracy system and the bringing of them to criminal responsibility."

You listen to all of this and, like everyone else present at this session, you ask yourself: why did they have to do all of this? An unambiguous answer was provided by the speakers themselves: political careerism and adventurism. Currently Gdlyan and Ivanov, at numerous rallies, are shouting that "the case is being dumped on them," and that, as soon as they got as far as "the Kremlin wall," they were immediately removed from the investigation. This is a "roof" created by them in order to get out of giving any answer for the illegal actions they committed. And the content of their most recent rally speeches is already such that they are directly calling for the overthrow of the country's political and state leadership, and this, in and of itself, constitutes a *corpus delicti*.

The overstatement by Gdlyan and Ivanov of the volumes of the crimes, and the insulting of the national dignity of Uzbeks, have given rise in Uzbekistan truly to a wave of just indignation. And the guilt for this also lies with the previous leadership of USSR Procuracy, which poorly monitored the activities of the Gdlyan and Ivanov group.

It is difficult to explain all this to the people. That was mentioned by People's Deputy V. A. Yarin, co-chairman of the commission that had been created by the Congress. He evaluated the discussion that had occurred as the repentance of the procuracy workers. But only halfway.

"It would be correct," V. A. Yarin said in his statement, "to carry out the second half of the repentance to the Uzbek nation. It is a more heinous crime to 'play truth' with the nation today. We commission members went to Uzbekistan and discussed the situation with people there, and we told one another the truth."

Yes, the lesson that USSR Procuracy learned was a serious one and USSR Procuracy was obliged to make stern conclusions for its. I can imagine how difficult it was for General Procurator A. Ya. Sukharev to conclude the board. He bravely summed up the results by stating, "The reality is such that the social tension in this case is great. The 'Gdlyan and Ivanov phenomenon' was created by them with our aid. However convoluted the

situation might be, we must learn legal and political lessons from it, and must give precise evaluations. I assume part of the responsibility for the delay..."

The board passed a decision to make a representation to USSR Supreme Soviet in order to obtain consent to remove T. Kh. Gdlyan and N. V. Ivanov, who are USSR people's deputies, from the positions that they occupy and to bring them to responsibility in conformity with the law.

A difficult but extremely necessary step toward the truth has been taken.

Alleged Abuses by Gdlyan Investigators Reported *90UN0924A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Interview with V.A. Yarin and members of USSR People's Deputies Commission, by Anatoliy Kovalev (SELSKAYA PRAVDA, Tashkent): "Everyone Must Know the Truth: The Whole Truth!"; in Tashkent, date not given]

[Text] Members of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies' commission for verifying materials associated with the activities of the USSR Procuracy Investigative Group headed by T. Gdlyan—USSR People's Deputies Veniamin Aleksandrovich Yarin, commission co-chairman; Nikolay Alekseyevich Sturkov, commission co-chairman; Valeriy Grigorievich Aleksandrin and Vladimir Tychievich Adylov, members of the commission; and also official experts on the commission Akhrar Khudoyarovich Rakhmankulov and Mikhail Yakovlevich Avrukin, who recently traveled to Uzbekistan on business for their commission. After finishing their work, they responded to questions from a correspondent from the republic newspaper, SELSKAYA PRAVDA. This conversation, published in the newspaper on 30 January 1990, had repercussions throughout practically the entire country—which caused IZVESTIYA to take the unprecedented step of reprinting it in its pages. We are reprinting the article almost unabridged, having "abridged" only certain of the questions of our colleague Anatoliy Kovalev, for which we hope he will not be offended; and some of the technical details from the experts on the "physical effects" to which those arrested were subjected on the part of criminals who were placed into the same cell with them. We are also leaving out the postscript from SELSKAYA PRAVDA, thus allowing the reader the opportunity to judge everything for himself.

[Kovalev] Esteemed members of the commission and experts! Probably I am not mistaken if I say that the entire nation of Uzbekistan is anxiously awaiting the final conclusions of your commission. Just when will the commission complete its work and report the results to the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Yarin] According to the decision of the Second Congress of People's Deputies, the commission is to present

its results to the nation's Supreme Soviet at the coming session. I believe we will be prepared to do this at the third session.

[Strukov] The process of gathering, verifying and analyzing the facts is going on at top speed. I share Veniamin Aleksandrovich's opinion that by the third session we will have prepared a summary report, in which we will expound a political analysis of the actions of the Gdlyan group and, as you put it, the epoch of the "cotton cases."

[Kovalev] What was the purpose of your trip to Uzbekistan? To study specific criminal cases, or to clean up some kind of omissions and unfinished work?

[Yarin] The members of the commission are not capable of studying all the criminal cases themselves, nor was such a task set. This difficult work was given to experts recruited for that purpose, and they will provide us their conclusions on each case. It goes without saying, the members of the commission are not brushing this work aside and are personally studying all materials from the most scandalous cases.

We have been working in Tashkent, Karakalpakia and Khorezm Oblast; we've gone out to the kolkhozes and kishlaks, and we have visited the homes of the simple country laborers and acquainted ourselves with their way of life and standard of living. I'm telling you, what we saw makes one's blood freeze. It is dismaying and stunning to see the extreme squalor in which the villagers live, offering themselves up to the cotton monoculture—to that Moloch which devours everything: the people's health and lives, and the happiness and joy of their children... And infant mortality is so high!

And the price of all this is their beggardly wages. We visited families who had suffered from the lawlessness in which there were seven to eight, and in some cases ten to thirteen children. And these families live on 100-150, or at best, 200 rubles a month. How do the dekhkans [peasants] live on such income? Badly! What kind of furniture they have—a cot for six children, without an elementary kind of mattress... We caught ourselves thinking that when we describe everything we have seen, to Muscovites for example, they wouldn't even believe us. And Telman Khorenovich, who considers himself an intelligent person, is loudly telling the entire country, the entire world, about the depravity of the Uzbeks, who have allegedly slipped and slid into the world of crime. Such shameless statements!

[Aleksandrin] And you see, Gdlyan has seen the standard of living of the villagers, the cotton-pickers, and he knows that they can barely make ends meet... Pardon me, but there is nothing at all in the dekhkans' homes except for their bedding. Poverty prevails everywhere. And to speak about such long-suffering and, I would say, hardy people, using such vile words as "thieves," "plunderers," and "bribe-takers," means to sink to the depths of moral devastation.

I am in your region for the first time, but I have gained a boundless admiration for the Uzbeks—they do not impart anger, and we did not hear a single bitter or nasty word. The people expressed their woes and problems to us with dignity, while politely offering us tea. Does such a people really deserve such abuse, such mocking from hundreds, perhaps thousands of highly-placed extortioners and embezzlers of public funds?! And Gdlyan brought down reprisals on the working families...

[Kovalev] Nikolay Alekseyevich, you are an experienced jurist, and you have seen a great deal in your time, as the saying goes. Right now, as you are investigating the activity of Gdlyan's group, what sort of facts have you encountered? Incidentally, I'd be grateful if all members of the commission would express their opinion on this question.

[Strukov] I have many years of investigative experience, and of course have come into contact with some terrible crimes, and with various violations of the law. But while working on the commission I have been amazed by the scale and the volume of the abuses and unprincipled manner of Gdlyan's investigative group. Truly, realization of this makes one's hair stand on end.

[Yarin] For any normal person, not only would his hair rise up, but also his soul, from such inhumanity... You see, you hear about a person who has lost his sight, and you are amazed that he still has the courage to tell about what they did to him. You want to rear up and howl when it becomes clear to you that a ten-year-old boy was the sole breadwinner for his still smaller brothers and sisters, since their father was illegally arrested, and their mother died of a broken heart...

[Adylov] "Mass terror" and "small genocide" are the terms which Gdlyan hurled from the rostrum of the Second Congress to the delegates and the entire country. Unfortunately, he was correct in his analyses. But his terms also testify to the fact that he has come to realize and clearly understand what his group and the organs of the republic procuracy had done, while investigating "cotton" and other criminal cases. Terror and genocide, these concepts characterize the activity of the investigation. Is this not shocking!

[Aleksandrin] Earlier I suggested that Uzbekistan is an exotic place, almost an earthly paradise. But then I was looking at everything with the eyes of an "ignorant" Russian... It's terrible! The scope of the lawlessness is not just depressing, it is genuinely stunning! I was stunned by the phenomenon (I stress, by the phenomenon and not by separate instances), when in the dead of night they would arrest the parents, leaving the small children absolutely to the whim of fate. They were arresting quite often without presenting sanction or accusation, and held completely innocent people in jail for weeks and months. What a terrible thing!

As a professional jurist and a people's judge, I must be objective and impartial, subjecting facts and phenomena to analysis. Believe me, I follow this principle, and

always remember the wisdom of the ancient Roman jurists: "Though the world perish, long live justice!" To put it another way, this aphorism proclaims that law is above everything else.

However, Gdlyan's investigative group (and not only his) were armed with another principle: "To achieve the goals, all means are good." No! Not all! Only legal means are good. And here in Uzbekistan, we have encountered tyranny.

[Yarin] I recall again and again that Karakalpakian kishlak on which a military assault was made; how rocket-armed helicopters hovered over the roofs of the pitiful inhabitants, and how under all this furor the so-called Gdlyan Investigative Group poured out of their vehicles... Without any other kind of illustration one can no doubt understand the kind of terror felt by the children, the women, the old men and all residents of the kishlak. What purpose did such an action serve? It was aimed at taking away the valuables of the dekhkans.

One cannot deny the fact that certain underground millionaires, sharp dealers in the cotton business, would occasionally hide the money, gold and jewelry which they plundered from the working people, in the homes of common people. But to employ such incomprehensible methods of oppression, terrorizing the citizens—is (and I am expressing my own personal opinion) a manifestation of savagery and barbarism.

[Information from expert A. Rakhmaikulov] "In order to avoid illegal arrests and to protect his family from abuse, Kolkhoz Chairman Alymov of the Kyrnyz Kolkhoz in Karakalpakia, who is by no means a young man and who had suffered two heart attacks, under threats from Gdlyan and his investigators collected 422,000 rubles, the personal savings of the kolkhozniks on the entire farm. But this man had committed no crime; just as Bekchanov from Khorezm Oblast had committed no crimes. He was also forced to gather a large sum of money. While gathering these sums Bekchanov provided a notarized receipt to each person. Gdlyan committed dozens of such scandals."

[Yarin] On these days we questioned more than 150 persons, many of whom passed through Gdlyan's torture chamber, and recorded 80 stories on magnetic tape. I alone have more than 48 hours of voice recordings. Nikolay Alekseyevich also has quite a number of cassettes with the bitter testimony of those who were unjustly accused. We bring to the voters of Moscow and Leningrad, and to the citizens of the entire country, the human suffering and the soulful cries of the dekhkans. Everyone must know the truth!

Some time before the creation of our commission, while reading articles about the "cotton cases" with which Gdlyan and Ivanov were associated, I—I must admit—had considered them to be virtual heroes, the "vengeful sword of the people," fighters for cause of justice, and for strengthening legality. But now that I have seen a great deal myself, heard for myself, and myself have sounded

out and digested an enormous amount of negative facts on their activity—now, forgive me, I can say with all candor: the victories of these people were a fake! They did not recognize and did not observe the elementary laws, which stand for the defense of the honor and dignity of our citizens.

We shall tell the country about the millions with which they are trying to cover their outrages. Officially the group received money and valuables worth 20 million rubles, and not 140 million as Gdlyan asserts. We will tell how many millions of the 20 were truly stolen by criminals and then taken away from them, and how many the investigative group forced the citizens to gather in the kishlaks, ostensibly in order to make up for that which was embezzled from the state. The official record states that this money, which was taken from the working people, was confiscated from extortioners and embezzlers. The illegally-confiscated money should be returned.

[Kovalev] Returned to the people of Uzbekistan? Is that what you, Veniamin Aleksandrovich, have in mind?

[Yarin] It should be returned to every honest worker, from whom it was illegally confiscated as "debt payment." Returned to those ordinary "accused," who were summoned for interrogation or arrested; who were subjected to "processing," demanding that they contribute a certain sum. And the people contributed, selling the fruits of their labor, in order to avoid unpleasantness and protect their family from the tyranny and oppression of the investigators.

We still have a great deal of work to do, and we shall work unceasingly. I will tell you straight from the heart—I am ashamed! Ashamed for the investigators, the procurators and the judges who committed such flagrant abuses. When you meet with the people and listen to their bitter stories, filled with horror, you somehow unwillingly drop your eyes and are afraid to look at them...

[Strukov] Today I can tell you with all candor that they could not have gotten away with one-hundredth of the gross violations which Gdlyan's investigatory group committed anywhere else—not in Russia; nor in the Ukraine; nor in Belorussia... We cannot allow such tyranny anywhere.

[Kovalev] But why was the lawlessness so pervasive in Uzbekistan? I assume that the geographic location of the republic and its climatic peculiarities have nothing to do with it.

[Strukov] Of course geography and climate have nothing to do with tyranny. But you see Gdlyan and Ivanov had considered the character of the people. Openness, hospitality, faith in people and in their decency, patience, and respect for the elders and for the law—they took advantage of these and many other splendid traits of the Uzbek people.

What is most unfortunate is that Gdlyan's group was operating without controls. Procuratorial oversight was in hibernation. There was a procurator of Uzbekistan, but it was as if he was not there when he should have been upholding the law. People's Control, workers' control, party control... There are controllers galore, but there was no one to control. There was Gdlyan and his group, but over them there was—no one. Similarly, it was as if the party, soviet and law-enforcement organs of that time had given up the struggle, and deferred to this group. Why this took place—is something we have yet to find out. In short, no matter how hard we tried, we could not see any mutually supporting control on behalf of the governing institutions.

[Kovalev] Nikolay Alekseyevich, in terms of propagating tyranny, Buturlin and his deputy Gaydanov, and other administrators both in the procuracy and in the republic MVD of those years are guilty to a considerable degree. Is the commission investigating the actions of these people, who as if nothing at all had happened, are still standing in defense of legality in other republics?

[Strukov] Members of the commission and its experts are inspecting the entire system of law-enforcement organs in the republic: the procuracy, the KGB and MVD, the judges, the prisons... After all, during investigation of the "cotton cases," they were all in the same loop with Gdlyan's group. But, I repeat, our mission is to determine a political analysis of what occurred in Uzbekistan. As far as the question of liability is concerned for Buturlis, Gaydanov, Didorenko and many other creators of tyranny, according to the USSR Constitution this should be resolved by the investigative organs. However, having touched upon negative aspects of the activities of the aforementioned administrators in the course of the inspection, we are carefully looking into all the facts and are summarizing them. We will then give all materials to the investigative team which is already investigating cases on instances of violating legality. And we shall report to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Kovalev] That means that the Commission has the facts...

[Strukov] It has, and quite a number of them. These are both gross violations of the law while detaining and arresting people, and while keeping people in IVS [possibly: Ispravitelno-Vospitatelnaya Sistema; Correctional Education System] and in prisons. We also know of instances in which citizens were unlawfully kept in "secret" houses and hotels. Unauthorized methods of conducting investigations, recruiting recidivists "for service," blackmail, threats, administering beatings—all these are characteristic of not only Gdlyan's group.

Procurators of rayons, oblasts and as I've already noted, even the republic procurator deferred to Gdlyan, placed their seals on documents giving sanction for arrest without checking the investigative documents, without conducting interrogation of the suspects—and the law prescribes that procurators must interrogate everyone

prior to arrest. All this is terrible! Procuratorial oversight in the republic was under the thumb of Gdlyan's group. Alas, but that is so! No one was concerned for the people, their fate and the fate of their children; and they often fabricated cases in the most unconscionable manner.

[Kovalev] Here in Tashkent you, esteemed comrades, gave hearings to U. Tadzhikhanov, I. Pazytkhanov, A. Mukhammadiev and other persons who brought numerous complaints both against Gdlyan's group, and against Buturlin and Didorenko... Well, you, Valeriy Grigorievich, being a judge and now knowing the case of Pazytkhanov, would you convict him?

[Aleksandrin] Only one accusation was brought against Pazytkhanov—abuse of his official position. My conclusion: not only should he not have been brought to the dock, there were no grounds for bringing accusation against him. It goes without saying that jurists of the rank of Buturlin, Gaydanov and Didorenko, as well as investigator Bukharov and the judges who twice pronounced guilty verdicts, knew this as well as I do. The final dot has been placed on this case—Pazytkhanov has been vindicated. Unfortunately, there are many hundreds of examples of unlawful condemnation of citizens...

[Kovalev] Today over 2,500 people have already been rehabilitated. Law enforcement officials have unlawfully suffered a great deal as well: A. Fazylov, F. Eminov, M. Dzhumaeva, Sh. Ruzmatov, M. Nigmatuldaev, A. Abdurakhmanov, M. Khaydarov, A. Kalsin, Zulfiya and Rustam Akhmedov, B. Mirakhmedov, M. Dzhalalov, G. Shokhidaev, M. Mushrapilov... The cadres of local law-enforcement organs were shattered, in my view, consciously and deliberately...

[Aleksandrin] Alas, such a line is examined with great care, when one has to get rid of experienced but somehow unsuitable militia officers, procurators and judges. I am confident that all those guilty of lawlessness will be punished.

Yes, now people who have been away in prison for several years are being rehabilitated, and are being reimbursed materially for the harm. But how can they be compensated for their moral losses? Moreover, who is capable of doing that? I am one of those who believes that moral harm should be compensated materially at the expense of the persons who carried out the unlawful arrests and sentencing. This question has already been raised at certain commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but so far it is only at the stage of theoretical substantiation.

[Yarin] It goes without saying, a deluge of lawlessness has descended upon Uzbekistan... And nevertheless, how amazing are your people! With tears in their eyes they tell us about their suffering (We, of course, apologized for causing them pain, reminding them with our questions of terrible memories), but they do not ask us to return to them the money that was unlawfully taken from them; rather, they demand to be restored to the ranks of

the CPSU, and to return their party cards. "For what wrongdoing were we expelled from the party?" asked the dekhkans who had committed no crimes. We must deal with this question immediately as well.

Gdlyan had often said that he had had no opportunity to express his position to the people, or to set forth his own truths. I have a special selection of publications, of both supporters and opponents of Gdlyan. Materials in the latter category are a lot smaller.

[Kovalev] But what if you take into account the numerous press conferences, and the thousands of meetings at which he and Ivanov explain their positions?

[Yarin] ...Then they have taken in tens of millions of citizens living in various regions of the country. The people's low level of understanding of the law permit them to supercharge the atmosphere of psychosis in the country; to drum into people's minds that there are only thieves and bribe-takers in the place where their group was working, and that the highest state leaders are allegedly freeing the criminals from responsibility.

It would be hard for us to speak with an audience of Gdlyan-supporters. From the goodness of your heart you would speak only truth, and in return you would receive just the opposite. Gdlyan pumped the people full of poisonous lies, and mesmerized them.

[Adylov] Gdlyan, in pursuing far from the best ends, took advantage of all the mass information media—newspapers, magazines; television and radio.

He established for himself, exclusively, a reputation as a "crusader for justice" in open combat. The central press, having lost its sense of proportions, did not verify the information, and proclaimed that an attempt had been made on Gdlyan's life (Remember the barbed wire, allegedly stretched across the runway, so that the aircraft with Gdlyan on board would crash?); that Gdlyan and his investigators are conducting extremely dangerous operations in confiscating valuables, dressed in bullet-proof vests; that Gdlyan's group, after handing over millions, are on starvation rations—they are down to their last ruble...

All this is a myth! A big lie! No criminal case was instituted on an incident regarding an attempt on his life. Apparently the incident itself never occurred. And the "anecdotes" about bullet-proof vests are funny. True, once the group got seven outfits from the KGB, not for conducting a "dangerous operation," but in order to pose in them for the movie cameras. These are some of the methods they used to fool the people and to win the votes of the electorate.

[Yarin] Nor can one help but notice the fact that it is the public itself that is trying to place this investigative group beyond criticism, and wishes to hear only the tales of its leaders. And this is dangerous! Really dangerous! The public had actually offered Gdlyan and Ivanov and

certain other investigative groups the right to say anything that comes into their heads; or to distort, conceal, and present the facts in a light favorable to them. By "public" I have in mind first of all their electors.

Our task is complex and difficult but we are obliged to carry it out in such a manner that the people approach this question objectively, and set their emotions aside. We know that tricky and even provocative questions await us from Gdlyan and Ivanov's electors; but we are not afraid of dialogue with them, for we have something to say.

[Kovalev] By the way, Veniamin Aleksandrovich, Gdlyan's group, which consisted of investigators Kunets, Shishelov, Abdiev, Kartashyan, Litvak and Kimsanov, was not only the target of dissatisfaction on the part of those who suffered, it was also directly accused of employing unauthorized methods of conducting the investigation. Militia Gen-Maj A. Mukhammadiev, former republic deputy minister of Internal Affairs, had spent more than two years in prison; today he has been exonerated. However, certain of his tormentors have today defected to the side of Gdlyan's enemies. Are they not monsters, trying to maneuver to escape liability? Have you met with them, and did you get an explanation?

[Yarin] Today I'm not going to name the names of the investigators who were caught, frankly speaking, beating people with their fists, tormenting not only those under suspicion and the accused, but also their wives, children, relatives, friends and neighbors. We have them a hearing before the commission, we know of their scandalous actions from the citizens' complaints and from the materials prepared by independent prosecutor Martinson's group. A portion of this data—an extremely small one—was heard at the Second Congress. Right now I can say unequivocally that we have irrefutable proof of the fact that many investigators were using methods far removed from that of Soviet investigation and the Soviet legal system.

[Information from Expert A. Rakhmankulov] "Aralbay Doshchekaev, 56, former chauffeur for Karakalpak ASSR Health Minister Khudaybargenov, was unjustly arrested and handed over to IVS. They demanded he hand over the millions of the latter. The chauffeur did not have them. Doshchekaev was then handed over to hardened criminals for re-education.

"Day after day the criminals beat him up, 'inviting' him to submit to the investigators and bring out the minister's millions. Doshchekaev's wife was also detained and interrogated under torture.

"Heroine-mother Bibizada Dolieva—she has 11 children and 24 grandchildren—was also arrested. They demanded she hand over the millions of Kamalov, former Karakalpak Oblast party committee first secretary. It goes without saying, she didn't have them. Then she too was placed into the cell with the hardened criminals. They beat her up, starved her, allowed her to

sleep only on the bare floor, and tried to pry out her gold teeth with a ball-point pen... They threatened to arrest all her children and grandchildren. Once they showed her her daughter Ziyada in the isolation cell, and told her, 'You see, we've jailed her too...' Dolieva's relatives got together 40,000 rubles and handed them over to the investigators. Only then was she set free."

[Yarin] Commission members and experts examine and verify facts, and line up witnesses for every instance such as this (and there are hundreds). But the complicating factor is that not all such outrages can be proven beyond a doubt today. After all, they began as long ago as 1983. Time has gone by! And these monsters are trying to hide behind that fact today.

[Kovalev] Are Gdlyan and Ivanov, and other investigators of the group and their supporters interfering in the commission's work?

[Strukov] They are. They interfere all the time. If you were paying attention to the interim report delivered at the Congress, you would have noticed that in it we were trying to give special emphasis to the positions, views, and opinions of everyone—both the interested and uninterested parties.

[Kovalev] Yes, I noticed. And I was indignant, since I characterized your position as bowing and scraping.

[Strukov] Well, that's what a lot of people think. But their opinion is wrong.

Of course we could have given all the deputies the information from Martinson's group, which is replete with facts; or the information for Ligachev, which sets forth facts against Gdlyan; or documents which testify to the lack of procuratorial oversight over the activity of Gdlyan's group... That would have been a book of much more than 100 pages. But we decided not to do that, and here's why.

The commission was in general opposed to preliminary conclusions. But since that happened, we did not want to excite the hall and pump the deputies full of facts, when we still had lots of work to do. We rejected pressure tactics on the deputies and voters. Nor did we stake our claim on sensational shock—although we could have.

Gdlyan, on the other hand, chose precisely that method of defense and offense. The hall was filled with the newspaper GOLOS IZBIRATELYA, with articles under the banner headline, "Hands Off Gdlyan and Ivanov!" Who published the newspaper? It goes without saying, Telman Khorenovich and his cronies. And you see, he had been informed that the commission took the decision not to "blow up" the hall.

[Yarin] And it was then that I went to the rostrum and asked the deputies not to discuss this question, based on the fact that we were about to take a trip to Uzbekistan, and that there was an awful lot of work to do in Moscow. We asked them to have patience and hear the final report in a few months...

Next, a letter from the voters of Zelonograd arrived, requesting the deputies from Uzbekistan not be allowed to come to the rostrum to relate facts not yet verified by the commission. Gdlyan could not help knowing about this letter, allegedly signed by 70,000 people; you see, his defense committee is in Zelonograd. In a word, they had in fact won over the audience, to discuss the question and then hold a vote by roll call.

Just what did Gdlyan and Ivanov achieve? Clearly, they managed to hold a sort of political meeting with the participation of all the People's Deputies, and to tell the entire country (The session was televised): that the commission's portfolio is, allegedly, empty. And to a certain extent they managed to do so. But reason soon returned: "That's enough endless discussion!" The deputies understood that Gdlyan himself did not have any kind of documents to prove the guilt of those persons whom he and Ivanov had accused of all kinds of criminal offenses. And then a threat was heard... I have in mind the end of Ivanov's speech. Not one single parliament in the world would put up with such tricks. But our parliament is kind, and it choked down that pill too.

[Kovalev] Such kindness is worse than evil. It is simply dangerous. But that is another story. Tell me, Veniamin Aleksandrovich, have the leaders of the USSR Procuracy and the Uzbek SSR Procuracy placed any obstacles whatever before the commission in order to conceal the lawlessness which took place in Uzbekistan?

[Yarin] I must acknowledge that during the first stage of our work they tried to put up an "obstacle." No, there was no pressure; but they tried to hide serious materials from us, including the fact that there was no procuratorial oversight of the activity of Gdlyan's group. At present no one is putting up any impediments.

No one hindered our work in Uzbekistan. You see, we had already met with administrators at all levels: both the republic and oblast party committees, and the law-enforcement organs. We had also inspected the interrogation chambers and jail cells...

[Kovalev] What is your view of such an idea: to remove the ITK [Corrective Labor Camps], prisons, interrogation chambers and the IVS from the control of the MVD and the procuracy? You see, having free access to the prisoners, the officials of these organs quite often abuse this ability, and dictate to the administration their own illegal rules for holding people.

[Yarin] I am in complete agreement with your idea and its motives. Investigation is one form, the place of incarceration is another, and oversight is a third. Such a reform would probably not solve all the problems, but I am confident that we would avoid such a bouquet of negative phenomena which now prevails under the same "canopy."

"Tours" of the prisons also convinced us of the correctness of this idea... We saw cells in which both actual criminals and innocent people were kept, as the latter

were being held on cases brought by Gdlyan's group. We saw cells in which the wives and children of suspects and the accused were crowded. How can one stoop to such inhumanity? I address this question to Gdlyan and the leadership of the USSR Procuracy. Once Gdlyan's supporters asked me, "And how old were these children?" Excuse me, what difference does it make whether they were 10 or 17? Children do not answer for the misdeeds of their parents? And they are not obligated to answer!

[Information from Expert A. Rakhmankulov] "Gdlyan's investigative group also used video recordings to blackmail and frighten people. And that has already been proven. Here are some examples. On the TV screen, the accused tries to convince his daughter to give the investigators everything: property, money, valuables, anything; so that they will put an end to his physical and mental suffering... Or such a video tape: a father sees on the screen his weeping, tormented and terrified daughter, who pathetically cries, 'Papa, save us... Give them everything, but save us... What are we suffering for? Have pity on us...' What kind of heart could stand such scenes? And quite often, the unjustly accused would ask their relatives and friends to collect the necessary sum..."

[Yarin] Does Soviet law truly permit such scandals? We have cited only a few facts from the vast number, which are irrefutable. For now we will not mention the others... We shall verify ten times, but we shall tell the country the truth. The people expect the truth.

[Kovalev] There has been a lot of talk about how Gdlyan's group confiscated valuables. Certain of these facts have already been mentioned in passing. Could you not speak of them in more detail?

[Adylov] I believe it would be more proper if the information about the valuables was provided by the experts. They are up on all the details.

[Information from Expert M. Avrunin] "The law stipulates that when conducting search and seizure, an investigator is obligated to describe all valuables in detail in the presence of witnesses, paying attention to individual features. Next all the seized goods are packaged in a proper manner, verified with signatures and sealed."

[Kovalev] Pardon me, Mikhail Yakovlevich, is the presence of expert appraisers mandatory in such instances, in order to accurately describe and determine the true value, of jewelry, for example?

"No, it is not mandatory," Avrunin continues. "If there is opportunity to do so, specialists are called in immediately. If not, then all the confiscated valuables are sent out for expert analysis, where in the presence of those same witnesses the packages are opened and the specialists determine the weight, cost and description of the valuables, and their other features. And when the confiscated valuables are important physical evidence, they are also described in detail and are included in the case by special decree.

"All these are requirements of the law and are known to beginning jurists, yet during all these years and all these cases, Gdlyan's group has ignored them. It is completely obvious that this was not done by accident. Judge for yourselves.

"The confiscation of the valuables took place according to the following practice. The investigative group arrives, most often led by Gdlyan; the valuables are confiscated, and are described on one page as follows: 'Confiscated, three briefcases: one containing gold coins and Soviet money in denominations of 50-100 rubles, and articles of jewelry. In the second, articles of jewelry and gold coins. The third briefcase is filled with bonds issued in 1982.'

"A detailed count was not undertaken, and the 'briefcases' were sealed with USSR Procuracy seal number 374 or 268. And Gdlyan kept both the valuables and the seals... And only after several days was an inspection of the valuables held; but on this occasion no specialists were called in, and the requirements of the law were not carried out. For example, the official document indicated: 'Confiscated, 27 rings of metal of a yellow hue with stones and without stones.' With what kind of stones? Glass or natural diamonds? These questions are not idle ones. After all, the value of a ring fluctuates from several hundred rubles to several tens of thousands. Moreover, valuables confiscated from different persons were dumped into a pile, lost their identity, and were then sent to Moscow in one bag."

A question to Strukov: "Nikolay Alekseyevich, I have heard that your commission has split into two groups: one is on Gdlyan's side, and the other is opposed to him. Is there anything to such talk? You, incidentally, are considered one of Gdlyan's allies."

[Strukov] Yes, there is such an opinion (It was stated at the Congress), that I am Gdlyan's man and that I am protecting his interests. But that is far from the case. How he selects his members or agents, I do not know. My creed is—Truth. I am on the side of Truth. Whoever violates the law, that person must bear responsibility.

Nor does the talk about a schism hold water. Of course, one cannot look into the soul of every member. But judge for yourselves: an interim report was read at the Congress; it was approved and signed by all members of the commission. Naturally, during the discussion there were stormy debates, and arguments on the legal and political analysis of this or that fact or phenomenon; but we arrived at the same opinion without a fierce struggle.

[Yarin] Unfortunately, the time allotted for this conversation is coming to an end. In conclusion I would like to note that we do have something to report to all other members of the commission, and we do have something to give to the mass information media. We do not want to lay it on too thickly, but at the same time we have no intentions of protecting, saving or white-washing

anyone. We shall submit a report to the people that is objective, and carefully checked and re-checked many times.

Juridical Specialist on Crime, Co-op Activity

90UN1029A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Doctor of Legal Sciences G. F. Khokhryakov by L. Nikitinskiy: "Mafia and Myths"]

[Text] The editorial page has addressed the topic of organized crime on several occasions. Today Doctor of Legal Sciences G. F. Khokhryakov expresses yet another point of view (albeit debatable!).

[Nikitinskiy] Gennadiy Fedorovich, you became interested in organized crime as a scholar long before it became a topic of discussion in official forums. Might you not be experiencing satisfaction from the fact that this subject is now in the center of attention?

[Khokhryakov] I am happy that we are now talking about organized crime at full volume, that this issue even appeared on the agenda of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. At the same time it seems to me that the existence of organized crime in our country and its growth are being used to deliberately whip up hysteria, which is making it hard for us to determine the disease history and select the proper treatment.

In fact, in 1988-1989, and in the latter year in particular, significant growth occurred in the indicators of crime statistics. Facts, as they say, are a stubborn thing. But not so much so that they cannot be manipulated, talking some down and overemphasizing others. I am getting the impression that certain forces stand to gain from advertising growth of crime as a means of "attaining perestroika."

We have somehow forgotten all too quickly that the first years of perestroika brought us a significant decline in crime. If we adopt the "pre-perestroika" year, 1984, as 100 percent, then the criminal statistics for the following years would appear as follows: 1985—102.7 percent, 1986—97.9 percent, 1987—88.6 percent, 1988—92 percent, 1989—121 percent.

[Nikitinskiy] Every social phenomenon should have its objective causes....

[Khokhryakov] I associate with the beginning of perestroika a rebirth of hope, the advent of social optimism, a general ground swell, and as a consequence, a drop in crime in 1987 that was rather tangible, by almost 12 percent. But after that, perestroika found itself in a zone of its own stagnation, and crime reacted to it with perhaps doubled force. I explain the jump in crime not by perestroika but on the contrary by its skidding, by inconsistent and half-way reforms.

[Nikitinskiy] Besides quantitative changes, do you see any qualitative changes in crime?

[Khokhryakov] Alas. I also associate recently noticeable negative qualitative changes in the criminal milieu with a failure to meet of public expectations. First of all there is the convergence of mercenary and violent crime, where less-dangerous thefts are being supplanted by more dangerous robberies, robberies are being supplanted by violent robbery and banditry, and a qualitatively new form of professional crime is making its appearance—rackets taking on the characteristics of big business.

Second, there is the growing violence of crime. Analysis of the statistics shows that forms of crimes such as murder are growing faster than hooliganism, while a strict correlation had always been observed between them previously. This from my point of view indicates that criminal aggression is directly ascending to extreme expressions, bypassing the less dangerous stage of commonplace assault and battery.

Third and finally, crime is merging with new negative social manifestations that impart a more malevolent hue to it, and raise it once again to a new qualitative level. Such is the case with criminal aggression, which is transforming into inter-ethnic collisions.

[Nikitinskiy] Does that mean that you don't consider growth of organized crime to be one of the new manifestations?

[Khokhryakov] It is to some extent. But it came into being much earlier. In any case it would be totally wrong to view organized crime only as a new level of general criminal behavior. The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is causing precisely this sort of misconception to arise in society. In his report to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Comrade Bakatin proclaimed:

"...the MVD does not view organized crime apart from vulgar criminal behavior. Organized crime is a natural stage in its development...." Does this mean, then, that the Rashidovs, the Churbanovs and others are just "grown-up" hooligans?

In my opinion this definition, which comes from the mouth of an official executive of this rank for the first time, lacks the most important attribute. Most researchers of organized crime agree that although it has certain things in common with general criminal behavior, it is in no way a product of it; rather it is a product of the authoritarian system of the economy's and society's management, of a factor that is not at all criminal. By necessity, incompetent and obtuse methods of compulsion by other than economic means generate a vast shadow economy in the country, and organized crime is primarily a means of organizing the underground shadow market.

The legal authoritarian pyramid and the mirrored pyramid of organized crime are Siamese twins, they are vitally interested in one another. Even professional crime may do business with the authorities through

bribery, or exist with them on a parity basis: You leave us alone, and we'll leave you alone. But organized crime can no longer function separately from the authorities: They are growing together, and this is that qualitative characteristic which distinguishes organized crime from all of its other forms.

[Nikitinskiy] I do not think that I can agree with you in everything, Gennadiy Fedorovich: Other substantiated points of view exist as well.

[Khokhryakov] I insist that the position of law enforcement organs is not a misconception but a conscious political move, a deliberate shifting of accents in order to shield certain power structures, to deflect social consciousness by surreptitiously feeding it a false "image of the enemy." Recall that in his report to the Second Congress, the minister of foreign affairs supported his theses concerning organized crime with illustrations. Clear, memorable ones that literally make the hair stand on end. And all of these examples were personally associated with, of all things, the cooperative movement.

However, organized crime took form and flourished in our country during the Brezhnev era of stagnation; it even existed in embryonic form in the Stalin era, when no one had even a thought of speaking about any sort of cooperatives. And today, organized crime has penetrated into cooperatives in many ways with the active participation of the bureaucratic apparatus, which has been displaying expansionist tendencies in relation to the new market.

[Nikitinskiy] Workers of cooperatives are displacing, in the social consciousness, the "bourgeoisie" which used to frighten us in former times.

[Khokhryakov] The resisting authoritarian system has a crucial need for an image of the enemy. Only it can justify, in the social consciousness, preserving and increasing the role of the apparatus as a weapon against some monsters urging us along the path of perestroika. Consider this: The MVD is not above frightening us with the vampire cooperative worker:

"Tumultuous debates are now going on about property. The entire debate centers on the main issue—to permit private ownership of the implements of production or not. Some suggest that we should, on the basis of the premise...that anything which would make it possible to feed the people is suitable.... But there are other questions that need to be answered. Who has the so-called seed capital available to him? Are there such citizens in the USSR, who are already prepared to acquire the implements of production...? And most importantly, who are they?"

In this way we are directly led to the notion that legalizing private ownership (let me add that it has long existed illegally in the shadow economy) in any form would result in organized crime's ultimate dictatorship of society. As if a number of prominent economists have

not suggested programs in accordance with which private ownership may be achieved in the honest hands of laborers while access to it to parasitic groups would be blocked....

[Nikitinskiy] Do you believe that the objectively existing tendencies for growth of crime, and organized crime in particular, are being utilized by certain forces to inhibit the radical reforms of perestroika? Do I understand you correctly?

[Khokhryakov] Precisely so. In this sense it is not at all just the interests of the MVD that stand behind Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin's report. Similar notions have also been developed by some participants of the just recently conducted CPSU Central Committee Plenum. This position is objectively hindering radical reforms.

Moreover, consciously frightening public opinion, the law enforcement departments are preparing it to accept a number of innovations in criminal and criminal process legislation with consequences which appear extremely doubtful to me personally.

These innovations have already been formulated by the department in the form of a number of articles that are to be included in the basic law of the USSR and the union republics on the judicial system:

"In cases involving serious crimes, wire taps may be placed on the telephones of a suspect or an accused person as well as accomplices in a crime on the basis of a resolution of an investigatory organ or an examining magistrate, and only with the sanction of the procurator, given sufficient grounds for assuming that eavesdropping would provide information having important significance to the case."

"...Adoption of operational and search measures involving the use of video recordings, film, photography and sound recording, and violating the sanctity of the home and the privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraph messages, is permitted when sufficient grounds exist for assuming that a grave crime has been committed or is being prepared for, and only with the sanction of the procurator."

[Nikitinskiy] What precisely do you object to?

[Khokhryakov] First of all the fuzziness of the concepts in the proposed amendments raises my concern. The cited passages are abundant with subjective wordings that untie the hands of the individual making a decision: "sufficient grounds for assuming that," "important significance to the case" and so on. The concept "accomplices in a crime," which was previously unknown in the law of criminal proceedings and which is totally unclear, is introduced. Who are these people? Finally, organized crime, for the fight against which all of this is supposedly being undertaken, has been completely deleted. Its place has been taken in the wordings of the articles by "grave crimes," which defines perhaps two-thirds of the crimes in the criminal code.

Thus "when sufficient grounds exist for assuming" that a grave crime is only just being prepared for, actions "violating the sanctity of the home and the privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraph messages" may be carried out practically arbitrarily even before the beginning of an investigation, prior to inception of a criminal case.

Those in favor of the procedural innovations love to cite the experience of Western democracies, in which all of this is actually done. The argument is outwardly very effective, but it does contain a cunning trap of omission.

It was very fashionable in our country's past, and today as well, to reproach the USA for the fact that eavesdropping, tailing and so on are allowed there. But for some reason they forget to remind us that any citizen of the USA has a right to demand to personally see any file initiated on himself by any organ maintaining such a file. Please do as you wish, go ahead and listen to my conversations in accordance with the law, but at least let me fill in the context of the recordings—I want to make sure that nothing has been misrepresented there. And if you have done this illegally, then not only do you have a scandal of political scale to contend with, but also your efforts from the standpoint of judicial proceedings are totally useless, since you cannot use the recordings as evidence.

But do we have such rules and guarantees in our country? The system of justice in the West is entirely different: In distinction from our system, which traditionally defends the state first, it protects the rights of the individual. I am not against borrowing from useful experience. But in this case let's at least borrow it in its entirety, and not arbitrarily and selectively.

[Nikitinskiy] In conclusion I would like to know what your program will be if you are elected people's deputy of the RSFSR.

[Khokhryakov] I will fight for reform of criminal justice directed at democratizing our judicial system. Legal scholars have drafted such a reform in its entirety. As far as organized crime is concerned, radical economic reform, and a legal market created by it in place of the black market, must displace the latter to the periphery of social life—the only place it can exist in a civilized country.

Georgian MVD Evaluates 1989 Performance

90US0609A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Feb 90 p 3

[GRUZINFORM dispatch: "Collegium Evaluates Georgian MVD"]

[Text] The collegium of the Georgian SSR MVD has held an expanded session. The session examined the operational situation within the republic, summed up the activities of internal affairs organs and their subunits during 1989, and set tasks for organizing an uncompromising struggle against crime during the current year.

A report by Georgian SSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs V. Shaduri and the addresses noted that the past year turned out to be a complicated and extremely tense one. The tragic April events in Tbilisi and interethnic conflicts in the rayons of Nizhnyaya Kartla, the Abkhaz ASSR, and the South Osetin Autonomous Oblast created a difficult social and political situation within the republic. The situation was aggravated as well by the activities of various informal associations. Mass meetings, strikes and other actions became common.

In a word, militia organs were forced to work in complex, extreme conditions and, on the whole, they passed this test, although certain local organs and their directors became confused in an unaccustomed situation and were unable to display decisiveness. Such confusion, and in a number of cases also passivity, was manifested during incidents in the Abkhaz ASSR and rayons of West Georgia, when attacks were made on a number of city and rayon internal affairs departments with the aim of seizing weapons. Unfortunately, there were also cases of perfidy on the part of militia workers who now have been subjected to administrative and criminal penalties. Directorate of Internal Affairs (UVD) organs in the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast also did not act entirely correctly when members of the "Adamon Nykhas" organization carried out an illegal action. A absolutely scandalous incident was uncovered in November of last year. In the village of Tamarasheni, a precinct inspector at the Tskhinvali city department of internal affairs (GOVD), Senior Lieutenant G. Kochiyev, was detained and arrested. A rifle and shells and two hand grenades, one of them homemade, were confiscated from his automobile. For whom were these weapons intended? Why did the leadership of the directorate not know about this? These questions were justly asked at the session.

The MVD leadership has no intention of punishing people groundlessly for mistakes, but everyone who has waived his honor and conscience and his professional obligations is being called to strict administrative account.

The stormy and sometimes dramatic processes that are accompanying perestroika are creating qualitatively new conditions for law enforcement activities. And today, as never before, we are faced with acute problems of the strictest observance by MVD cadres of discipline, socialist legality, and requirements the Rules. During the past year, 96 employees were punished for violations of socialist legality. There are cases of unjustified use of weapons, of impermissible contacts with prisoners, of physical force, and others. Instances among personnel of drunkenness, failure to appear for work, negligence, and loss of documents are not infrequent.

Instances of death and injury to militia workers in the course of carrying out their official obligations have recently become more frequent. Study of cases has shown that it would have been possible to avoid these

sacrifices if operational plans had been correctly worked out and if various circumstances had been foreseen and taken into account.

In connection with the fact that militia workers are constantly being diverted for the protection of public order in rayons where interethnic conflicts are occurring, there has been a marked decline in the heat of the battle against crime. During the past 10-15 years, there has not been such an increase in crimes against the person as now. During the past year, 297 murders and 202 attempted murders were committed—this is 40 percent more than during the preceding year.

The level of educational and prophylactic work among the population by local party, soviet, and law enforcement organs is extremely low, particularly on the part of precinct inspectors. They must visit labor collectives and educational institutions more often and must be in the possession of information about the moral and ethical climate within their rayons.

The ministry has been disturbed by the growing level of criminal violations involving personal and state property, which militia organs frequently learn about only after crimes have been committed. It happens that they delay in responding to reports from citizens and incidents even occur when cases of embezzlement are being concealed from state accounting.

The situation on the republic's roadways, as before, is a source of serious alarm. The number of road and transportation accidents has increased, which is explained by a decline of discipline on the part of the driver staff and those on foot.

There has been a verified decline in OBKhSS [department for Combatting Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] work results, especially in the periphery. As a result, there are still many incidents of bribery, of deriving non-labor earnings, and of malpractice within cooperatives. And, in their reports, some OBKhSS workers are drawing a picture of stability.

Participants in the Collegium session also touched on the sharp and current topic of the activities of the informal associations. These movements cannot be ignored and they enjoy the support of a certain part of the population. Here too, the only correct tactic is patient dialogue and wise compromises. In a number of specific cases, success was achieved in reaching mutual understanding. But, in this work, a great deal of support is necessary from local party and soviet organs.

With the goal of eliminating existing shortcomings in the operational and office work of the republic MVD, the collegium demanded that the heads of directorates, organs, and subunits take a more active stance in the solution of law enforcement problems, while placing primary reliance on the prevention of law violations and while ensuring a radical restructuring of all services.

It is necessary to learn to work under conditions of increased democracy and expanded glasnost, to rely on the trust and support of the people, to overcome formalism, bureaucratism, and red tape. New forms and methods of prophylactic work should be used to increase the effectiveness of the struggle against crime in the economic area. It is important to analyze crimes against the person that are committed within the family and everyday situation, to activate the struggle against property crimes, to intensify realization of a complex of measures aimed at combatting crime among juveniles, and to improve work to maintain public order within the republic's rayons and cities.

Minister of Internal Affairs Sh. Gorgodze summed up the results of the session. O. Gonadze, director of the state legal department of the Georgian CP Central Committee, took part in the session.

Latvian MVD Official on Foreign Travel, Emigration Regulations

90UN1095A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Anton Yanovich Baltatsis, head of Latvian MVD Visa and Registration Department (OVIR), conducted by V. Varlamov, SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA correspondent: "Interview at Your Request: How To Travel Abroad"]

[Text] *All restrictions on travel by Soviet citizens to other countries will finally be lifted when a USSR Supreme Soviet session passes special legislation to that effect. In practice, any Soviet citizen will be able to go abroad for various periods of time without any invitation whatsoever, after first coming to the MVD OVIR [Visa and Registration Department] and filling out a simple form, indicating the country of destination and the person's employment over the past 15 years (in order to establish that his or her employment did not involve access to secret information). And not just to visit, but also to study and to work. There will be no hindrances on the part of our authorities. All the rest will depend on what the consular services of other states decide.*

A formal invitation will be required only for permanent residence in a foreign country, but the invitation may be received from any resident of that country, not just from a relative.

As is well known, all work connected with entry and exit documentation is done by the MVD and MFA of the USSR and the union republics. The former deals with private trips, the latter with trips on official business.

The Latvian SSR MVD OVIR is headed by A. Baltatsis. Our correspondent asked him to answer a number of questions which are of interest to SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA readers.

[Correspondent] Anton Yanovich, do you have any comparative figures on the tendency toward greater

travel abroad from our republic by various categories of citizens following the removal of many of the familiar restrictions?

[Baltatsis] Just two years ago we handled the paperwork on trips to capitalist countries for just 1,324 individuals, yet last year this figure rose by a factor of 10, to 16,000. The corresponding figures for socialist countries are 3,648 and 14,000. Last year over 3,000 people received permission to take up permanent residence in other countries, primarily capitalist countries.

[Correspondent] In practical terms, what should citizens who wish to take a private trip to another country, as well as those who wish to take up permanent residence abroad, do until the new law is passed?

[Baltatsis] In order to leave the country to take up permanent residence in a capitalist country it is necessary to have an invitation from close relatives, with family reunification as the grounds. (Emigration to the State of Israel is an exception to this rule. In order to obtain permission to emigrate to that country it is sufficient to show us an invitation from a relative living there.) In addition, members of various non-traditional religious organizations (this includes the sectarian Baptists, Pentecostals, *molokane*, Seventh-Day Adventists and others) can receive permission to emigrate to capitalist countries if they have an invitation from fellow believers.

In order to visit a capitalist country it is sufficient to have an invitation from any person living in that country.

According to regulations we should consider requests for exit visas within one month. However, in practice this time period extends in the majority of cases to one-and-a-half or two months, and in certain cases up to six months; provision is also made for this in the regulations.

The procedure for obtaining an exit visa for a visit has been simplified. In a questionnaire which is now one page long instead of four pages as before the only sections which must be filled out are those indicating the individual to be visited by the Soviet citizen, and a transcript of the past 15 years of the citizen's work record. Any employee of the personnel department or any other official can verify the work record. If an individual does not work he brings us his work book or pension book, and we verify what he wrote on the questionnaire ourselves. No decision by the troika—administration, party committee and trade union committee—is required.

[Correspondent] How long does your permission remain valid, and for what length of time is a foreign passport issued?

[Baltatsis] After receiving his documents a person can leave within a period of up to six months. But at the present time there are problems getting tickets, having currency

exchanged and obtaining visas from the consulates of various states. In view of this we can extend our permission. All foreign passports are issued for a period of five years and remain with the person to whom they are issued. We used to take the Soviet passport as security before the trip and then issued the foreign passport. Now we no longer do that. But one still has to go through the entire procedure each time one receives an exit visa.

You can go to Rigas Ekspresis to have an invitation translated into Russian; it is located at 25 Kr. Baron Street. We do not take the original copy of the invitation in any case. The citizen presents it upon application for a visa from a foreign consulate, and can also use it while abroad.

We permit visits abroad for a period of up to six months, no more. If someone wishes to go abroad for a long period of time then the case is handled like a request for permanent residence. If a person wants to stay longer once he or she is already abroad, then that person must contact the Soviet consulate there and reach agreement on a length of stay. It is possible to stay for a year or two years in this manner.

[Correspondent] Everything you have said pertains to trips to capitalist countries. What about trips to socialist countries?

[Baltatsis] The procedure is much simpler. Most trips to socialist countries can be made without a visa. An invitation on the appropriate official form is substituted for a visa. The same procedure is also followed for trips to West Berlin, since there are not any embassies or consulates there. The situation in regard to trips to Yugoslavia is different: a visa is required to go there. Generally speaking it should be noted that due to the introduction of restrictions on the export of goods by a number of socialist countries there has been something of a boom in travel to Yugoslavia. And the interesting thing is that the same individuals are inviting hundreds of our citizens to visit them. And the goods which those citizens take with them to Yugoslavia are in short supply in our country. But whereas it is to our advantage to have high-quality consumer goods from Yugoslavia introduced into our market, the fact that our tourists, who have a limited amount of hard currency, are taking large quantities of hard-to-find items with them—high-quality food products or electrical items—does not make us very happy. Customs agents, both here and in Yugoslavia, simply pretend not to notice. Things have gotten to the point where ready-made invitations are being brought in from Yugoslavia with a notary seal and signature already attached; all one needs to do is fill in the name of a Soviet citizen. Those who sell these invitations do not do it for free. Furthermore, there is no way of being sure that those are genuine signatures or seals. So we have begun declaring invitations of this nature invalid.

[Correspondent] Must a health certificate be presented in addition to the documents you have already mentioned?

[Baltatsis] No health certificate is required. However, persons travelling to Africa, South America and Southeast

Asia must get proof that they have been vaccinated for typhoid, yellow fever and other illnesses, depending on which country they intend to visit. And the vaccinations must be taken at least 10 days before arrival in the destination country. If they are taken any later than that an exit visa may not be issued. There is no AIDS testing in connection with exit visas. But one must be tested for AIDS upon return if one has lived in a foreign country for more than a month.

[Correspondent] Tell us about foreign tourism by motor vehicle.

[Baltatsis] Private trips may be taken to any country in the world by motor vehicle. After receiving exit visas from us one must then apply to the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate. There one pays a tax and the vehicle to be taken is inspected. Consideration is also given to how many traffic violations the driver has. Travel abroad in a borrowed automobile is not permitted.

There are many automobile tourists despite the high price of gasoline. The reason for that is that in the West public transportation is very expensive. One could spend all one's hard currency just on transportation. But in an automobile tourists can get around much more easily, and it is less expensive. When traveling by motor vehicle tourists file at the same time for permission to visit several countries, even though transit through other countries en route to the country of destination is permitted.

[Correspondent] What specific changes are planned under the new legislation on entry and exit procedures?

[Baltatsis] There are plans to eliminate the 500-ruble fee collected from Soviet citizens taking up permanent residence in Israel, as well as to repeal the 1967 ukase depriving them of their Soviet passports upon departure. A person would be able to leave and return at will.

One important point in the new legislation is the matter of foreign travel by Soviet citizens in the event that relatives remaining behind in the Soviet Union do not consent to their departure. As you are aware, in our country relatives have a responsibility to support other members of their family. However, in many cases this practice is often at odds with real-life situations. If relatives have long since lost contact and are as such purely nominal relatives (for instance, if one member of a divorced couple did not permit their child to travel abroad, even though that person had not contributed to the child's upbringing for a long time), then the person wishing to leave the USSR has a right to sue. The court will decide suits of this nature within the framework of alimony obligations, which are spelled out quite clearly in the law.

And another thing: under the new regulations no invitation will be required for Soviet citizens to travel abroad for a limited period of time. If a person wishes to take up permanent residence abroad it will be necessary to have an

invitation from any individual who is a permanent resident of the country in question.

People will also be permitted to go abroad to work and to study. The length of time to be spent abroad on personal business, including business connected with professional activities, is specified by the traveler at the time he or she submits a visa application. This time period can be extended by a USSR diplomatic representation or consular facility at the traveler's request. But I assume that foreign customs will require that some guarantee be provided that the Soviet citizen in question has a job. I believe that after the new law is passed Western countries themselves will place restrictions on entry by Soviet citizens. They will check carefully to ensure that people who are merely seeking an easy living do not slip in, and also to keep out lawbreakers and criminals. It is likely that we will also be able to perform this sort of monitoring when we fill out exit and entry documents.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview.

Kharkov Corruption Investigation Described

90UN0869A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90
Morning Edition p 2

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondent A. Kleva: "An Especially Great 'Service'"]

[Text] Several central newspapers recently simultaneously published a report entitled, "In the USSR Procuracy." It was stated in this laconic sketch that the investigation of a large group of embezzlers and bribe-takers that had been operating in Kharkov for a long time, had been completed. More than 100 officials were handed over to the courts in this case. They included the pro-vice-chancellor of the institute of law, 16 internal affairs workers, and others. And there is more: Investigators from the procuracy took from the accused "money, gold articles, and other valuable obtained by criminal means, to the value of almost R6 million."

In order to clarify these details our correspondent in Kharkov met with workers in the local law enforcement agencies. This is what they said.

It is difficult to call this report a sensation just of these days, says the oblast procurator, G. Kozhevnikov. It started way back on 28 August 1986 when the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy opened a criminal case concerning the embezzlement of particularly large amounts of state property and bribe-taking within the system of personal services for the population of the Kharkov area. This had been preceded by painstaking work by the KGB organs in the oblast: The Chekists had for a year been studying currency and contraband deals by smart dealers in the spheres of personal services and law enforcement agencies and protection from highly placed officials. It was the KGB that established that at a number of factories that do custom tailoring work and mend clothing criminal groups were operating, producing goods "on the

side" from fabrics and selling the clothing in various parts of the country and converting the revenue into foreign currency.

"The underground syndicate flourished for three years thanks not only to the bribery of the leadership controlling the activity of the services; lawyers, militia workers and party functionaries were also in the conspiracy," says the leader of the Ukrainian Procuracy investigating group for especially important cases, V. Pavlov. "And so at that stage the KGB handed the case over for further investigation... A total of 37 experts from the procuracy and the oblast KGB were involved in the work."

Knowing that protection money was being paid at the highest levels, even as high as the chief controller of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Finance Control-and-Auditing Administration for Kharkov Oblast, L. Boyko, the criminals operated openly. As a result, it was relatively easy for the investigating group to open more than 40 criminal cases, in which about 60 people were convicted. The last of these cases were dealt with in 1987, and this was seen in the written appeal from the

leader V. Pavlov to the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs requesting some reward for workers in the Ukrainian Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation who had distinguished themselves in the search for the thieves and the recovery of valuables and money.

"So what is the reason for the report from the USSR Procuracy?"

"It is obviously the following fact. A month ago the republic procuracy passed a criminal case to the oblast court for review, concerning the main group of 18 embezzlers led by the main dealer in the syndicate."

In the Kharkov procuracy they reported the following to your correspondent: Investigators recovered valuables and money to the tune of R1.8 million from those convicted. And another important "detail." Among those convicted was the former senior investigator for especially important cases, the Kharkov procurator, I. Vragov. He was sentenced to nine years.

Armenian Newspaper Scores TASS Reportage of 28 Jan Yerevan Events

90US0583A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
6 Feb 90 p 6

[TASS report and editorial response: "Who Understands Legality and How: Concerning a Certain Published Article"]

[Text] The following TASS report was published in the 2 February 1990 issue of *IZVESTIYA*.

As was already reported, on 28 January in Yerevan a Soviet Army subdivision confiscated the following items that had been previously seized by extremists: a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle, an armored personnel carrier, an eight caterpillar-tread and wheeled vehicles, and three antihail guns. On 30 January the *KOMMUNIST* newspaper, the organ of the Armenian CP Central Committee, the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, published a report entitled "In the Republic's Emergency-Situation Council." That report states, in particular, that a session of the Republic's Emergency-Situation Council was held on 29 January, and that session had considered the incident that had occurred on 28 January in Yerevan, in Rayon imeni 26 Komissarov. The report went on to state that it had been noted that, without coordination with the appropriate republic agencies of state authority, a military subdivision had carried out the operation to confiscate the military equipment. Weapons had been used in the course of the operation, and that had led to the death of E. A. Markosyan, a worker at the Astro PO [Production Association].

"The republic's procuracy," the report stated, "has initiated a criminal case and, jointly with the military procuracy, has begun an investigation... The republic's leadership decisively censures this irresponsible act and asserts its own unchanging position, that all questions, including questions of the confiscation of weapons, must be resolved primarily by means of persuasion, by serious explanatory work among the population, with the strict observance of legality..."

In this instance the logic of the interpretation of Soviet laws seems to be at least strange. It is not the illegal retention of weapons, much less the seizure of combat equipment, that is criminal in and of itself, but there are a few people in Armenia who are ready to declare that the confiscation of that equipment is an irresponsible act. The reason for initiating the criminal case was not the seizure of the combat and other military equipment. The criminal case appeared only when it had proven necessary to employ force to return the weapons that had turned up in the hands of the extremist elements.

May one ask whether people at the republic procuracy consider to be legal, for example, the fact that all the infantry fighting vehicles that were being used at the Military Department of Yerevan State University for educational purposes were driven away? Or the seizure

of an anti-aircraft gun at the Military Department of Yerevan Polytechnical Institute? And how do the numerous instances of attacks upon military subdivisions, the militia, and the militarized guard in Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR for the purpose of seizing weapons conform to the law? The weapons in the hands of extremist groups in the region currently number in the thousands.

In the trans-Caucasus one continues to hear shots being fired from weapons in the hands of extremist, terrorist elements. As a result, people are dying. It is precisely for that reason that it has been necessary to resort to the army's assistance in confiscating the weapons from the extremists. Soviet fighting men, executing their duty, are doing everything possible to stabilize the situation as quickly as possible, and to bring peace and calm to this land. Frequently they risk their own lives, walk along under a hail of bullets, and suffer casualties. Armed resistance against them occurred also on 28 January in Yerevan. They were forced to open up return fire. So it was not their fault that one of those who had been the first to employ weapons was killed.

While expressing regret concerning the death of a human being, one cannot fail at the same time to emphasize that this tragedy also, it would seem, has not taught anything to the nationalistically minded leaders of the informal associations.

Editorial note: Please Allow Us to Disagree

During the past two years the Armenian public has repeatedly expressed its indignation concerning the anonymous reports in the press, which have made it impossible to hold accountable any specific person for having given false information.

It has been emphasized repeatedly at the highest level that one of the most important aspects of creating a socialist law-governed state is the fight against anonymous reports, regardless of the agency from which they originate. However, the facts bear witness that the vicious practice of writing these anonymous reports has not been eliminated.

Quite recently, on the "7 Days" program, a false report was broadcast on the basis of a TASS report without any indication of a specific correspondent. That false report stated that the Kurds are being persecuted by the Armenians and it mentioned the hostile attitude of the republic's population to the Soviet Army.

Then, on 2 February 1990 *IZVESTIYA* printed a TASS report in which there was deliberate distortion of the actual situation, actually in an attempt to justify the arbitrariness and illegality of definite officials. The anonymous TASS correspondent had brought to his attention by agencies of Armenian SSR Procuracy the fact that, from 14 through 28 January, 104 criminal cases had been initiated on the basis of thefts of weapons from ROVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Departments], VOKhR [Militarized Guard], military units, and other entities,

and it was improper to assert without any substantiation that "the reason for initiating the criminal case was not the seizure of the combat and other military equipment. The criminal case appeared only when it had proven necessary to employ force to return the weapons that had turned up in the hands of the extremist elements."

It might be a good thing for the anonymous TASS correspondent to know that one should not achieve legal goals by illegal means. Armenian SSR is a sovereign state, and no one is allowed to organize on the territory of the republic any actions without informing the legal agencies of state authority. For some reasons the authors of the reports were not surprised by the fact that the appropriate military subdivisions did not open fire, although they had the full right to do so, when their weapons were being seized from them.

The criminal case initiated with regard to the death of citizen E. A. Markosyan, lathe operator at the Astro Production Association and father of three children, is in the stage of preliminary investigation and no one, including TASS, is allowed on the pages of the press to give his own subjective interpretations of the materials in the preliminary investigation.

One need only open the USSR Constitution and read Article 160, which firmly establishes the principle of the presumption of innocence for the citizens of the socialist state. It would also be worthwhile for the correspondent to know that E. A. Markosyan was killed at a distance of more than 200 meters from the scene of the incident.

The Armenian SSR Procuracy, jointly with other law-enforcement, as well as party and soviet agencies, and public organizations and formations, is conducting purposeful work to assure the voluntary return of ammunition and explosives, and to reveal the crimes that were committed. If the author of the report could find the time to drop in at the republic's procuracy, he would have the opportunity to acquaint himself with the results of this work, as a consequence of which a considerable amount of weapons and ammunition have already been voluntarily returned.

It seems to us that an article of this kind has two purposes:

1. To create at all costs an **artificial parity** between the pogroms and murders of Armenians and other instances of vandalism in the city of Baku, and the destruction of the USSR State Border with Iran for its entire length, which is completely obvious from the numerous items published in the same IZVESTIYA newspaper, with the situation in Armenian SSR.

2. To create artificially strained relations between the fighting men of the Soviet Army, the USSR MVD internal troops, and the Armenian nation, which has always been distinguished by exceptional goodwill toward the Soviet Army.

Armenian Writer Condemns Central Press Coverage of Caucasus Crisis

90US0583B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST in Russian*
7 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Zoriy Balayan: "Parity Games"]

[Text] As everyone knows, perestroika has evoked from the lexical archives a large number of forgotten and half-forgotten words and terms, making them popular and fashionable. Alternative and rotation, pluralism and stagnation, populism and emission. I am taking that which lies today on the surface. But probably the word that can be considered most fashionable, especially in our region, is "parity." Reborn in the 1970's, when it suddenly became clear that with regard to the quantity and quality of the armaments between the West and the East there was no observance of balance—that is, parity—that word acquired new force as a result of the events that developed "around Karabakh."

Parity. Dictionaries define it as equivalency, the correlation between currencies and gold; equality; equal relationship; identical situation. It would seem that everything is completely clear and understandable. Most frequently the term was used in financial matters. A phrase that became very widespread was "monetary parity"—parity based on the amount of pure gold contained in monetary units. But today this term has become especially popular in censorship, against which, it would seem, perestroika is fighting. We now see a certain way of illuminating the events, as it is already the general practice to say, in the trans-Caucasus, and to implement this, so to speak, on parity principles. So, if suddenly today the mass media have received a certain objective report that is not to the liking of any of the sides, then tomorrow, at all costs, it is necessary to "locate" and provide to the population a "corresponding" other report, but now one that is to the liking of some other side. If they have not been able to "locate" it, they can apparently wait for it. They can remain silent for a certain period of time. Maybe something will happen. If it doesn't happen, you can provoke it. And if, in general, it is a bit difficult to deal with "facts," then one can, on parity principles, apply to one another even such a philosophical category as time, or, rather, time intervals. The Vremya program shows frames of refugee Armenians arriving in Yerevan in Baku. But, in order, all of a sudden, not to disturb the notorious parity principle, Vremya, disdaining elementary ethical norms and journalistic canons, immediately shows film footage that is almost a year and a half old, showing refugee Azerbaijanis. We are very well acquainted with those frames, that were photographed on a snowy December day after the earthquake in Shirak, when Azerbaijanis whose homes had been destroyed made their way in groups to the helicopter pads and highways. They left Gugarka and the Ararat Valley in November 1988, when there was neither snow on the ground or a snowstorm. But the crux of the matter is not in these relatively unimportant or even very fundamental details. The crux of the matter is that at that very time the genocide of Armenians was being carried out in Kirovabad and in Dashkesandskiy, Khanlarskiy, and Shamkhorskiy rayons. During that time the entire population of the

ancient Armenian village of Chardakhlu was forcibly deported, and this time we shall not speak of the historic merits of that famous village. At that time, in response to appeals issued by Vezirov, pogroms were in progress in Baku. And suddenly we see frames about those days and only about how a group of Azerbaijanis were being resettled from the calamity zone. In the mind of the "average Russian" and "average Soviet" television viewer there was certainly created the impression that today, in those cold February days, the refugee Armenians and the refugee Azerbaijanis are traveling in different directions. They are traveling in different direction on... parity principles.

The State Border has been ruined and destroyed. The Soviet authority has been overthrown in a number of rayons in Azerbaijan, where people have seized not only the archives, but also weapons. It has been admitted in the press that, essentially speaking, the Azerbaijan People's Front is the republic's leaders, it is "their own" militia. It is, of course, all the authorized weapons that are located in the republic's arsenal. And the world knows very well where the muzzles of those weapons are aimed. However, after all this Defense Minister D. T. Yazov, in his interview, in which he said that weapons that were taken away from the authorities are being kept illegally in the region, asserted: most of the weapons have been accumulated in Armenia. One would like to say, then, that the minister himself has now disturbed the parity. In order to maintain the balance that had been established from the top, it would have been possible at least to state that both sides have an identical number of weapons. At least the parity concerning parity would have been observed.

Today I have been reading the supplement to SOVETSKAYA MILITSIYA magazine—"The Shield and the Sword." I definitely have no intentions of reviewing the libelous publication. God can be the judge of the author and the editor. But I would like to write about parity. The publication "The Shield and the Sword" also contains parity that has been presented in a substantive form. It states, "For a soldier's head in a spotted beret, 25,000 rubles; for an officer's head, 50,000 rubles"—the Armenian People's Front announces in its leaflets. Similar threats are made on the part of the Azerbaijanis." Once again the parity has been disturbed. The supplement to SOVETSKAYA MILITSIYA disturbs the way in which parity is set up. It should not do that. On the basis of parity, it should have also mentioned the figures that define the value of the "spotted berets" "on the part of the Azerbaijanis." As for the specific figures, to be perfectly honest one can say the following: "The Shield and the Sword" did not make any mistake. The press has already publicized those monstrous figures. And this was mentioned from the rostrum of the 19th Plenum of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee. "We are alarmed by the growing aggressiveness with respect to military personnel. For example: For the head of Lieutenant Igor Semin, platoon commander in a subdivision of special-purpose 'spotted berets,' Azerbaijani extremists will pay 50,000 rubles. This is mentioned in open text and in shouts from the crowd. In posters and in memoranda." This is a quote from a statement made by Captain S. Demidedenko at the

Komsomol plenum. It was also mentioned in the Latvian newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH a week before the genocide, pogroms, and vandalism began in Baku. As you can see, it is no easy task to observe parity for the sake of parity. Truthfully speaking, I would like to be ironic. Because what we are dealing with is obvious provocation, which must be judged according to today's standards. And the guilty individuals must answer completely to the law. And, first of all, they must answer the question: "how many military personnel were killed in Azerbaijan SSR and Armenia?"

Recently IZVESTIYA answered that question. Strictly observing the principle of parity, the newspaper informs the readers that, in both republics, murders are being committed. How is this done? I would like to cite this quotation: "According to official information, as of 3 February 1990 the number of military personnel and civilians who suffered in Azerbaijan SSR and Armenia during the state of emergency is: killed, 148 persons; injured, 503 persons." One hundred forty-eight persons died. Consequently, 148 mothers are mourning today. Their grief is unconsolable. There is a tragedy in 148 families. And today I think about how, having read the newspaper, 148 mothers will probably think: the blame lies equally on the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis, since the report cites the monstrous 'estimate' in the two republics together. And, expressing profound sympathy, I hasten to report to the mothers who have been killed by grief that neither on the territory of Armenian SSR, nor on the territory of Armenian Karabakh, not only during the state of emergency, nor during the entire period of the Karabakh movement, was a single serviceman killed. Without exception, all 148 were killed in Azerbaijan SSR. And these are actually official information that was issued officially by G. A. Galoyan, secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, and by army commander General-Major N. P. Pishchev, to USSR Ministry of Defense.

There is just one thing left for us to do: to serve the truth, which, as everyone knows, is concrete. We must think effectively about the people who are suffering. About the fate of the Homeland, which—if you will forgive me for using the fashionable word—does not have an alternative. We must think and remember that no provocations, no "parity games," no disinformation will cause us to lose patience. Wisdom will not betray us. Effective, combative wisdom.

Latvian CP Plans Changes in Structure, Output of Official Publications

90US0462A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
5 Jan 90 p 1

[Latinform report: "At the Latvian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The Buro of the Latvian CP Central Committee at its first session this year examined certain questions of restructuring the operations of the Izdatelstvo of the Latvian CP Central Committee.

In the course of the discussion it was emphasized that the mass information media play an important role in the processes of restructuring social life, in establishing a spirit of glasnost, openness and justness in all spheres. At the same time, under the conditions of a real political struggle, the party press is experiencing growing competitiveness from the publications of the other sociopolitical organizations, often being put deliberately under less favorable conditions than certain leading publications of these organizations.

For broadening the independence of the editors in their financial and economic activities and for increasing the interest of the press workers in the results of their labors, beginning in 1990, the editors of all newspapers and magazines in the republic are to be given the right independently to determine the structure and staffs within the limits of the established unified wage fund. This fund is to be formed out of the wage fund of the editorial workers, the money of the editorial fund as well as, when necessary, that portion of the royalties fund which is assigned for payments to regular employees.

Permission has also been given to establish bonuses for highly-qualified specialists and workers of the newspapers and journalists and who have a mastery of foreign languages and employ them daily in their practical work, additional payments for combining professions (positions) and increasing the amount of work performed as well as introduce piece or other progressive wage forms.

There is also permission to pay under labor agreements for the services of editorial consultants (on the questions of economics, law, science, technology, culture and so forth) out of the unified wage fund.

In line with the increased demand for advertising, permission has been granted for the newspapers and journals to employ contractual prices for publishing informative advertising materials (in addition to announcements of the citizens), but these should not be lower than the set rates.

The Izdatelstvo of the Latvian CP Central Committee and the Izdatelstvo Avize are permitted to establish direct ties with foreign firms and earn foreign exchange for the exporting of newspapers and magazines with the assigning of a portion of the receipts to the editors of these publications.

In accord with the USSR Law on the Economic Independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the decision has been taken prior to March of the current year to work out an overall plan for the operations of the Izdatelstvo of the Latvian CP Central Committee and an economic model for the relations of the Izdatelstvo with the editors and provision has been made for an opportunity to conclude bilateral contracts which would regulate their production and financial activities.

A decision has been taken to prepare prior to 1 April of this year and introduce for review a draft of the new

selling prices of the republic and local newspapers and magazines as well as the new subscription rates for them.

The decision was adopted of the Izdatelstvo of the Latvian CP Central Committee and the CP Ideological Department that beginning in March 1990, publishing is to be halted on the Sunday editions of the republic party newspapers, publishing them in a double size on Saturday.

Supreme Soviet Member Lunev Comments on Draft Press Law

90US0462B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with V.A. Lunev, people's deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet by A. Golovenko, PRAVDA Correspondent, special to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA: "Both Freedom and Responsibility"]

[Text] We have asked the People's Deputy and Member of the USSR Supreme Soviet V.A. Lunev to voice his opinion over the question of the draft Law Governing the Press and Other Mass Information Media.

[Correspondent] Viktor Andreyevich, in listening to certain speakers in Parliament, one might think that the Law Governing the Press and Other Mass Information Media is not very essential for us.

[Lunev] That is not the case. Since the very beginning of perestroika, discussions have been underway on the need for a Press Law. On the one hand, everyone realizes that the press even in the 5th year of perestroika has not escaped from a diktat and various interference into editorial life and, on the other, at present more and more one feels that the newspapers, radio and TV are becoming a sort of patrimony of certain groups of people who voice everything that comes into their minds. At times, there are even things which are simply incompatible with the calling of a communist.

[Correspondent] Would the draft Press Law place a barrier in front of such factionalism?

[Lunev] It seems that it may not. Let us take the first article. This proclaims freedom of press. That has a fine ring. And immediately the questions start: Freedom from what? From responsibility for what one has said? What sort of "free expression of opinions" is meant? What is going to happen with state secrets? Someone might say to me that if the currently existing Glavlit [the sensor] feels that information containing state secrets is being publicized, it can resort to the court. What could be more insipid than such an argument? First we give away our secrets and then get tied up in the courts for years?

Or then I, for example, cannot understand how cases will be initiated on the revealing of secrets or instigating the overthrow of the existing system or everything that is prohibited by Article 5 in the draft. In the text I read that the procurator will initiate this. Does this mean that he should have the corresponding staff who will listen to

and view all the information coming out? Are the law enforcement bodies ready for this? The publications of a purely anti-Soviet stripe which at present are sold freely on Pushkin Square show that no, they are not ready.

I would like to point out a key view of mine and that is that certain forces at present are interested in returning our nation to a capitalist path of development and to involve it in the morass of anarchy. For this they are carrying out careful working over of both the mass information media as well as individual journalists.

[Correspondent] Let us go back to the draft. Articles 6 and 7 introduce a free procedure for registering mass information media. Anyone can run his own newspaper including organizations, institutions and citizens of the USSR if they have the paper and the equipment. Is this a guarantee for the free expression of opinions?

[Lunev] Here, in my opinion, the same error has been made as in the Law Governing Cooperatives: the free procedure for registering cooperatives has led to their complete lack of control and in order to eliminate this anarchy we have had at the second session of the Supreme Soviet to adopt a number of corrections.

What will happen if these articles in the draft are carried out with such wording? Where are the new founders of newspapers to secure paper? In their request they are freed from indicating a source. But certainly the existing newspapers also lack paper and there is not enough for children's literature and for notebooks. And probably the new publishers will take it from the others.

Furthermore, what sort of Soviet citizens can become the founders of newspapers, magazines or radio and TV editors? Underground millionaires like Koreyko or legal millionaires from the cooperatives? What ideas will they foster in the masses? Will they depict the attractions of the free entrepreneurship and the Western way of life?

Will they favor increased prices and a freezing of wages? Will they favor the selling of national wealth even including our gold reserves? Thank you, the workers are already fed up with these appeals.

[Correspondent] As a journalist, I was amazed that the draft completely skirts the problem of the effectiveness of the articles. Who is to answer for criticism and at what time?

[Lunev] I agree with such a posing of the question. Only an effective and constructive response to critical materials can get one or another question moving. Moreover, at present large masses of the "humiliated and insulted" come to us, the deputies, and to the newspapers as a last resort. Who will respond to actions in defense of such persons? Will there not be the classic "the writer writes a bit and the bureaucrat reads a bit?"

[Correspondent] Since we have touched on the question of effectiveness, we must also not avoid a discussion of the role of the party committees. Certainly, we often expect a response precisely from them, in criticizing, for instance, the actions of one or another communist.

[Lunev] The question of effectiveness, of the creative role of the press is one of the key, most important ones. But it is certainly not only the legislators who must resolve it....

As a whole, I would like to say that the USSR Supreme Soviet must take a very thoughtful approach to the "final polishing" and adoption of the Press Law and guarantee consideration of all the effective comments and proposals heard in the course of the discussion. Certainly the newspapers, radio and television not only "provide information" but also actively influence our minds. What all of us will be and all our society depends upon what sort of information media there will be. And we must assume socialist and communist stances.

22161

59

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD

SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication containing the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.